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Abstract
 
This PhD thesis studies how natural renewable resources and institutions governing those re-
sources mutually influence each other. Theoretical models are developed in which members of a 
small community have joint access to a common pool resource. We analyze under which cir-
cumstances social norms of cooperation evolve that effectively regulate resource exploitation, but 
also when those social norms break down, identifying obstacles for community governance. Fur-
thermore, in the light of biological and social complexity this thesis analyzes how governmental 
policy should be designed if self-governance is not sufficient to protect the resource stock. The 
insights obtained are applied to the case of Arcto-Norwegian cod. An optimal management plan 
is developed that can be adapted to several policy objectives concerning the utilization of the 
fleet. In addition, management advice is given for the case that harvesting may trigger an evolu-
tionary response of the fish stock.  
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1
Introduction
 
 
 
1.1 Setting the stage 
When I spent one summer in Oslo to write parts of this thesis, I was living in a shared house to-
gether with Anette, a musician, and Cecilia, a young student from Sweden who worked during 
summer vacations in Oslo. One evening I came home and saw Anette in the kitchen – she was 
furious: “Andries, I am so angry! Cecilia hasn’t paid rent, she doesn’t clean her dishes, and now I 
discovered that she also steals my food! I hate that Partysvensker1
 What can we learn from this little anecdote? It shows us that sharing a common resource 
is not always easy. In fact it can be quite difficult for several reasons. First, some individuals may 
use the resource at the expense of others and think only about their own short-term benefits. Es-
pecially if the individuals sharing a resource (i) do not really know each other, (ii) do not really 
care about each other, (iii) do spend only a short time sharing the resource, cooperative-minded 
individuals may be completely powerless against selfish individuals.  
!” Seeing Anette so upset, it 
occurred to me that it was definitely not the right moment to tell her that I had finished all her 
coffee, even though I had already bought new one. If I told her now – in this context – she could 
have easily thought that I had misunderstood her story and thought that she was also mad at me. 
So, next day I told Anette very occasionally that I had bought new coffee. Anette looked at me 
and said “Andries, please don’t think that I told you that story about Cecilia to make you stop 
taking my coffee. I didn’t mean it in such a way.” And I replied “Anette, that is exactly why I did 
not tell you yesterday. I did not want you to think that I would think that you are angry at me. 
Because I know you are not.” 
1 Many young Swedish students spend their summers in Norway to work hard and earn good money, only to party 
even harder and spend all the money in excessive binge drinking. These so-called “Partysvensker” are often blamed 
for their disruptive effect on the courteous Norwegian society – in spite of the fact that Norwegian students do basi-
cally the same. 
2 Second, it is not always immediately obvious what kind of behavior is appropriate. Why is 
drinking Anette’s coffee OK, while eating Annette’s pasta (which she had planned to eat for din-
ner) is not? Apparently what is acceptable and what not depends to a large extent on the charac-
teristic of the resource. It makes a lot of sense to share coffee (as it tastes fresh the best) or bulk 
stuff that lasts long and does not cost much, salt for example. In contrast, one may want to keep 
the good bottle of red wine that one has always at home (just in case an unexpected visitor 
comes) or the portion of fresh pasta serving one person for dinner for oneself.  
 Third, the anecdote shows that social interactions are inherently complex. We observe 
and judge behavior of other people around us, and also reflect on our own behavior. But what 
makes human interactions really complicated is the fact that we also consider how our actions are 
perceived by others. This is one of the main points of the theory of the moral sentiments of 
Adam Smith (1759, section 3.1): 
One consequence of this social complexity is a high context-dependency of our actions. What 
may be perfectly acceptable to us in one social setting, may be unacceptable, or even embarrass-
ing, in a different one. Most economic models tend to ignore this social complexity, mostly for 
convenience. The example of me drinking Anette’s coffee was rather innocent, but there may be 
situations where the stakes are very high. For example, if many individuals have access to the 
same fishing grounds, severe overexploitation – or even extinction may occur. This thesis argues 
that social complexity should be taken into account when resource management and government 
policy is analyzed and designed. After all, any form of resource management is also about manag-
ing people, with the explicit or implicit aim to change the incentive structure of those people. 
This can only be done successfully, if the incentive structure is understood.  
We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in 
this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of 
other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. 
 The next section gives a brief overview about examples of social dilemmas, as they may 
occur when a natural renewable resource, such as a fish stock, is jointly managed. Section 1.3 
gives a very brief overview on the nature of different types of common pool resources. Section 
1.4 introduces the concepts of social norms and social preferences, while section 1.5 introduces 
an evolutionary approach to social norms. Section 1.6 introduces us to the fascinating world of 
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fisheries, a topic that is addressed towards the end of the thesis, and section 1.7 gives an overview 
of the different chapters in this thesis. 
 
1.2 Social dilemmas in common pool resources 
A social dilemma occurs if private interests do not coincide with collective interests. Typically, 
the actions of one agent give rise to an – unintended – externality that affects the payoff of other 
individuals. If agents do not take this externality into account, the outcome of their actions will 
be socially sub-optimal. Social dilemmas are ubiquitous in daily life and especially visible when a 
common pool resource is harvested. Very often simple metaphors, such as the Tragedy of the 
Commons (Hardin, 1968) are used to describe the anatomy of a social dilemma, in spite of the 
fact that the range of potential problems may be very broad, and fundamentally different 
(Kollock, 1998). In the case of a renewable resource, users face often more than one social di-
lemma, making the need to be precise even more important. 
 First, there is an intertemporal or dynamic externality associated with resource harvesting. 
This happens when the effects of current exploitation cause a decline of resource availability in 
the future (Wilson, 1982).  
 Second, there is very often a static externality as well associated with resource harvesting. 
One example is a situation where exploitation costs depend positively on the extraction efforts of 
all agents. This is sometimes called a “crowding cost” and may happen for several reasons. In 
fisheries, nets or vessels may congest (Clark, 1990, p.223), or it becomes increasingly costly to 
search for a good fishing spot. 
 Third, environmental costs are often not only born by all agents engaging in the same 
activity, but by all individuals living nearby or even far away. In agriculture, using a lake to sup-
port farming or cattle may cause lake eutrophication, putting a cost on all individuals who use the 
lake (Carpenter et al., 1999; Iwasa et al., 2007; Scheffer et al., 2000; Suzuki and Iwasa, 2009a). 
Cutting parts of a forest may lead to a direct cost by reducing the amount of ecosystem services 
provided by the deforested area (Cárdenas et al., 2000; Satake and Iwasa, 2006; Satake et al., 
2007).  
 Most economic models assume environmental costs to be a positive strictly convex func-
tion of the level of economic activity or harvesting. This implies that average costs increase when 
economic activity is getting more severe. This assumption seems to be realistic for most situa-
4tions. A good overview on these issues can be found in Burrows (1995) and Hanley et al. (1997, 
Ch. 2). It is not uncommon that both dynamic and static externalities are present at the same 
time. An intertemporal externality is particularly hard to overcome, because the future is uncer-
tain, individuals are often slightly myopic and hold different time and risk preferences. Therefore, 
one can often observe that communities are able to reach a consensus on how to overcome the 
direct externality (e.g. taking turns in getting the best fishing spots rather than competing for 
them), but no consensus may be reached on the amount of fish that is extracted; see for instance 
Taylor (1987).  
 
1.3 Common property regimes and common pool resources 
In the economics literature, the terms common pool resources and common property regimes are 
often used interchangeably – possibly also because of the common abbreviation (CPR). In this 
thesis, a common pool resource will be defined as a type of good that delivers benefits to several 
individuals, where individuals cannot be excluded easily (otherwise the good would be private) 
and the average benefits decrease as the number of users increase (otherwise it would be a public 
good); see Ostrom (2003). A common property regime will be defined as a set of institutional 
arrangements, that defines the condition of access to and control over benefits, arising from a 
common pool resource; see Swallow (1995). Common property regimes are often implemented 
by small communities at the village level.  
 There is ample empirical evidence that self-regulation of communities can be effective in 
reducing overextraction of resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Casari 
and Plott, 2003; Coleman and Steed, 2009; Cordell and McKean, 1992; McCay and Acheson, 
1987; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 2002). Additionally, laboratory experiments have helped un-
derstanding under which conditions self-governance fosters and what help users overcoming a 
social dilemma (Carpenter, 2007; Castillo and Saysel, 2005; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Janssen et al., 
2010; Masclet et al., 2003; Milinski et al., 2006; Ostrom et al., 1994; 2009). Whether self-
regulation is effective depends essentially on two factors. First, do the necessary social norms and 
rules exist that can – if followed by all users – preserve the natural resource? Second, if these so-
cial norms exist, are they obeyed and enforced by the users? The first question requires under-
standing the nature of the resource at stake. What may be a sustainable exploitation pattern for 
one resource may be very destructive for another. Furthermore, the likelihood that social norms 
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for resource preservation evolve also depends on the resource characteristics. Schlager et al. 
(1994) identify stationarity and storage possibility as attributes that facilitate self-governance 
based on social norms. Both characteristics assure that benefits from delaying harvesting can be 
reaped at a later point. If resources are very mobile and cannot be stored (e.g. a highly migratory 
fish stock) the government should set some rules, as the local users are incapable of doing so. 
According to Swallow (1995), the most important motivations for successful common property 
regimes are risk pooling, economies of scale in exploiting the resource, equity in the distribution 
of the benefits and high transaction costs for central enforcement. In these cases, privatization – 
if possible – would solve the social dilemma, but the outcome may still be inferior compared to a 
common property regime. A good synthesis is given by Ostrom (2009), who identifies a common 
property regime to be more successful when: (i) the size of the resource system is moderate, (ii) 
the resource is neither too abundant, nor already exhausted, (iii) the resource system dynamics are 
predictable, (iv) the resource unit mobility is low, (v) the number of users is small, (vi) some users 
act as leaders, (vii) users hold common social norms and values, (viii) users have common know-
ledge about the system, (ix) the resource is very important to the users (in terms of livelihood or 
cultural value), and (x) the users have full autonomy for crafting collective-choice rules.  
 
1.4 Social norms and social preferences 
A social norm is a customary rule of behavior that is self-reinforcing (Young, 2003). When fol-
lowing a norm leads to a strictly higher payoff than not doing so, there is no need for enforce-
ment. When this is not the case, social norms are enforced through two mechanisms. The first 
mechanism can be summarized as social sanctions. Instruments that have been explored in the 
literature include peer–to–peer punishments (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; 
Gächter et al., 2008), peer–to–peer rewards (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2008), verbal expres-
sions of disagreement and discontent (Masclet et al., 2003), but also excluding individuals from 
profitable economic exchange (Milinski et al., 2002; Milinski et al., 2006), and direct ostracism 
(Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2007). In many cases these mechanisms are combined, and the mere 
threat of using them is often sufficient to induce cooperative behavior (Andreoni et al., 2003; 
Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). 
 The second enforcement mechanism can be best described by a process of norm interna-
lization (Young, 2008). A social norm is internalized when an individual feels obliged to obey it, 
6even when not monitored. In many cases, it is the combination of sanctions and norm internali-
zation that works hand in hand: an individual who has internalized a norm may be willing to bear 
significant costs to punish norm violators (Boyd et al., 2003; Hauert et al., 2007; Henrich and 
Boyd, 2001). This happens because an agent who has internalized a social norm does not only 
feel obliged to act in a certain way herself, but she expects others to follow that strategy as well. If 
these expectations are not met, certain emotions are triggered (Bicchieri, 2006). If other agents 
violate a norm, typical feelings are anger, indignation or disdain. Shame, guilt or embarrassments 
are widely experienced after own inappropriate behavior. According to Dolan (2002) these emo-
tions provide “the principal currency in human relationships”. This has been pointed out earlier 
by Trivers (1971), who stated that “friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, 
trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, aspects of guilt, and some form of dishonesty and hypocrisy can 
be explained as important adaptations to regulate the altruistic system.” 
 One of the social norms studied most is the notion of fairness. A large number of studies 
have shown that individuals make monetary sacrifices to improve the situation of agents that are 
less well-off. In such a case one could also speak about agents holding an equity preference, since 
individuals seem to prefer giving up some of their own payoff to obtain a more equitable out-
come (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). Again, agents usually expect that a 
sense of fairness is shared by other individuals, making such a preference conditional or reciproc-
al. This implies that agents do not have a preference for an equal outcome as such, but rather for 
fair play. In principle there is no difference between having a reciprocal or conditional preference 
for fairness and having internalized a fairness norm, since the consequences will be the same. 
This ambiguity is mainly due to the interdisciplinary nature of this issue. While the term interna-
lized social norms (Scott, 1971) is very common in sociology and psychology, economists tend to 
work with preferences. An important difference is, however, a non-conditional social preference. 
In that case, an agent always prefers a more equitable outcome, irrespective of whether this is 
shared by other agents. Another semantic caveat is the fact that in the economic science, social 
norms are sometimes interpreted as equilibrium outcomes of a collective decision-making 
process. This overshadows a bit the notion that social norms are inherently dynamic and there-
fore an adaptive process (Ostrom, 2005b). In this thesis, social preferences are by definition held 
by single individuals, while the emerging patterns (preferences and decisions) at the group level 
are defined as social norms. In this micro-macro transition (Coleman, 1990), norms are part of a 
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feedback process, as individual actions shape the norm, which in return influences individual 
choices. 
 Once a certain norm is established in a population, individuals that do not have interna-
lized the norm tend to conform in order to avoid punishment or disapproval that may lead to a 
loss of social status (Bernheim, 1994). Thus, norm compliance helps explaining why social norms 
of cooperation are followed even if non-cooperation seems the more profitable choice. However, 
norm compliance alone does neither answer the question which social norms evolve, nor explain 
how beneficial such an evolving norm is (Boyd and Richerson, 2001). Only because a social norm 
is enforced does not automatically imply that the social norm is beneficial and makes the group 
better off. To understand the nature and dynamics of social norms, it is not enough to analyze 
whether they are stable once they are in place, but also how they got established – we need to 
understand the evolutionary process.  
 
1.5 The evolution of social norms
Humans face in general internal and external constraints when making decisions. Herbert Simon 
(1955) pointed out that humans are not optimizers, but human choices can be better described as 
a process of adaptation and learning. Assuming choices to be optimal is, however, a good proxy 
if individuals learn quickly, problems are not too complicated and situations change only slowly 
(Simon, 1959). In fast changing, complex, or unfamiliar environments behavior is typically far 
from equilibrium and is, hence, not optimal. In those cases it is appropriate to take learning 
processes into account. Adding learning and evolution to classical game theory is a fruitful way 
for explaining human behavior (Goeree and Holt, 1999). Also social preferences (Sethi and 
Somanathan, 2001; Weibull and Salomonsson, 2006) can be understood as an evolutionary 
process. Preference formation is typically influenced by learning, culture and natural selection 
(Rogers, 1994). The outcome of this process is not so clear, because the environment is complex, 
and adaptation is not always quick. In such a case, as already noted by Simon in 1959, prediction 
about the behavior of an organism requires information about the speed with which it “adapted” 
to the environment and “moved towards its goal”.  
 The emerging pattern of decisions and preferences determine the social norms that will 
be in place. According to Coleman (1990, p. 241) norms do not emerge randomly, but evolve for 
a reason. A good example is the case where a social norm helps solving a coordination or exter-
8nality problem (Arrow, 1971). This point is not so clear-cut, since certain norms seem to make 
everybody worse off (Elster, 1989). Additionally, many norms that may look futile now may have 
been appropriate at the time they evolved. Likewise, a social norm that is unfavorable for most 
individuals, while beneficial for some may spread if the social consequences of conformity are 
strong enough. A social norm will always coevolve with its environment, which means that the 
social norm will be shaped by the environment and – in return – shape the environment. Envi-
ronmental factors include the institutional environment, such as the overall culture or govern-
ment policy, but also natural factors, such as natural resource characteristics or climate. 
 
1.5.1 Evolutionary models
This section does not attempt to give a comprehensive overview of evolutionary models, but will 
only give the reader a hunch about which evolutionary models are used in this thesis. For a good 
overview on classical game theory, one may consult Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Gintis (2000) 
has written a great and entertaining book that covers classical and evolutionary game theory. 
Probably the best introductory reading on evolutionary game theory is given by Nowak (2006). 
Also Weibull (1997) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) are good and thorough readings in evolu-
tionary game theory. Finally, a very nice book by Sigmund (2010) on the evolution of cooperation 
has recently appeared.  
 In economics, one of the most common ways to model evolutionary processes is through 
a set of coupled differential equations. In particular, the so-called replicator equation (Taylor and 
Jonker, 1978) is often used to model how the frequency of a fixed number of strategies changes 
over time. Its main advantage is the fact that it does not require any additional assumptions ex-
cept that different strategies grow exponentially, where the growth rate depends on their payoffs, 
while the overall size of the community is fixed. This can be best illustrated with an example, 
which is based on Nowak (2006). In a community, individuals are either cooperative or they are 
not – let us call these non-cooperators defectors. The community comprises N  individuals in 
total, of which C  are cooperators and D  are defectors. As a starting point it is assumed that the 
community size is not fixed, and both strategies simply grow exponentially dependent on their 
payoff ? . Then the change in numbers of cooperators over time is given by / ,CdC dt C??  while 
the number of defectors changes by / .DdD dt D??  If payoffs are positive, both groups would 
grow ad infinitum, which is not very plausible. Therefore, usually the restriction is imposed that 
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the community is closed. Individuals can switch from one mode of behavior to the other, but the 
overall community size is fixed, which implies .N C D? ?  In such a case the two strategies do 
not grow independently anymore, but their growth is coupled by an interaction term ? . The 
growth of the two strategies is now given by / ( )CdC dt C ? ?? ?  and / ( ).DdD dt D ? ?? ?  The 
condition N C D? ?  is only met if ?  is equal to the average payoff in the population 
/ / ;C DC N D N? ? ?? ?  see Nowak (2006, p.15). Therefore, the growth of the two strategies can 
be expressed as / ( )CdC dt C ? ?? ?  and / ( ).DdD dt D ? ?? ?  This gives us the replicator equation 
as, for example, used in Noailly et al. (2003) and Sethi and Somanathan (1996). The main advan-
tage of the replicator equation is the fact that the framework is fairly generic and differential equ-
ations can be analyzed very conveniently. Besides, it can be modified easily to allow for exten-
sions. For example, it has often been suggested that not only diseases, but also habits, customs, 
social norms, beliefs, and even feelings are contagious and can be modeled through epidemiolog-
ical models (Bettencourt et al., 2006; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). Since these models also 
make use of differential equations, they can be easily combined with the replicator equation. In 
chapter 3 we use a model, in which cooperation is contagious and spreads through personal inte-
raction, but agents are also driven by payoff considerations, as is the case in the replicator equa-
tion.  
 While the simplicity of the replicator equation framework is certainly appealing, it has 
some important limitations. First of all, it requires a set of discrete strategies, which have to be 
imposed by the researcher. In the previous example it was assumed that the community compris-
es only cooperators and defectors, but we ruled out any other strategy, such as enforcers (who 
punish defectors). Mutations are usually not considered, and therefore new strategies do not arise 
by itself. Second, it is also problematic to allow individuals to choose mixed strategies, such as 
cooperate only half the time. An evolutionary stable mixed strategy, as defined by the Bishop-
Cannings theorem (Bishop and Cannings, 1978) is a property at the population level, which im-
plies that it is irrelevant whether a certain fraction of the population follows two pure strategies, 
or all individuals follow the same mixed strategies. This implies that it is impossible to distinguish 
a community, where everybody is a half-hearted cooperator from a community where half the 
members are full-hearted cooperators, while the other half consists of cold-blooded defectors. 
The fact that it is impossible to distinguish the population from the individual level is more than 
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a slight inconvenience: it may also cause mixed strategies to be structurally unstable (Dieckmann 
and Metz, 2006).  
 A good modeling alternative is adaptive dynamics (Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Geritz et 
al., 1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1990; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990), an analytical modeling tool 
that can conveniently analyze continuous strategies. While adaptive dynamics is widely used in 
biology, it has not fully reached the field of economics yet; for exceptions see Dercole et al. 
(2008) and Horan et al. (2008). Adaptive dynamics makes use of the assumption that different 
processes operate at different time scales. We will use this modeling framework in chapter 4 to 
analyze how social norms for resource harvesting evolve.  
 Akin to adaptive dynamics is what is known as the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth 
and Kliemt, 1998; Huck and Oechssler, 1999). Very much like adaptive dynamics it makes use of 
the assumption that economic decisions are changing quicker than preferences. Usually, it is as-
sumed that choices are based on preferences, while only the material outcomes determine the 
evolutionary survival of a strategy. This is an interesting case, as it seems like a handshake be-
tween the self-interested homo economicus and his behavioral counterpart, who consistently 
makes wrong decisions – not because he is irrational, but because he is human (Morrissey and 
Marr, 1995). Nonetheless, assuming the success of a strategy to be solely determined by material 
payoff seems too restrictive and does not find empirical support (Güth et al., 2007). But we 
should not dismiss the indirect evolutionary framework as such. In principle, it is straightforward 
to modify the indirect evolutionary survival in such a way that status considerations (or any other 
form of non-material incentives) are part of the payoff function and determine whether a strategy 
is successful or not. Compared to adaptive dynamics, the biggest difference is that the indirect 
evolution approach usually looks only at equilibrium outcomes and not at the trajectories towards 
that equilibrium. Also, adaptive dynamics can distinguish whether a population converges to-
wards one homogenous equilibrium (say half-hearted cooperators), or splits into a population 
that comprises several different strategies (say full defectors and full cooperators).  
 An additional interesting approach is evolution in finite populations (Hauert et al., 2007; 
Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004). It is not used in this thesis, but it will be briefly men-
tioned as it takes specifically into account the stochastic component of evolutionary processes. In 
small community sizes stochasticity plays a bigger role and inferior strategies may get established 
by accident.  
Introduction ? 1
11
 Finally, agent-based simulations will be used (BenDor et al., 2009; Bousquet and Le Page, 
2004; Grimm and Railsback, 2005; Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). They lack analytical tractability, 
which is a disadvantage, but allow almost infinite complexity. Since they are based on rules and 
probabilities, they are ideal for complementing insights from analytical equation-based models. 
Agent-based (or individual-based) models are used in chapter 4 and chapter 6 of this thesis.  
1.6 Fisheries  
Globally, 80 percent of marine fish stocks are overexploited or maximally exploited (FAO, 2008). 
Symptoms of this overexploitation are declining fish stocks, overcapacity of fishing fleets, and 
consequently low profits. Hence, there is no doubt that the global fisheries are in crisis (Clark, 
2006; Hilborn et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2001; Worm et al., 2009). At the same time, it has been 
widely recognized that successful resource management must be case-specific (Beddington et al., 
2007; Degnbol et al., 2006; Jentoft, 2006). While small communities have a key role in managing 
common pool resources sustainably, most large marine fisheries do not fit in this picture: The 
number of resource users is large, users come from different regions, or even countries, making it 
unlikely that a management regime will be set up without an active role of governments. This is 
especially the case for highly migratory fish stock, where those who restrain fishing effort will not 
necessarily be the ones who benefit from these protective actions (Berkes, 2006). Therefore, fi-
sheries are often seen as a manifestation of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons. This makes some 
form of government intervention often necessary.  
 In this thesis, particular attention will be given to Northeast Arctic cod, which is currently 
the world’s largest cod stock and the main target species of the Norwegian fishing fleet. Chapter 
5 investigates how Northeast Arctic cod could be optimally managed – taking into account sever-
al policy objectives. Chapter 6 looks at a particular interesting case of coevolution between insti-
tutions and renewable resources, as harvesting causes a genetic response in the exploited species. 
A recent study that summarized the magnitudes of phenotypic change in fish, ungulates, inverte-
brates, and plants found that harvesting may produce rates of evolution that is up to 300% larger 
than in natural systems (Darimont et al., 2009). In commercial fish populations, changes in life-
history traits, exemplified by maturation at earlier ages and smaller size can be caused by intense 
harvesting (Jørgensen et al., 2007; Olsen et al., 2004 ; Stenseth and Dunlop, 2009).  
 Unlike in terrestrial ecosystems, it is almost impossible to define clear boundaries that 
separate different users in marine ecosystems. This leads to strong interactions between fisher-
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men with different family or community backgrounds, and also diverse boat and gear types. As a 
result, the prospects for self-governance are often low, while the arising social complexities in 
fisheries are typically very high. A direct consequence of this social complexity is that individuals 
are embedded in a social context and decisions are context dependent (Granovetter, 1985). This 
implies that these decisions cannot be necessarily described by models assuming that agents are 
only self-interested (Jager et al., 2000; Ostrom, 2010). Instead, agents typically care about how 
their actions are perceived by others and may also be intrinsically motivated to keep up a certain 
self-image. This is the case in developing countries, as well as in developed countries, where fish-
ing is often perceived to be an important element of community culture and identity (Ginkel, 
2009; Henrich et al., 2001). As a consequence, fishermen are not always acting like profit max-
imizing entrepreneurs, but decisions about fishing techniques, such as choice of gear, equipment, 
boats, but also fishing locations and fishing periods are highly influenced by the social environ-
ment (Jentoft et al., 1998; Salas and Gaertner, 2004; Wilen et al., 2002). These social complexities 
have profound impacts on the success of any management regime and these factors will be dis-
cussed in chapter 7. 
 
1.7 Overview of this thesis 
We know that small communities have a salient role in managing renewable resources, but there 
are still important gaps of knowledge that this thesis addresses. First of all, even if we understand 
that humans do indeed act much more cooperatively than predicted by models with individuals 
motivated exclusively by monetary outcomes we are not quite sure about the exact mechanisms. 
Chapter 2 forms a bridge between the literature on the evolution of cooperation, resource man-
agement and design of environmental policy. That chapter also addresses how government policy 
influences any voluntary motivation to act as a good citizen. How can government policy make 
individuals feel more socially responsible? And when does government intervention make indi-
viduals feel decoupled from society? Chapter 3 and 4 both zoom in at the community level and 
try to unravel the mechanisms of social sanctions. In both chapters a small community jointly 
harvests a common pool resource. In chapter 3 cooperators try to convince selfish individuals 
that obeying a cooperative harvesting strategy is in everyone’s benefit. Therefore, the cooperative 
spirit is contagious – at the same time individuals feel the rising temptation to defect as more in-
dividuals cooperate, because of the excessive profits that could be grabbed. While we expected 
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these two forces to stabilize each other, we found something different –something very surpris-
ing. Chapter 4 does not a priori assume individuals to be either cooperators or defectors. Instead 
we do not impose any moral labels from the outside. Instead, a social preference to sanction 
peers evolves from a continuum of strategies, and we explicitly allow also for anti-social punish-
ment. This form of punishment is targeted at individuals who are acting in society’s interest and 
is therefore theoretically very difficult to explain. This model builds on the observation that insti-
tutions, such as a moral value system, change slower than economic decision. The results shed 
interesting lights on the question under which conditions a sanctioning mechanism evolves to-
wards a socially optimal level. Along the way, we touch upon one of the biggest puzzles of Phi-
losophy: The roots of morality. Chapter 5 is the first chapter that explicitly deals with fisheries. In 
that chapter we move away from informal institutions towards formal institutions. The question 
we try to answer how an optimal management plan for Northeast Arctic cod can be adapted to 
several policy choices. These choices include harvesting cod at minimal costs, using only a specif-
ic type of boat to minimize an adverse impact on the ecosystem, or having a diverse fleet for cul-
tural considerations. Chapter 6 turns the concept of coevolution around. While we analyzed in 
chapters 3 and 4 how informal institutions evolve with the resource, here, it is finally time for the 
resource to strike back. Under which conditions does harvesting pressure lead to genetic change 
in the exploited fish stock? If it does, is such a change good or bad? What are the management 
implications for such evolving fish stock? Chapter 7 synthesizes the findings obtained so far and 
bridges social and biological complexity with policy design for the case of fisheries. We provide 
specific policy recommendations that can be readily implemented in many fisheries. Finally, chap-
ter 8 provides a discussion on the methods used in this thesis and contrasts them with the litera-
ture. Besides, it is briefly addressed why political, but also scientific constraints make fisheries 
management extremely difficult. 
2  
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Global environmental problems, voluntary 
action and government intervention
 
 
 
Abstract
 
The global community currently faces several very pressing environmental challenges. Govern-
ments are in the process of designing environmental policies to address these problems unilate-
rally, but also collectively (in the form of international agreements). Meanwhile, private citizens 
and firms are observed to take protective action voluntarily. Whereas standard game theory 
would predict that formal government intervention can only provide an extra stimulus for protec-
tive action, there are many examples of external interventions decreasing agents’ propensity to 
undertake socially desired activities. This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the 
circumstances under which formal interventions can crowd out voluntary contributions to the 
common good. Furthermore, it is discussed how the effectiveness of government intervention 
may be improved by preserving the agents’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to the common 
good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is a slightly modified version of: Richter, A.P. and D.P. van Soest, 2011. Global environ-
mental problems, voluntary action and government intervention. In Governing Global Environmental 
Commons: Institutions, Markets, Social Preferences and Political Games. E. Brousseau, T. Dedeur-
waerdere, P.A. Jouvet and M. Willinger (eds). Oxford University Press, in press. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Climate change, the depletion of (high sea) fisheries, and biodiversity loss rank high on the list of 
environmental problems the global community is confronted with. Over the past decade these 
problems have been addressed extensively in the media (at least in developed countries), and as a 
result firms and consumers are very much aware of their existence and also – albeit to a varying 
degree – of the necessity to take mitigating action.  
 Even if individual agents are well aware of these problems, it is not necessarily the case 
that they do take protective action. Environmental quality depends on the aggregate behavior of 
all agents on this planet, while each individual agent’s actions have a negligible impact on any of 
the above global environmental problems. Indeed, all these problems are classic examples of the 
so-called “Tragedy of the Commons” as the benefits of protective actions are enjoyed by every-
one, while the costs of taking them are private.  
 This analysis suggests that without government intervention, the prospects for mitigating 
or preventing climate change, fisheries depletion and biodiversity loss are bleak. However, casual 
observation of the behavior of people around us reveals that many people take at least some pre-
ventive action. When buying a new electric appliance people do take into account the energy con-
sumption of the various competing brands; energy efficiency and amounts of CO2
 These examples of private mitigation activities suggest that people are motivated to take 
protective environmental action even if extrinsic incentives – such as environmental taxes or 
quota – are absent. This raises two issues. The first is whether the amount of action taken is equal 
to the socially optimal level. And second, if more action is needed, how should government in-
tervention be designed to bring preventive action to its socially optimal level?  
 emitted per 
kilometer driven are among the criteria on the basis of which people choose a new car, and many 
households voluntarily separate their waste flows for recycling purposes. Also within the business 
community the concept of corporate social responsibility receives increasing attention.  
 The answer to the first question is easily given – for most environmental problems we 
cannot rely on the voluntary actions of consumers and firms alone. If we could, these environ-
mental problems would have been solved a long time ago. But the second question is much more 
relevant, because of the following reason. In the standard game-theoretic framework – that is, 
assuming that all agents are exclusively self-interested – government intervention is always wel-
fare enhancing: own-profit maximizing agents do not voluntarily contribute to the common good 
(if there are costs involved in doing so). However, because we observe that at least some people 
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voluntarily undertake protective actions, the possibility arises that government intervention may 
be counter-effective, because it may result in crowding out of the agent’s intrinsic motivation to 
contribute. And this is what this chapter aims to analyze; under what circumstances does gov-
ernment intervention strengthen (“crowd in”) or weaken (“crowd out”) the regulated agents’ in-
trinsic motivation to act pro-socially, and under what circumstances is the change in behavior 
permanent, and when is it reversible?  
 The set-up of this chapter is as follows. In section 2.2 we provide an overview of the 
economic and psychological literature on the interaction between formal government interven-
tion and the regulated agents’ intrinsic motivation to contribute, resulting either in crowding in or 
out. In section 2.3 we turn to examples of crowding out in (real-world) environmental problems. 
Having established that crowding out is observed to occur in the real world, we analyze how this 
is related to the institutional setting (section 2.4). In section 2.5 we indicate the factors that may 
lead to crowding out. Section 2.6 shows how these factors effect formal and informal institutions. 
The corresponding policy recommendations are provided in section 2.7, and finally, section 2.8 
concludes. 
 
2.2 Intrinsic motivation and crowding out 
One is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent 
reward except the activity itself (Deci, 1971). Employees in firms may not be just motivated to 
work hard to capture incentive payments; they also take pride in their work. In a similar vein, 
people are willing to abstain from certain activities that are harmful to their environment, even if 
the private returns to these activities are positive (think of voluntary reducing the amount of 
waste produced by one’s household, which requires effort to search for environmentally friendly 
products that are, in many cases, more expensive than other products). 
 The reason why the introduction of extrinsic incentives does not always result in in-
creased provision of public goods is because the extrinsic reward may negatively affect an indi-
vidual’s intrinsic motivation ‘to do the good’. This is best illustrated using Figure 2.1. In this fig-
ure, an agent’s contribution to a public good is measured along the horizontal axis, while the ver-
tical axis reflects the incentives provided by the government to induce the agent to act coopera-
tively (a subsidy per unit of contribution to the public good, or a tax per unit of pollution gener-
ated). If the agent is intrinsically motivated to contribute to the public good, her contributions 
will be non-zero even if there are no incentives provided by the government to do so. Suppose 
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that this level is equal to point A in Figure 2.1. Now the standard line of reasoning in economics 
would be: “we do not know why the agent provides a non-zero contribution to the public good, 
but if the government provides incentives (in the form of a subsidy or a tax), the stimulus for the 
agent to contribute is larger and hence contributions will go up.” Assuming that the agent’s 
supply function is stable, the policy maker would expect that contributions would be increased to 
point B if the incentive (on the vertical axis) is set equal to, for example, s*. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Crowding out occurs if the supply curve of an individual shifts to the left and the individual 
contributes less to the public good for a given external incentive 
 
However, the assumption of a stable supply function is often not met in practice. External inter-
vention may crowd out the intrinsic motivation to contribute, resulting in a leftward shift of the 
individual’s supply function from S to, for example, S’. If so, setting the incentive equal to s* 
would result in contributions ending up in point C rather than in point B. The monetary incen-
tive itself increases the marginal cost of shirking and/or increases the marginal benefit of good 
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provision, but this does not only result in a movement along the original supply function (from A 
to B), but also in a leftward shift to point C. Hence, crowding out occurs because external incen-
tives are not separable from intrinsic motivation (Bowles, 2008). 
 This simple graph suggests two things. First, government intervention is effective if the 
incentive is sufficiently strong, but it may be counter-effective if the external incentive is too 
small (see also Frey (1997, Ch. 11), and Nyborg and Rege, (2003)). In our example introducing s* 
results in contributions falling from A to C, but if s ? s**, contributions end up in D, or better. 
The second conclusion is that it is probably cheaper to use policy instruments that preserve the 
agent’s intrinsic motivation to contribute; when preserving the agent’s intrinsic motivation, the 
same level of contributions can be achieved at much lower incentives. This is because (i) the loss 
of intrinsic motivation constitutes a direct decrease in utility, and (ii) the enforcement costs are 
likely to be an increasing function of the level of stimulus provided.2
 According to psychologists, crowding out is likely to occur if external intervention is per-
ceived to reduce people’s self-determination and/or their self-esteem because they feel that their 
involvement and competence is not appreciated (Frey and Jegen, 2001, p.8). But the extent to 
which crowding out occurs in actual practice, is hard to establish because of the many confound-
ing factors. Kreps (1997) gives the example of the difficulty of identifying the existence of intrin-
sic motivation in the workplace. Employees may work long hours because they take pride in their 
work, but also because they respond to fuzzy extrinsic motivators including fear of discharge, 
scrutiny by fellow employees or even the desire for their coworkers’ esteem.  
 And clearly government in-
tervention would be even more effective if it were able to crowd in the agent’s intrinsic motiva-
tion to contribute, inducing her supply curve S to move to the right. Hence, governments should 
be interested in finding out which policy instruments are likely to result in crowding out, and 
which are able to increase contributions by strengthening the agent’s intrinsic motivation to con-
tribute. 
 Whereas strong empirical support of the stylized fact is hard to find, anecdotal evidence 
abounds. Children are willing to mow the lawn, but after they have been paid once to do it, they 
are only willing to do it again if they receive monetary compensation (Deci, 1971). The pharma-
ceutical company Merck decided to invest in developing an unprofitable drug against river blind-
2 Note that this is even the case if the stimulus is provided in the form of taxes. For the same level of monitoring, 
higher taxes make tax evasion more profitable and hence enforcement needs to be increased. This is a welfare cost 
while the tax revenues themselves are a transfer from the agent to the government, and hence do not constitute a 
welfare gain. 
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ness in order to increase its workforce’s intrinsic motivation for research (Murdock, 2002). Im-
posing a fine on parents arriving late to collect their children at day care increased the number of 
late-coming parents (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a). Small honoraria for seminar speakers may 
increase the probability of declining the invitation (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b). Unit pricing 
of unsorted waste does not necessarily result in a substantial increase in the amount of material 
offered for recycling (Ackerman, 1997; Berglund, 2006). Survey results suggest that people may 
actually decrease their contribution to voluntary work if a fee for non-participation is introduced 
(Brekke et al., 2003). Opposition against the implementation of “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) 
projects may increase when monetary compensation is offered to the local community. An ex-
ample is the case with a mid-level radioactive nuclear waste repository in Switzerland (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey et al., 1996).  
 
2.3 Crowding out in environmental problems 
As Kreps (1997) argues, “abundant smoke signifies a fire, and the assertion is too strongly rooted 
in folk wisdom to be entirely hot air.” While monetary incentives do not crowd out intrinsic mo-
tivation per se (Cameron and Pierce, 1994), it is by now well-established it can happen for a wide 
range of conditions (Bowles, 2008; Deci et al., 1999, 2001; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and 
Stutzer, 2006; Gintis et al., 2005; Ostrom, 2005a; Vollan, 2008).  
 However, this list of instances of crowding out raises two questions. The first question 
concerns the circumstances under which crowding out is observed to take place. The examples 
presented are of a parent who wants his lawn mowed by his child, a boss of a firm who wants a 
project to be implemented, an owner of a day care centre who wants to induce the parents to 
pick up their kids on time, etc. These are all examples of so-called principal-agent problems 
where the principal has certain objectives for which he is dependent on the efforts of someone 
else (the agent) to have them achieved. In these situations the interests of the principal and the 
agent do not completely coincide. So how does this relate to environmental problems where 
there is not just one principal to be “served”, but a larger group – or even society? Indeed, failing 
to take protective action in environmental problems results in damages accruing to a large and 
diverse group of agents (citizens, firms, or consumers) as is the case with, for example, overhar-
vesting fisheries and failing to invest in water capture in arid regions. These environmental prob-
lems have in common that all agents involved would be better off if they collectively undertook 
protective action, but given that all others do so, it is in each agent’s private interest not to do it. 
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The second question regarding the examples presented refers to the temporal nature of the 
change in motivation: if crowding out occurs, is this change permanent and (largely) irreversible, 
or is it just transitory? 
 Before addressing the issue of whether crowding out may occur in (global) environmental 
problems too, we investigate whether social interaction in multiplayer social dilemma situations is 
properly described by the neoclassical assumption of selfish actors. Here, social dilemmas are sit-
uations in which actions that maximize the sum of payoffs of all stakeholders do not coincide 
with the actions that maximize the payoffs of an individual agent, and vice versa. An example of 
such a situation is the fishery. After every fishing trip, the agent pockets the sales revenues of his 
harvests, but he bears only parts of the costs. When catching a fish one does not only remove 
that fish from the pond or sea, but also all offspring generated by that fish. If all fishermen de-
cided to catch fewer fish, more offspring would be produced and all fishermen would be better 
off. However, given that all other fishermen restrained their fishing effort, each individual fi-
sherman would profit from increasing his fishing effort. And similar considerations apply to oth-
er environmental problems such as global warming and biodiversity loss. 
 Whether or not agents are willing to contribute voluntarily to a public good is often diffi-
cult to observe in practice. Figures on individual catch, for example, are hard to obtain, and also 
it is difficult to establish what baseline level to compare actual catch with. One more easily ob-
servable act of voluntary cooperation is agents’ propensity to discipline their peers. For example, 
Brazilian fishermen in the Bahia region destroy the nets of fellow fishermen who do not respect 
the catch quotas (Cordell and McKean, 1992). Sanctioning one’s peers is an example of public 
good provision because there are often – hidden – costs associated with imposing punishments 
(for example because one exposes oneself to retaliation) while – if effective – the benefits of the 
punished individual restraining his fishing effort level accrues to all individuals having access to 
the fishery. 
 Because it is hard to establish to what extent observed pro-social behavior is the result of 
intrinsic motivation or because of other considerations (including the threat of social punishment 
or the presence of hidden rewards), economists and psychologists alike have studied this beha-
vior by means of controlled experiments. In social laboratory experiments subjects are con-
fronted with a (computerized) game that captures the essence of the decision problem the re-
searcher wants to analyze (such as the fishery problem described above). Subjects are induced to 
think carefully about how to behave as decisions have actual financial consequences. The propen-
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sity of humans to act cooperatively has, among others, been studied in Public Goods (PG) games 
and in Common Pool Resource (CPR) games. In both games the costs of contributing to the 
common good is larger than the private benefits but smaller than the resulting increase in aggre-
gate payoffs (i.e., the sum of payoffs of all group members). In the PG game the decision to be 
made is how much to contribute to a public good, where the associated benefits accrue to all 
members of the group. In the CPR game subjects need to decide whether they are willing to put 
in less than the privately optimal amount of harvesting effort in order to reduce the negative con-
sequences of their catch on the payoffs of their peers. It is easy to see that homo economicus 
would act non-cooperatively, deciding not to contribute to the public good in the PG game and 
choosing the privately optimal extraction effort level in the CPR game. This prediction also holds 
in case of multiple rounds of interaction as long as the number of periods the game is played is 
finite (and subjects are informed about this). In such a finitely repeated setting, there is no reason 
to “invest” in trying to maintain cooperation in the last round (because there are no future deci-
sions to be affected), and hence also not in the round before that (because there will be zero co-
operation in the last round anyway). But that means that there is no reason to invest in maintain-
ing cooperation in the second-but-last round either, and hence, on the basis of backward induc-
tion, the conclusion is that it does not pay to invest in even the first round. The typical pattern 
that emerges when PG games and CPR games are played over multiple rounds is that coopera-
tion declines quite steeply over time (see for example Fehr and Gächter, (2000), and Ostrom et 
al., (1992)). This holds when university students are used as subjects, but it holds for a wide varie-
ty of other subject pools too. This suggests that humans are willing to act cooperatively, but that 
defection by others results in cooperation declining over time.  
 Interestingly, both Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Ostrom et al. (1992) also implemented 
treatments in which subjects can punish their peers for acting non-cooperatively. In these treat-
ments, each round consists of two stages. The first is the “social dilemma stage” as described 
above (i.e., modeled in the form of either a PG game or a CPR game), and the second is the sanc-
tioning stage. In the latter stage subjects can decrease the payoffs of any of their peers at positive 
costs to themselves. Game theory predicts that sanctioning would never occur because of a 
backward induction argument very similar to the one above. In the last period there is no reason 
to sanction because the punisher incurs costs while it is impossible to affect the punished indi-
vidual’s behavior because the game ends. Hence there is no incentive to act cooperatively in the 
first stage (the social dilemma stage) of the last round either. That means that there is no reason 
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to punish one’s peers in the second stage (the punishment stage) of the one-but-last round, which 
implies that there is also no incentive to act cooperatively in the first stage (the social dilemma 
stage) of that one-but-last round. Continuing reasoning backwards, the standard assumption of 
purely selfish players result in the prediction that there will be zero contributions to the common 
good and also no sanctioning in any of the rounds the game lasts. 
 The experimental evidence gathered by Ostrom et al. (1992) and Fehr and Gächter (2000) 
refute these predictions. Punishments do take place, and the threat of being sanctioned raises the 
level of cooperation almost to the level that maximizes group payoff. And similar results are 
found when self-regulation is by means of rewards (as opposed to punishments), although the 
results tend to be a little less strong (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2008). 
 Given that humans (fishermen in the real world, student subjects in controlled economic 
experiments) act more cooperatively than predicted by standard economic theory, the question is 
to what extent formal government intervention can be counterproductive by crowding out the 
regulated agents’ propensity to cooperate voluntarily. In the environmental economics literature 
several cases have been documented of crowding out occurring in environmental problems. One 
of the earliest examples is by Anderson and Lee (1986, p.690) who observe that “the suggestion 
that policies be implemented assuming that people will not comply with them has the potential 
for eroding social capital which depends on respect for the law”. This claim has been corrobo-
rated by, among others, Hatcher et al. (2000) and Sutinen et al. (1999). 
 A second example of formal rules crowding out informal norms is provided by Cárdenas 
et al. (2000). In this study, experiments were run with people in rural Colombia who are con-
fronted with a common pool problem in their daily life. The game used by Cárdenas et al. was a 
CPR game in which subjects were asked to decide how much timber to extract from a forest. The 
scenario presented was that harvesting had an adverse effect on water quality (as is actually the 
case in the study region), posing a cost on everyone in the group. The game was played first 
without any regulations, while at a later stage an extraction norm was introduced that was en-
forced by a mild probabilistic fine. Cárdenas et al. (2000) find that subjects reduce their extraction 
level after the regulation is introduced, but start extracting more aggressively after realizing that 
consequences are rather mild. Strikingly, in the last rounds, extraction levels were higher with the 
regulation than without. As a result, payoffs are significantly lower when individuals are con-
fronted with a formal rule than in its absence; the weak official rule interacted with the internal 
norms of the subjects and crowded out their intrinsic motivation to cooperate. Therefore, it can 
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be seen as a warning towards indiscriminately introducing regulatory intervention without a 
proper understanding of how it might undermine norms already operating in the field. 
 These examples suggest that crowding out can occur in multiperson environmental prob-
lems too, but the studies presented above do not answer the question whether crowding out is 
likely to be permanent or just transitory. Some evidence on the issue of the irreversibility of 
crowding out is available from Bouma et al. (2008). This study addresses the issue of farmers’ 
propensity to invest in the construction (as well as the maintenance) of soil and water conserva-
tion structures. The study sites were five villages in three different watersheds in (predominantly 
arid) rural India. Investments in soil and water conservation structures (as well as in their main-
tenance) provide private and public benefits, and one can hypothesize that the same set of factors 
determines whether households invest in the structures themselves, or whether they put effort 
into maintaining them. In practice there is a crucial difference between the two activities, though. 
The investments themselves are highly subsidized (either by government organizations or by 
NGOs), whereas the maintenance activities are not. As expected, the households’ propensity to 
invest depends on the extent to which they are dependent on income from agriculture, on the 
size of their land holdings, etc. Interestingly, the authors found that the decision to invest also 
depends on the community’s amount of social capital. To measure social capital the authors use 
several proxies including social homogeneity (as given by the relative size of the largest caste in 
the community), but social capital was also quantified by having villagers participate in a simple 
game, a so-called Trust game. This game is played by two players and is set up as follows. The 
player that moves first, the investor, has to decide how to allocate an amount of money between 
him/herself and the second mover, the trustee. The investor can keep all money, give the total 
amount to the trustee, or anything in between. The amount of money sent – if any – is tripled by 
the experimenter, and given to the trustee. Then the trustee has to decide how to allocate the 
amount received between him/herself and the first mover, the investor. The trustee can keep all 
money, give the total amount to the trustee, or anything in between.  
 Behavior in the Trust game is expected to reflect social capital because the standard game 
theoretic prediction is that the investor will not send any money. The reason is that the trustee 
will not give back any money if he/she is purely selfish, and hence the investor will pocket the 
investment fund him/herself. Hence the Trust game provides two measures of social capital – 
trust/altruism as measured by the amount sent by the investor, and altruism/reciprocity as meas-
ured by the share returned by the trustee; see also Cox (2004). 
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 Bouma et al. (2008) used straightforward regression analysis to analyze the villagers’ pro-
pensity to invest in soil and water structures themselves, as well as in their maintenance. Explana-
tory variables included the various measures of social capital (social homogeneity, amount sent, 
and share returned) as well as a large vector of subject-specific and village-specific control va-
riables. In the results of the regression explaining the villagers’ propensity to invest in the struc-
tures themselves, only variables that reflect private stakes are significant (per capita land holdings, 
household size) and none of the “social capital” variables. In contrast, the “social capital” ones 
are the most significant variables explaining the propensity to undertake maintenance activities. 
This is salient because the investment activities are subsidized whereas the maintenance activities 
are not. Interestingly, the probability of a household contributing decreases substantially if there 
are maintenance funds that support material costs but that do not compensate individual effort. 
 These results reflect two things. First, it seems that the formal intervention by the gov-
ernment organizations and NGOs crowded out the households’ propensity to voluntarily contri-
bute to a public good – given that social capital indeed matters, as evidenced by its role in the 
maintenance activities. Second, it is noteworthy that this crowding out in the investment phase 
did not spill over to maintenance activities, suggesting that crowding out may be highly context-
specific, but also does not result in permanent crowding out (as the maintenance activities ob-
viously took place after the investments in the structures had been made). 
 
2.4 Crowding out and the design of environmental policies 
Having established that indeed formal intervention may be counterproductive in terms of re-
source conservation, the question arises whether government policies can be designed such that 
formal and informal institutions are mutually reinforcing. It seems that three institutional charac-
teristics are especially important: (i) the extent to which the external intervention is perceived to 
be legitimate and adequate (or proportional), (ii) the extent to which participation is voluntary, 
and (iii) to what extent the institution is perceived to be supportive (rather than restrictive). 
 When an institution is perceived to be legitimate and fair, participants are much more in-
clined to obey the rules (Frey, 1997, Ch.6). A striking example supporting this finding comes 
from Danish fisheries, where “fishers feel they are taken hostage by an illegitimate management 
system, and thus feel it is morally correct not to comply” (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). 
Somanathan (1991) describes how state intervention in Central Himalaya “directly weakened vil-
lagers’ incentives to allow regeneration and conserve forests”. As a result, a well-functioning in-
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formal system based on social arrangements was crowded-out. Similar phenomena can be ob-
served in many African societies (Vatn, 2007). This raises the question how legitimacy can be 
achieved. Sometimes it seems to be enough to convince the individuals about the usefulness of 
the rule and that obeying it is in everyone’s interest (Rodriguez-Sickert et al., 2008). Reeson and 
Tisdell (2008), however, found that moral suasion does indeed promote cooperation, but only in 
the very short-term. 
 One way to achieve legitimacy is involving stakeholders in the process of designing for-
mal institutions (Dankel, 2009; Hatcher et al., 2000; Jentoft et al., 1998). Such a participatory ap-
proach may build trust between users themselves, but also between users and central authorities. 
This may crowd in stewardship motives, and increase compliance. This form of co-management 
has the additional advantage that stakeholders possess important knowledge which may help 
crafting better institutions (Jentoft et al., 1998). An active dialogue between stakeholders and de-
cision makers can also help identifying and overcoming potential conflicts of objectives and 
stakeholders (Dankel, 2009). Many economists are somewhat skeptical about involving stake-
holders too closely in the process of designing institutions, as it gives them the possibility to seek 
rents (Bergland et al., 2002; Johnson and Libecap, 1982). This is indeed problematic, especially 
when certain stakeholders have a lot of political influence or resources to lobby for their interests. 
In many cases, the voices that shout loudest are most heard (Hatchard, 2005). One could over-
come this by making stakeholders more responsible and accountable (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 
2008). This is especially necessary when objectives of local users and the whole society are not 
congruent. For example, local users may be interested in having a well-functioning ecosystem 
(which ensures income in the future), while they do not necessarily care about biodiversity as 
such. 
 Regarding this, several economic experiments have been conducted to test whether user 
participation does indeed increase the effectiveness of the institution under consideration. In a 
laboratory setting, this can be tested by allowing regulated subjects to vote on the details of the 
enforcement institution’s design. Voting serves a dual purpose. First, the voting outcome (for 
example based on a majority voting rule) affects the design of the institution, and hence its direct 
effectiveness. But voting outcomes also provide information about the intentions and prefe-
rences of the community’s majority to effectively protect the resource and to maximize group 
payoff (as opposed to trying to non-cooperatively maximize one’s individual payoff). Therefore, 
in voting experiments we can observe whether a group of people is able to find consensus on 
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designing effective institutions, but also whether voting itself affects the compliance of the insti-
tution that has been agreed upon. 
 Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004) provide an example where a failure to obtain ma-
jority agreement for the socially optimal action is detrimental to social welfare. In their experi-
mental study, subjects have the possibility to vote on a minimum contribution level to a public 
good, upon which they make their decisions about how much to contribute. When the group fails 
to achieve a majority vote in favor of the rule, contributions are significantly lower than in the 
treatment without. This makes intuitive sense because even though in both cases there are no 
binding rules, a failure to reach consensus reveals information about the lack of cooperativeness 
of the co-players.  
 Obviously, the consequences of not achieving a majority vote are even more detrimental 
if the voting outcome results in the abolishment of formal institutions, as is uncovered by Tyran 
and Feld (2006). In this study, subjects can vote on the level of a (deterministic) sanction in a 
public goods environment. As is the case in Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004), subjects tend 
to contribute significantly less (more) when the majority vote was against (in favor of) the pres-
ence of an enforcement institution empowered to impose fines on those who contribute less than 
a certain level. 
 Having established that introducing voting with respect to details of the enforcement in-
stitution’s design can either improve or reduce welfare (and conservation) depending on the vot-
ing outcome, the question arises what factors determine voting behavior. Vyrastekova and van 
Soest try to answer this question in two related papers (Vyrastekova and van Soest (2003), and 
van Soest and Vyrastekova (2008)). In these two papers, subjects are allowed to vote on whether 
the enforcement institution should be provided with sufficient incentives to actively sanction ex-
cessive extraction, or not. More specifically, one subject was assigned to take the role as policy 
enforcer. The other subjects voted on whether or not the subject representing the enforcement 
institution is allowed to keep the fine revenues. If a majority votes against this, any collected fines 
are removed from the game. In this case, the enforcer is not expected to actively impose fines 
when observing violations of the formal rule because there are fixed costs associated with punish-
ing. In this setting the weakly dominant strategy is to vote in favor of the enforcer receiving the 
fine revenues. In Vyrastekova and van Soest (2003) two treatments were compared. In the first 
treatment, the policy enforcer always receives the revenues of her sanctioning activity (i.e., the 
fines imposed on those resource users who extract more than is prescribed by a rule). In the oth-
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er treatment, the enforcer is only allowed to keep the fines if the majority votes in favor of this, 
as described above. Vyrastekova and van Soest find support for the hypothesis that voting actual-
ly improves efficiency of resource use as compared to the treatment in which incentives are as-
signed exogenously. Casting their vote serves as a means for resource users to communicate their 
stance with respect to the need for reduced aggregate extraction. Conditional on a majority hav-
ing voted in favor of implementing an appropriate incentive structure, the extraction behavior 
was significantly more cooperative in the voting treatment than in the treatment where the en-
forcer is always allowed to pocket the fine revenues. 
 In a companion paper, van Soest and Vyrastekova (2008) analyze to what extent actual 
voting outcomes depend on the characteristics of the enforcement institution. The specific cha-
racteristic they focus on is the probability that when engaging in enforcement, the institution is 
indeed able to successfully impose fines. Keeping the expected fine constant, they compared the 
impact of a 50% chance of conviction (and a specific fine level) on voting behavior to that in case 
of a 90% chance of conviction (and a lower fine level). In both cases, the weakly dominant strat-
egy is to always vote in favor of the enforcer receiving the fine revenues, because of the argu-
ments given above. Van Soest and Vyrastekova actually find marked differences between the 
50% and 90% probability treatments. Whereas in the latter treatment resource users almost al-
ways vote in favor of the enforcer receiving the fines, a favorable majority voting outcome is 
achieved in less than 40% of the cases in the former treatment. These results are striking as they 
imply that trying to save on enforcement costs by reducing the probability of conviction (with a 
concomitant increase in the fine level such that the expected fine is kept constant) is hazardous if 
the enforcement institution's effectiveness is at least to some extent dependent on the support of 
the regulated individuals. If the intervention is insufficiently effective, intrinsic motivation to con-
tribute to the public good is reduced and the regulated agents decide to vote against the govern-
ment regulation. These findings suggest that individuals will not support an institution that is per-
ceived to be unfair. A very similar study has been undertaken by Kosfeld et al. (2009), where in-
dividuals could choose to become member of a sanctioning institutions. The authors show for-
mally that a likely equilibrium outcome will be that such an institution will be formed and effi-
ciency will be enhanced. These findings have been corroborated in an experimental setting. This 
study showed that institution formation can be an effective tool for solving a social dilemma, but 
fairness issues can be serious obstacles, confirming the results obtained by van Soest and Vyras-
tekova (2008). 
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 An interesting case arises when individuals can communicate with their peers regarding 
what they perceive to be appropriate behavior. An experimental regularity is that communication 
alone is often sufficient to promote cooperation, even if any agreements made are non-binding. 
In many instances the social pressure arising from “cheap talk” corrects behavior more success-
fully than a fine that could serve as a price. Even more surprising is the fact that voluntary partic-
ipation can foster cooperation even without social pressure. Di Falco and van Rensburg (2008) 
analyze the effect of governmental subsidies on livestock farmers in Ireland. Farmers receive li-
vestock premia based on the number of cattle, but they can choose to sign up for a rural envi-
ronmental protection scheme (REPS) as well. The authors analyze the effect of both payments 
on cooperation, but also on conservation effort. While the livestock premia have no effect on 
cooperation and a negative effect on conservation, the payments from the REPS lead to more 
cooperation and higher conservation effort. This is remarkable as encouraging cooperation is not 
an explicit aim of the REPS. An open question remains whether the voluntary nature of the pro-
gram makes users more cooperative, or just attracts users that have more cooperative attitudes. 
While it is well established that there are important feedbacks between institutions, preferences, 
and economic outcomes, further research is needed to identify the causal relationships between 
those elements. 
 
2.5 The theoretical foundations of crowding out 
In the previous section we have documented that crowding out is highly related to (i) the legiti-
macy of the institution and the level of involvement of the individuals, (ii) the voluntary nature of 
it, (iii) and the enforcement structure. While these are all properties of an institution, the mechan-
isms behind crowding out must be identified at the individual level. Microeconomic models that 
assume agents to be exclusively motivated by material interests are undoubtedly very useful, but 
they are not necessarily capable of describing behavior of the average person, who is concerned 
about his identity, embedded in social structures, and equipped with a moral compass. Even 
worse, “policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine the moral sentiments”, as 
Samuel Bowles (2008) has pointed out. Therefore, formal models of moral motivation help us to 
understand the interactions between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, while taking into account 
the corresponding feedbacks between the individual and the institution.  
 The fact that voluntary contributions to public goods are so omnipresent suggests that 
individuals derive some benefit from it. This raises the question whether people care about the 
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public good itself or whether they enjoy the act of giving. The first is sometimes referred to as 
“pure” or output-oriented altruism, while the second is referred to as “impure” or action-oriented 
altruism (Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008). This form of altruism is “impure” because it is not 
the result that makes people happy, but the act of giving itself. Whether this makes the deed less 
altruistic is part of a lively ongoing debate3
 Behavior is always the result of preferences and beliefs, embedded in certain institutions 
(Bowles, 2003). One way to account for pro-social behavior is to assume that agents have “social 
preferences”, such as inequity aversion or care about the payoff of other people in general (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2002). Some authors have criticized that explaining social behavior with social 
preferences is a tautology ; see for example Baland and Platteau (1996, Ch. 6). This is certainly a 
valid concern for any model with a limited strategy space and does of course also apply to models 
of moral constraints – if the researcher imposes them, it is no surprise that model outcomes re-
flect “moral behavior”. One could overcome this problem by developing very flexible models 
that allow for a whole array of strategies, such as pro- or anti-social preferences. Nyborg and 
Rege (2003) analyze how different models of moral motivation, based on altruism, social norms, 
fairness considerations and conditional cooperation can explain crowding out. In the literature 
several mechanisms have been suggested that give rise to crowding out; cf. Bowles (2008). First, a 
loss of self-determination triggers some loss of motivation. We hypothesize that this is linked to 
the fact that humans may undertake voluntary action to signal their pro-social stance and trust-
worthiness. Second, incentives convey information which changes the beliefs, and hence, the 
choices of an agent. And finally, incentives change the context frame of a decision or trigger a 
complete preference change. Let us discuss each of them in more detail.  
, and may explain why some people find the term “al-
truistic” misleading and name it therefore pro-social or other-regarding behavior.  
 
2.5.1 Crowding out and costly signals 
Costly signaling theory suggests that behavior which seemingly fails the cost-benefit test, occurs 
because such behavior conveys reliable information from the sender to the receiver. Contributing 
to the ‘common good’ can improve one’s reputation in the community (or one’s social status), 
which may yield future benefits. In this view acting pro-socially is hence an investment in one’s 
3 This is nicely illustrated in the American sitcom “Friends”, in the following conversation between Joey and Phoebe. 
Joey: Look, there's no unselfish good deeds, sorry. Phoebe: Yes there are! There are totally good deeds that are self-
less. Joey: Well, may I ask for one example? Phoebe: Yeah, it's... Y'know there's...no you may not! (Friends, Season 5, 
Episode 4) 
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reputation or self-image, which can be profitable because it gives cooperative individuals the pos-
sibility to identify each other in social interactions, thus avoiding being exploited by non-
cooperators. Trust plays a crucial role in economic exchange (Fehr, 2009), and one’s contribu-
tions to public goods can be interpreted as a signal that the person is likely to be trustworthy in 
bilateral exchange situations too. Dynamic models have been developed that show that investing 
in one’s reputation or self-image can enhance one’s long-term payoff and hence contributing to 
the common good can be rational after all (Brandt and Sigmund, 2005; Gintis et al., 2001; Nowak 
and Sigmund, 1998).  
 Costly signals have been attributed to crowding out before, though often implicitly as im-
paired expression possibility (Frey, 1997), but also explicitly (Posner, 2000a, 2000b; Smith and 
Bird, 2005). When this signal gets blurred one may as well stop investing in it. This can be illu-
strated with a simple example. Consider a population that consists of pure altruists, strategic al-
truists and selfish individuals that all contribute to a public good. In society, being an altruist is 
perceived to be a good thing, and it leads to a good reputation or high social status (at least with-
in the group of the altruistically-minded individuals). The pure altruists care only about the result, 
i.e. the public good, but not about the social consequences, while selfish individuals are purely 
financially motivated. Strategic altruists contribute to the public good when it leads to higher so-
cial status and reputation. When no material incentives are attached to the provision of a public 
good, the selfish would free ride, while the pure and strategic altruists would contribute. When a 
material incentive is introduced, the selfish increase their contributions. This implies that altruists 
can no longer be distinguished from selfish individuals. This could be one reason for the strategic 
altruists, who are concerned about their reputation, to stop signaling their good intentions. The 
same would occur if, more realistically, individual preferences are determined by material interest, 
altruistic motivations and reputational or self-image concerns. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) have 
shown formally how such a model can explain several aspects of crowding out. These theoretical 
predictions have been confirmed not only in laboratory settings, but also in a field experiment a 
financial incentive increases the willingness to contribute to a good cause in private (i.e. when 
nobody is watching), while it actually decreases contributions in public when it is an observable 
signal (Ariely et al., 2009).  
 In reality, the benefits from a good self-image are not constant, but depend on the com-
position of the population. Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2004) modeled a situation where 
individuals are either altruists or egoists and choose whether to contribute to a public good. So-
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cial rewards depend positively on the number of contributing cooperators and negatively on the 
number of selfish people. A financial incentive for contributing induces more selfish people to 
contribute and hence lowers the social reward for altruists. As a result, altruists may cease contri-
buting and aggregate provision may decrease. Ideally, models are flexible enough to identify the 
factors that affect the change in the various individual preferences, but that can also explain 
changes in the composition of the population ; see chapter 4 of this thesis for such a model. 
 
2.5.2 Crowding out and beliefs 
The information content of an incentive is related to beliefs, which have often been attributed to 
the crowding out phenomenon. This is especially the case in traditional principal-agent settings, 
where contracts are usually incomplete, and an extrinsic reward or control could change the per-
ceived nature of the task. One reason for this to occur is that the reward reveals that the task re-
quires much more effort or is much less fun than previously thought (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). 
Therefore, beliefs play a big role in explaining crowding out in bilateral interactions, and it is 
possible to extend this line of reasoning to the delivery of public goods. There is a lot of debate 
on the scope of civic duties and therefore people may update regularly what they are expected to 
do as committed citizens. When one is getting paid for donating blood one may infer that it is 
something one is not expected to do by default. Scientists, politicians or celebrities may accept to 
give a talk without any compensation, but after having received a honorarium a couple of times, 
they may think twice whether or not to give a free lecture. Brekke et al. (2003) have developed a 
model in which utility depends on leisure, the consumption of a private good, the consumption 
of a public good, and a self-image as a socially responsible person (given by how actions deviate 
from some socially desired effort level.) A sufficient extrinsic incentive will make individuals feel 
morally no longer obliged to contribute, and hence, contributions may go down when the unit 
value of leisure is higher than the unit value of private consumption.  
 In certain cases, beliefs are linked to the pro-social signals described in section 2.5.1. If 
people are conditionally cooperative, not trusting reveals information about the expected share of 
selfish individuals in the population, making conditional cooperators not cooperate (Sliwka, 
2007). In a similar vein, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) show how crowding out can easily oc-
cur in bilateral interactions, where players are either altruistic or selfish. Utility depends on ma-
terial payoffs and on the warm glow from giving, but also on how actions are perceived by the 
others. Actions depend on one’s own type, on one’s beliefs about the type of the people one is 
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matched with and on their observed prior actions. A key mechanism is that one obtains a higher 
utility by being nice to a good person (i.e. an altruist), and hence signaling to be an altruist may 
pay back.  
 
2.5.3 Crowding out and context-dependent preferences 
In many situations behavior is observed to be context-dependent and takes place in a “decision 
frame” that “is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, ha-
bits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Evi-
dence from social experiments and the field suggests that many social preferences are conditional 
(Cox et al., 2008; Fischbacher et al., 2001). For this reason many people play fair only as long as 
the opponent reciprocates. More generally, preferences depend on the situation the agent faces 
and also on the process that has led to the situation (Bowles, 2003). Situation-dependent prefe-
rences are not unique for social preferences, as choices are always the result of given preferences 
in a certain environment. Process-regarding preferences, however, are special in the sense that 
they do not depend on the outcome only, but also on the chain of events that led to this outcome 
(Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998). People may be reluctant to help someone who took some foo-
lish decisions that brought him into trouble while they do help someone who was just extremely 
unlucky or unfortunate. Thus, one may conclude that preferences are higher-dimensional.  
 While many studies indicate the multi-dimensional nature of preferences verbally, they are 
hardly used in formal analyses, as the results may be rather complex. Assuming preferences to be 
higher-dimensional implies that the corresponding equilibria are higher-dimensional as well. 
When an individual stops cooperating, we may be inclined to detect a preference change. This 
may be the correct inference in some cases but not in all. An alternative explanation is that prefe-
rences are stable but the environmental context has changed, thus resulting in the agent changing 
his/her behavior. That means that people may decrease their contributions to the public good in 
response to the introduction of formal government intervention if they interpret the regulation as 
reflecting a lack of trust (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005).  
 Laboratory experiments are useful for unraveling many of these situations. One example 
is the fact that players make different choices when they face a human opponent or a computer. 
Another frequent observation is that cooperative individuals cease cooperating after having been 
exploited by defectors: Once bitten, twice shy. What looks like a true preference change may just 
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be a change in behavior given that a subject finds herself in a less cooperative environment than 
expected or believed.  
 This implies that it is very difficult to identify a true preference change. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2.2, which plots an individual’s contribution to the public good on the horizontal axis 
against the sum of contributions of his/her fellow group members on the vertical axis. In this 
stylized example, contributing to public goods is conditional, i.e. it depends on the number of 
people who do so as well.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Reversible and irreversible changes in behavior. The left panel shows the observed contribu-
tion to a public good. The right panel illustrates that this information is not sufficient to distinguish a shift 
in the supply curve from a contribution change along a stable supply curve.  
 
Suppose that an experimenter observes a high level of cooperation by both the individual and by 
the rest of the group (say point H) in the early stage of a game; see the left-hand side panel of 
Figure 2.2. During the game, the sum of contributions by the rest of the group (on the vertical 
axis) decreases and the individual agent reduces his/her cooperation too, resulting in a move to 
point L. The experimenter thus observes the shift from point H to point L, but she cannot de-
termine whether this is change in behavior is only a response to a change in the environment, or 
whether the individual is so frustrated that his willingness to contribute in general has changed; 
see the right-hand side panel in Figure 2.2. The first situation is represented by a shift along the 
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supply curve S1, where one could speak of a reversible change. If the number of cooperators re-
turns to the initial high level, individual contribution will also be high again. An irreversible 
change would occur if the supply curve shifts to the left, from S2 to S2’. This implies that a re-
turn to the initial level of cooperation in the group will not be sufficient to restore the initial level 
of contribution, because the new level will be at H’. Note that observing a drop in cooperation, 
followed by lower individual contribution is not sufficient to recognize which situation applies, 
because one does not know the slope of the supply function. To be able to do so, one would 
need sufficiently detailed data for single individuals, and that is typically not available. In real-
world behavior it is even more difficult to distinguish temporary effect from a long-lasting prefe-
rence change.  
 Another way of capturing the context-dependency of decisions is to assume that individ-
uals hold multiple preferences that are weighted according to the situation. A good example is the 
model by Nyborg (2000) where individuals hold a preference as consumers, but also as good citi-
zens. Individuals apply different preferences in different contexts. Therefore, choices depend 
highly on the situation. It is a priori unclear how consumers weigh these different preferences. In 
any case, an external intervention may lead to a shifting of weights. This is especially relevant 
when intervention influences the perception of a social dilemma. If an individual faces several co-
players that are “in the same boat” she may be more inclined to infer some form of Kantian 
moral imperative: “if everyone cooperates, we will all be better off.” If, however, a government 
regulator is imposing some law, the agent probably views the game very differently. The stage is 
now completely set, so her actions will most likely neither affect her future payoff, nor the rules 
set by the regulator. Therefore she would probably try to get the best out of the situation, given 
the presence of the regulator.  
 
2.6 Repercussions on institutional constraints 
In this section we will map these microeconomic fundamentals to the experimental results and 
try to understand its implications for institutional design. As mentioned before, we have identi-
fied three characteristics of an institution that seem to matter: Legitimacy, voluntariness, and the 
enforcement structure. Legitimacy is highly linked to context-dependency, but also to the endo-
geneity of preferences. When the institution lacks legitimacy, individuals may infer that being co-
operative does not pay off, or even lose all confidence in cooperative behavior altogether. Note 
that it matters whether the institution is perceived to be legitimate, not whether it is legitimate by 
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objective standards. Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) present a case from Danish fisheries, 
where rule-compliance went down after the fishermen felt decoupled from the decision-making 
process.  
 Fairness issues should be taken seriously, as they may not only influence the distribution 
of rents, but also the success of the institution, and therefore, its efficiency. In South Africa the 
government intended to reduce illegal fish landings by establishing de jure rights for the local fi-
shermen. Some fishermen had the feeling that the process was not very fair and expressed their 
discontent by “protest fishing” (Hauck, 2008). 
 The voluntary nature of an institution is important for three reasons. First, it reveals im-
portant information about the intentions of other individuals. Second, it gives individuals the 
possibility to signal their social attitude or build up a good image or reputation. These can only 
work when individuals have actually the choice to do so, otherwise it would be impossible to dis-
tinguish true signals or images from forced ones. Because of this loss of information, individuals 
may as well cease investing in a social image at all. The third reason why a voluntary institution 
may perform better than a compulsory one, has been pointed out by Hauert et al. (2007). When 
individuals have the possibility to withdraw from some joint activity, it is much harder for others 
to take advantage of them. Therefore, self-determination is a route to escape being exploited by 
defectors. An example where a new law crowded out existing norms of reciprocity is presented 
by Borges and Irlenbusch (2007). When the German government introduced a law that made it 
possible to return any product just bought (for example via the internet), the number of products 
returned upon purchase increased sharply. This happened in spite of the fact that most sellers 
offered the same refund possibility even before the introduction of the law. 
 Concerning the importance of the enforcement structure, it is difficult to pinpoint the 
exact micro-foundations, as many mechanisms are at work, making the interaction between in-
centives and enforcement a complex one. Chhatre and Agrawal (2008) analyzed 152 forests that 
were common property in 9 countries. They found, as expected, that the more valuable forests 
were depleted faster when local enforcement is absent. Interestingly, in the presence of enforce-
ment the opposite holds, as regeneration is higher when forests are more valuable. 
 It seems to be important to distinguish enforcement mechanisms that are centralized 
from decentralized ones. Most experiments focus on the role of punishments and rewards in de-
centralized peer-to-peer enforcement. While most studies show that peer-to-peer enforcement is 
very effective in inducing cooperation, its impact on welfare is more ambiguous (Egas and Riedl, 
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2008). Dreber (2008) found that costly punishment raises cooperation, but the cost may be so 
high that the community as a whole may be worse off and therefore “winners don’t punish”. This 
finding has been challenged by Gächter (2008) who found that punishment pays off, but only in 
the long run. Nikiforakis (2008) finds that adding a second stage of peer-enforcement may reduce 
all efficiency gains. This happens, because given the possibility of counter-punishments, most 
players do not punish in the first place, because they fear retaliation. The same breakdown can be 
observed when rewards are used as enforcement mechanism, albeit for different reasons. A 
second stage of rewarding gives defectors the chance to build a profitable rewarding network 
(Stoop et al., 2008). Therefore, both mechanisms seem to have their drawbacks, as the desire to 
punish non-cooperators can be very resource consuming, while rewarding or reputation does not 
always help sanctioning the bad guys. Rockenbach and Milinski (2006) have looked at this issue in 
detail, and concluded that it is the combination of punishment and rewarding based on reputa-
tion performs best in an experimental setting. Ohtsuki et al. (2009) have analyzed a formal model 
where two players of the population randomly meet and can either cooperate, defect, or punish. 
Individuals have a good reputation, or a bad one. There is, however, the chance that someone 
mistakenly identifies a partner as good when he is bad or the other way round. They find that 
when the probability to correctly identify someone is high, defecting with bad guys is the best 
strategy, while one should cooperate with the good ones. When the probability of correctly iden-
tifying someone is low, always defecting is superior. When the probability is in a very narrow pa-
rameters space between these two cases, punishing defectors and cooperating with cooperators is 
the winning strategy. This may indicate that increasing information (either through monitoring or 
gossip) makes punishment redundant, provided that one can actually refuse to interact with bad 
people. If one cannot, as typically the case in a common pool problem, the answer is less 
straightforward. In such a case, an appropriate defense mechanism against defectors is needed, be 
it either punishment or ostracism.  
 
2.7 Recommendations for policy design 
When a central authority sets an external incentive, crowding out may occur, with potentially very 
costly consequences. Several fairly simple recommendations can be made to avoid this unin-
tended loss of social capital.  
 First, evidence suggests that individuals are able to form institutions and enforce them 
successfully. Communication and monitoring are important mechanisms for enforcement, and 
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often gossip suffices as an enforcement instrument. If this is not the case, and more drastic pu-
nishments are needed, the welfare effects are more ambiguous. Therefore, lack of communica-
tion or monitoring possibilities can form an obstacle to the evolution of effective social norms. 
In such a case, formal institutions may be more efficient. When a central authority steps in, lack 
of involvement, but also fairness considerations can be an important reason why individuals ac-
tively try to undermine the institution. Including individuals in the rule designing process is often 
a solution, but may have drawbacks sometimes. This is especially the case when some individuals 
perceive the institution to be unfair, no consensus is reached or individuals who were opposing 
the rule feel not committed to follow it. Sometimes the social norms in place are maladaptive, 
because the environment or the technology has changed, while the social norms have not 
(Posner, 1996). In such a case, government intervention may be necessary, but should be done 
very carefully. Any attempt to manage or regulate social norms may backfire, because the authori-
ty is perceived to be part of the “game” (Posner, 1998). In the same vein, any attempt made by a 
central authority to strengthen existing social norms or “invest in social capital” may be well in-
tended, but may have unpredictable consequences.  
 Financial incentives are problematic because individuals take into account that this will 
affect their (self)-image. Incentives in the form of public goods could be a solution, because indi-
viduals can then signal that they have a pro-social attitude. Indeed, provision of compensation in 
the form of publicly provided goods are more effective in increasing support for “not in my 
backyard” projects, such as a noisy road, than money (Mansfield et al., 2002).  
 Once the government decides to impose an external incentive, it is important to identify 
the nature of the product/task that is targeted. Subsidizing a good that has signaling character, 
like a hybrid car, may be counter-effective as pointed out by Ariely et al. (2009). If a small sym-
bolic tax tries to underline the fact that a certain behavior is unacceptable, this may work especial-
ly well with goods that have signaling character, as the following example shows. After introduc-
ing a small tax on plastic bags in Ireland, using them became highly stigmatized and usage 
dropped by 94% (Bowles, 2008).  
 In general, it is crucial how the external intervention is perceived. In the famous child 
care study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), a small fine was perceived as a price that parents 
were more than happy to pay. Therefore, the conventional economic wisdom of “getting the in-
centives right” may only work as intended if governments send an unambiguous message. In that 
sense, tradable emission rights, for instance, may be especially susceptible to crowding out, be-
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cause the owner holds the “right” to do something, taking away the negative connotation from 
polluting (Frey and Stutzer, 2006). This seems to be relevant as well in the recent discussion on 
the success of individual transferable quotas (ITQ) in fisheries (Costello et al., 2008). When social 
issues are important, as is typically the case in small-scale fisheries, ITQs may undermine local 
stewardship (Ban et al., 2009). In the worst case, ITQ regimes crowd out ecosystem responsibility 
of the ITQ holders (who hold the “right” to fish), while leading to “protest fishing” among the 
non-holders, see also Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
2.8 Conclusions 
We can neither rely on external regulation, nor on voluntary actions alone to solve many envi-
ronmental problems. While there is not one standard recipe for solving diverse social dilemmas, 
several regularities that determine success or failure of policy design have been identified. Expe-
rimental and theoretical work has shown that decentralized arrangements, based on voluntary 
action, communication, peer control, and reputation can be very effective, but also highly fragile. 
As a warning, it must be emphasized that imposing external interventions may not strengthen 
these arrangements, but replace them, leading to crowding out and a loss of social capital. Even 
when a certain regulation is established to formalize a certain right that de facto already exists, 
surprises may occur. In any case, governments need to be aware that institutional changes im-
posed may lead to unintended consequences that will be very difficult to reverse.  
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Contagious cooperation, temptation and 
ecosystem collapse
 
 
 
Abstract
 
Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming 
a social dilemma, as it may occur in the joint management of a common pool resource, but also 
that they can be subject to slow erosion and even to sudden collapse. Using differential equa-
tions, we model a small community harvesting a renewable natural resource. The diffusion of co-
operative harvesting norms takes place via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the 
temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. We show that a collapse of the so-
cial-ecological system easily occurs if agents are endowed with a finite amount of time that can be 
maximally used for resource harvesting. We explore the underlying mechanisms by analyzing how 
a catastrophic transition from cooperation to norm violation resulting in a resource collapse is 
affected by changes in key parameters, including the severity of negative externalities from re-
source harvesting, the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress in resource 
harvesting. 
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This chapter is a slightly modified version of: Richter, A.P., D.P. van Soest, and J. Grasman, 2010. 
Contagious cooperation, temptation and ecosystem collapse, submitted to the Journal of Environmen-
tal Economics and Management. We are grateful to Cees Withagen for valuable comments on an ear-
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3.1 Introduction 
The history of mankind is one of gradual change in environmental quality and natural resource 
abundance, punctuated with sudden collapses of populations, species, ecosystems, and sometimes 
even of entire civilizations (Diamond, 2005; Scheffer, 2009; Taylor, 2009). Examples include the 
fall of the Maya empire and the collapse of the human population on Easter Island following the 
depletion of forest resources (Bahn and Flenley, 1992; Brander and Taylor, 1998; Diamond, 2005; 
Lentz and Hockaday, 2009; Scheffer, 2009). While system collapse is often the result of the inter-
play between natural resource regeneration and the social-economic system driving resource use, 
most of the research aimed at explaining its underlying mechanisms has focused on the former, 
with special emphasis on the existence of non-linear relationships in the dynamics of renewable 
natural resources. Examples of systems characterized by non-linear dynamics are those which 
feature a minimum population size below which extinction is inevitable (because of genetic dege-
neration, or because of increased difficulties to find a potential mate (Berck, 1979; Gould, 1972; 
Van Kooten and Bulte, 2000, Ch. 7)), but also those with complex interactions between the vari-
ous components of the ecological system as is the case in, for example, shallow lakes (Mäler et al., 
2003; Peterson et al., 2003; Scheffer, 1998) and grazing systems in semi-arid ecosystems 
(Anderies et al., 2002; Janssen et al., 2004; Kéfi et al., 2007). The non-linearities in the regenera-
tion functions typically give rise to the prediction that continued overharvesting of the resource 
results in a gradual demise of the resource until a threshold – or tipping point – in the ecological 
system is reached, beyond which collapse is inevitable and where subsequent system restoration is 
very costly – if not impossible; cf. Scheffer et al. (2001).  
 In this chapter we contribute to the literature on tipping points in social-ecological sys-
tems by analyzing how social interactions between resource users affect a system’s resilience. Fol-
lowing the literature on economic cooperation in social dilemmas (Bischi et al., 2004; Bulte and 
Horan, 2010; Noailly et al., 2003; Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau, 2007; Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996) we develop a model in which a finite number of community members have access to a 
commonly owned renewable resource. As is the case in the real world, we assume that the com-
mon property regime is such that community members are allowed to access and harvest the re-
source. However, it not allowed to hire non-community members to engage in resource harvest-
ing. Therefore, each agent is endowed with a binding time constraint. Next, the natural regenera-
tion function of the resource is modeled as a standard logistic growth function (Verhulst, 1838), 
and community members can decide to act cooperatively in harvesting the resource by limiting 
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extraction, or not. Agents are tempted to act non-cooperatively, also referred to as defecting, be-
cause of the associated higher profits, but we also allow for the possibility that whenever a coo-
perator and a defector meet, the cooperator may convince the defector of the social desirability 
of acting cooperatively. The diffusion of social norms regarding harvesting is thus assumed to 
take place via interpersonal relations, with cooperation being “contagious” with a certain proba-
bility: when an encounter takes place, the cooperator makes a moral appeal to the defector to 
start acting in the community’s interest, and the appeal may or may not be successful. This mod-
eling approach is consistent with the effectiveness of verbal expressions of discontent in inducing 
and sustaining cooperation in social dilemma situations as observed in laboratory experiments 
(Masclet et al., 2003), but the mechanism can also reflect the use of self-regulatory instruments 
like peer-to-peer sanctions or rewards (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gächter 
et al., 2008; Janssen et al., 2010; Rand et al., 2009). Our model thus combines the literature on the 
evolution of social norms for resource harvesting (Ostrom, 2000; Richerson et al., 2003) with in-
sights from that on contagious behavior (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Dodds and Watts, 
2005; Heal and Kunreuther, 2010; Lopez-Pintado and Watts, 2008; Young, 2009).  
 Unlike most studies of this kind, we do not assume any non-linearities in the dynamics of 
the ecological system or the social-economic system that, by themselves, give rise to multiple 
equilibria. If, for whatever reason, the number of cooperators increases, the social pressure on 
defectors to become cooperators increases, but the temptation to defect increases as well because 
the benefits of free-riding are larger too. And the opposite holds if there is a sudden, exogenous 
decrease in the number of cooperators. The social pressure on non-cooperators decreases, but 
the rents from defecting are dissipating too.  
 However, our system can still generate positive feedbacks between the two systems, giv-
ing rise to multiple equilibria, where the “good equilibrium” can be very resilient to exogenous 
shocks or external developments (such as exogenous technological progress in harvesting), while 
the same small shocks or developments cause the social-ecological system to collapse if the pa-
rameters are close enough to a critical threshold. This is a result of the positive feedbacks emerg-
ing because of the interaction of the social-economic and the ecological systems – these feed-
backs are driven by the fact that labor time is scarce as community members are not allowed to 
hire outsiders to assist in harvesting. If the resource stock declines due to an exogenous devel-
opment, cooperators restrain themselves, while defectors still harvest as much as they can. This 
increases the wedge between profits of defectors and cooperators, raising the temptation to de-
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fect. As a result, more cooperators decide to defect, putting even more pressure on the resource 
stock, which then increases temptation even more. This leads to a spiral, and eventually, the sys-
tem flips to the “bad” equilibrium. The societal consequences of such a flip can be substantial 
because the system exhibits hysteresis: upon system collapse, moving back to the “good equili-
brium” can be difficult and costly – if it is feasible at all.  
 To our knowledge, this chapter is the first to explain that collapse can be caused by inter-
personal interactions and economic constraints, rather than by the presence of non-linear func-
tions describing either resource growth or social pressure through user interaction. Our focus on 
the social-economic subsystem is especially relevant because of the prominent role social capital 
and community governance play in managing common pool resources like fish, forests, or graz-
ing lands (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990, 2008, 2009; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006). 
Having said that, it is also true that our chapter is not the first in noting that coupled social-
ecological systems can be inherently complex (Barkley Rosser, 2001; Liu et al., 2007; Rammel et 
al., 2007). Research on tipping points in the social-economic system includes Schelling’s model of 
segregation, in which agents prefer having neighbors with the same cultural background, giving 
rise to positive feedbacks depending on whether there are relatively few or relatively many ‘kin-
dred spirits’ in a region (Card et al., 2008; Schelling, 1969). Similar tipping points associated with 
social reinforcement have been identified in extreme situations such as riots, or simply because 
agents face substantial uncertainty about the possible consequences of their actions (Ball, 2004; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Gladwell, 2000; Granovetter, 1978; Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Scheffer et 
al., 2003). Regarding work about social interaction on renewable resource use, Iwasa et al. (2007) 
have analyzed a system in which agents are more inclined to undertake pollution-mitigating activi-
ties when the environment is in a poor state, and also when social pressure is high. In their mod-
el, alternative stable states occur when social pressure increases strongly with the fraction of coo-
perators in the community. This framework has been extended to incorporate non-linear re-
source dynamics as well, leading to even richer dynamics (Suzuki and Iwasa, 2009b). Finally, Tay-
lor (2009) developed a model in which a resource has a certain minimum viable size and resource 
extraction has a negative effect on the profitability of a competing sector, making resource ex-
ploitation even more attractive. Taylor finds that this positive feedback leads to alternative stable 
states: either the resource is fully depleted, or in relatively healthy shape. This chapter is comple-
mentary to this research because we do not a priori assume any functional forms giving rise, by 
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themselves, to tipping points, while our results stem from the fact individuals’ time endowments 
are not infinite.  
 The setup of the paper is as follows. In section 3.2 we present the model, focusing on the 
mechanisms driving changes in the size of the resource stock and on those affecting the number 
of cooperating individuals in the community. To provide a benchmark against which to evaluate 
the outcome of the coevolution of the ecological and social-economic systems, we derive the 
standard non-cooperative equilibrium as well as the socially optimal allocation of effort. In sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4 we analyze how the social-economic and ecological systems coevolve in re-
sponse to changes in key drivers of change including population growth and technological 
progress in harvesting. The analysis is complicated but we are able to analytically identify the sys-
tem’s tipping points in case (i) there are no sources of income other than resource harvesting and 
(ii) the agents’ effective time endowments system increase over time (for example because of 
technological progress in domestic activities). Having identified the mechanisms giving rise to 
tipping points in this simplest (and not most realistic) case in section 3.3, we resort to a numerical 
analysis in section 3.4 in which we relax the assumption of no alternative sources of income and 
where we analyze the system’s resilience in the face of more important drivers of change such as 
population growth, technological progress in harvesting, or changes in the strength of moral per-
suasion. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 The model 
We take the Gordon-Schaefer renewable resource model as starting point (Clark, 1990), and as-
sume that there are 1N ?   agents in a community who have access to a commonly-owned natural 
resource. The right to extract is exclusively associated with community membership; community 
members are not allowed to employ outsiders to assist in harvesting. The size of the resource 
stock at time t  is denoted by ( ).X t  Each agent is endowed with a fixed effort rate eˆ  which she 
can allocate to harvesting the common pool resource, or to an alternative economic activity. The 
rate of effort agent i ( 1... )i N?  allocates to resource harvesting at time t  is denoted by ( )ie t , and 
hence ˆ ( )ie e t?  is the effort rate she allocates to the alternative activity. We assume that the return 
to effort in the alternative economic activity is constant and equal to w , so that the income agent 
i  derives from this activity is equal to ˆ( ( )).iw e e t?   
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 The relationship between harvesting effort and the quantity of resource goods harvested 
is given by the Schaefer production function, ( ) ( ) ( ),i ih t qX t e t? where ( )ih t  denotes the harvest 
rate of individual i  at time t  and q  is a technology parameter reflecting what fraction of the re-
source stock can be harvested per unit of effort allocated to harvesting (the so-called catchability 
coefficient). That means that the total harvest rate by the N  agents at time t  equals  
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )N Ni ii ih t qX t e t? ??? ? .  
 Regarding the resource dynamics, this harvesting activity reduces the remaining stock, but 
there is also natural regeneration. The change in the size of the resource stock at time t , / ,dX dt
 
is equal to the net natural growth resulting from reproduction and mortality, ( ( ))G X t , minus the 
sum of the individual harvesting rates of all the N  agents having access to the resource. We as-
sume that resource regenerates according to the standard logistic growth function, 
( ( )) ( )(1 ( ) / )G X t rX t X t K? ?  where 0r ?  is the intrinsic growth rate and 0K ?  is the carrying 
capacity – the maximum stock size the resource would eventually reach if no harvesting took 
place. Without loss of generality we rescale the resource stock with the carrying capacity by set-
ting 1.K ?  The variable X  can now be thought of as the size of the natural resource stock as a 
fraction of its maximum value, and hence the size of the resource stock changes over time as fol-
lows: 
? ? 1/ ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ).N iidX dt rX t X t qX t e t?? ? ? ?  (3.1) 
Regarding the returns to harvesting effort, we assume harvests can be sold at the time-invariant 
unit price P  (so that sales revenues are equal to ( ) ( ) ( )),i iPh t PqX t e t?  but we also assume that 
resource harvesting gives rise to an instantaneous negative externality: the returns any agent rece-
ives on her effort negatively depends on the total effort put in by the 1N ?  agents. More specifi-
cally, we assume that the net income generated by resource harvesting at time t  is equal to 
( ( ) ( )) ( ),iPqX t vE t e t?  where 1( ) ( )
N
jj
E t e t???  denotes the community’s aggregate effort in re-
source  
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harvesting, and v  reflects the extent to which the net marginal benefits of resource harvesting of 
an individual agent are reduced if the community’s aggregate effort increases by one unit. Here, v  
can be thought of as the costs of congestion (for example because agents interfere with each oth-
er or have to compete for the bests spots), but also as any other negative interaction between 
contemporaneous harvesting activities (Cárdenas et al., 2000; Clark, 1990, p.223; Iwasa et al., 
2007; Satake et al., 2007; Scheffer et al., 2000; Suzuki and Iwasa, 2009a; Wilson, 1982). Adding up 
the net revenues of harvesting and those of the alternative economic activity, total income earned 
by agent i  at time t  is: 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ),i i i iPqX t e t w e e t vE t e t? ? ? ? ? where ˆ0 ( ) .ie t e? ? 4
Note that this setup implies that there are two negative externalities, an instantaneous one and an 
intertemporal one. The intertemporal externality arises because current resource extraction re-
duces the amount of resources available in the future – thus reducing the marginal productivity of 
harvesting effort (cf. (3.1) and (3.2)). The instantaneous externality, 
 (3.2) 
vE , arises because of crowd-
ing effects (cf. (3.2)). These intertemporal and instantaneous externalities give rise to so-called 
Class I and Class II problems, respectively (Munro and Scott, 1985), and we assume that com-
munity members are concerned about the instantaneous crowding externality (the Class II prob-
lem), but not about the intertemporal externality (the Class I problem) – because they are not ful-
ly informed about the dynamics of resource regeneration, or simply because they are myopic. 
This setup is consistent with the real-world observation that many communities are able to reach 
a consensus on how to overcome the direct externality of the Class II problem (e.g. taking turns 
in getting the best fishing spots rather than competing for them), but not on the amount of re-
source to be extracted, which corresponds to the Class I problem; see for instance Taylor (1987). 
 
4 From here onwards we omit time indicators, unless omitting them may cause confusion. 
48
3.2.1 Privately and socially optimal resource use 
Before analyzing the interaction of agents when some (but not necessarily all) adhere to a social 
norm, we first determine the socially optimal and privately optimal use of the renewable resource 
to obtain benchmarks for the more complex interactions between cooperators and defectors as 
presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
Harvesting decision of cooperators 
Because agents do not take the intertemporal Class I problem into account, the relevant bench-
mark for cooperation is the aggregate effort that maximizes the community’s instantaneous ag-
gregate income to overcome the Class II problem. We refer to this benchmark as the social op-
timum.5
ˆ0 ( ) .ie t e? ?
 Using superscript SO to denote socially optimal values and taking into account that 
for all t , the aggregate effort that maximizes instantaneous social welfare ( )SOE X  is 
defined as follows:  
? ?2ˆ ˆ( ) max ( ) 0 .SO
E
E X PXqE w Ne E vE E Ne? ? ? ? ? ?  (3.3) 
Solving (3.3), the symmetric individual socially optimal extraction effort rate ( / )SO SOe E N?  is 
equal to: 
ˆ ˆ( 2 ) / ( ),
ˆ/ ( ) ( 2 ) / ( ),
2
0 0 / ( ).
e X w vNe Pq
PqX we w Pq X w vNe Pq
vN
X w Pq
? ??? ??? ? ? ??? ? ???
SO
                if  
   if     
                if   
(3.4)
 From (3.4), we see that it is socially optimal to allocate all available effort eˆ  to resource harvest-
ing if ˆ( 2 ) / ( )X w vNe Pq? ?  and hence there is no social dilemma as long as putting in eˆ  cannot 
draw down the resource stock below this level – even if all N  agents commit maximum effort. 
Calculating /dX dt  (see equation 3.1) when ˆE Ne?  and ˆ( 2 ) / ( )X w vNe Pq? ? , we find that 
? ?
? ?2
/
ˆ
2
r Pq w N
e
vr Pq
?? ?
 
is a necessary and sufficient condition to have a social dilemma. Let us now determine the socially 
optimal steady state resource stock. The resource is in equilibrium when / 0dX dt ?  and the ag-
5 The socially optimal level of the resource stock as defined here is below the “true” socially optimal level as it only 
solves the instantaneous Class II problem whereas the true social optimum would require agents taking into account 
the intertemporal (= Class I) problem as well. 
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gregate harvests equal the natural growth. Using (3.1) and (3.4), the socially optimal steady state 
resource stock is thus equal to: 
2
2 2
( ) /ˆ ˆ( - ) / ,
2
2 ( ) /ˆ
2 2
SO
r Pq w Nr eNq r e
rv Pq
X
vr wq r Pq w Ne
vr Pq rv Pq
?? ?? ??? ? ? ?? ?? ? ??
   if     
     if     . 
 (3.5) 
 
Harvesting decision of defectors 
Next, let us analyze what happens if all agents try to maximize their own private welfare without 
taking into account the negative consequences of their extraction effort on the welfare of all oth-
er agents in the community. We refer to this outcome as the non-cooperative equilibrium (using 
superscript NC). The effort rate that maximizes instantaneous private welfare is given by 
? ? ? ?? ?ˆ ˆ( , ) max ,
i
i i i i i i ie
e X E PXqe w e e v E e e e e? ?? ? ? ? ? ?0<  (3.6) 
where .i jj iE e? ???  The best response function for selfish agents to the aggregate effort of the  
1N ?  other agents in the community is given by  
1 ˆ( , ) min , ,
2 2i i
PXq we X E E e
v? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?
BR  (3.7)
 
where superscript BR stands for best response. In the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium we 
have ( 1) BRiE N e? ? ? , and hence the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium effort rate equals 
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
ˆ ˆ( 1) / ( ),
ˆ( ) / ( 1) / ( ),
( 1)
0 0 / .
NC
e X w ve N Pq
PqX we X w Pq X w ve N Pq
v N
X w Pq
? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ??? ? ??
                if  
   if     
                if  
 (3.8) 
Next, we determine the non-cooperative equilibrium steady state resource stock. Substituting 
1
ˆ( )N ii e t Ne? ??  and ? ? ? ?1 / ( 1)N ii e N PqX w v N? ? ? ??  – cf. (3.8) – into equation (3.1) and setting 
/ 0dX dt ? , we find that the non-cooperative steady state resource stock is equal to 
2
2 2
( ) /ˆ ˆ( - ) / ,
2
( 1) ( ) /ˆ
( 1) 2
NC
r Pq w Nr eNq r e
rv Pq
X
N vr Nwq r Pq w Ne
N vr NPq rv Pq
?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ??
                if     
     if     .
 (3.9) 
Comparing (3.4) to (3.8) and (3.5) to (3.9), we find that NC SOX X?  and ( ) ( )NC SOe X e X? , and the 
social optimum and non-cooperative equilibrium coincide only if either  
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? ?
2
/
ˆ
2
r Pq w N
e
rv Pq
?? ?  or 1.N ?  Furthermore, if 
? ?
2
/
ˆ ,
2
r Pq w N
e
rv Pq
?? ?  the larger the community ( )N , 
the more resource rents are dissipated absent any cooperation. If N  is sufficiently large such that 
/ ( 1) 1N N ? ? , all resource rents are dissipated as soon as the time constraint ceases to be binding 
in harvesting:  
ˆ ˆ
( 1)i i
PqX wPqX w vN e we we
v N
? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?
NC NC   (3.10) 
if ˆ/ ( ) ( ( 1)) / ( ).w Pq X w ve N Pq? ? ? ?   
 
3.2.2 Modeling cooperation, defection and the dynamics of social interaction 
We assume that agents choose between two modes of behavior, acting cooperatively or non-
cooperatively (also referred to as defection). We assume that cooperating agents take the instan-
taneous Class II problem into account, while agents acting non-cooperatively just try to maximize 
their own instantaneous income, taking the effort of all other agents as given. In this subsection, 
we first derive the effort rates chosen by the cooperators and defectors, and then discuss the me-
chanisms inducing cooperators to defect, and those inducing defectors to start cooperating. Fol-
lowing Bischi et al. (2004), we assume that cooperators always put in their fair share of the aggre-
gate effort that would maximize instantaneous social welfare given the current size of the re-
source stock, ( ).SOE X  In other words, cooperators choose ( ) / ( )C SO SOe E X N e X? ?  for all X , 
where ( )SOE X  is given by (3.4). 
 Next, we derive what harvesting effort defectors choose to maximize their private wel-
fare, taking into account both the size of the resource stock X  and the number of cooperators 
and defectors in the community – as the numbers of cooperators and defectors influence the ag-
gregate extraction effort invested by the defectors. We use ( )C t  and ( )D t  to respectively denote 
the number of cooperators and defectors in the community at time t , where ( ) ( )D t N C t? ? . 
Then a defector maximizes his instantaneous profits, facing the aggregate effort of the 1N ?
 
oth-
er agents ? ?1 .iE Ce D e? ? ? ?SO BR  Substituting this expression into (3.7) and using (3.4), we find 
that the equilibrium effort rate defectors allocate to harvesting is equal to: 
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? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
ˆ2 ( 1)ˆ ,
2
2 ˆ2 ( 1)( , ) ,
2 ( 1) 2
0 0 .
D
w vNe N Ce X
Pq Pq N C
PXq w N C w w vNe N Ce X C X
vN N C Pq Pq Pq N C
wX
Pq
? ?? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ??? ? ???
                                   if        
    if    
                                   if     
 
(3.11) 
Note that the harvesting effort of defectors does not only depend on the size of the resource X , 
but also on the number of agents acting cooperatively C  at every instant in time. Furthermore, 
consistent with intuition, ( , ) ( )D NCe X C e X?  if 0C ? ; cf. (3.8) and (3.11). If all other agents act 
non-cooperatively, the best response of a defector is to choose the non-cooperative equilibrium 
effort rate too.  
 Next, we model social interaction by taking into account two countervailing forces. One 
is that agents are tempted to act non-cooperatively because of the higher profits associated with 
acting selfishly. The other is that agents see the need of solving the instantaneous Class II prob-
lem, and hence cooperators have an incentive to try to convince defectors of the social desirabili-
ty of reducing their harvesting effort to the cooperative rate. We explain the two countervailing 
forces one by one. 
 Regarding the temptation to start acting selfishly, we assume that agents are more likely to 
defect the larger is the income associated with acting non-cooperatively as compared to that of 
acting cooperatively. This assumption is consistent with the observation that individuals tend to 
consider relative payoff differences rather than absolute ones (Azar, 2007). More specifically we 
assume that the fraction of cooperators that decide to defect at time t  because of the temptation 
of higher income is equal to  
/ ( ( ), ( ))1 ,
( ( ), ( ))
C
D
dC dt X t C t
C X t C t
?? ?
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
 
where ?  is a parameter capturing the extent to which cooperators are tempted to become defec-
tors for a given payoff ratio ( ) / ( ).C Dt t? ?  Next, we assume that whenever a cooperator meets a 
defector, there is a probability ?  that the former succeeds in convincing the latter that he should 
act cooperatively. While we do not specifically rule out that cooperators turn into defectors after 
an encounter, we do assume that the net effect is favoring cooperation. This is a plausible as-
sumption because defectors have no incentive to convince cooperative individuals to defect. The 
occurrence of discrete encounters can be modeled as a Poisson process, with ?  being the Pois-
52
son parameter. The probability of an encounter taking place in the time interval ( , )t t t? ?  is pro-
portional with t?  and with the number of cooperators ( )C t  and defectors ( )D t . For t?  suffi-
ciently small, the possibility of a community member having more than one encounter is negligi-
ble. Consequently, the probability of cooperator meeting a defector in the time interval ( , )t t t? ?  
is equal to ( ) ( ) / .C t D t t N? ?  Taking into account the fixed size of the community and defining 
? ??? , the expected value of the change in ( )C t  is equal to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /C t t C t C t D t t N?? ? ? ? ? , 
and hence ? ?/ ( ) ( ) /dC dt C t N C t N?? ? . Combining the effects of moral persuasion and tempta-
tion, the number of cooperators develops over time according to the following differential equa-
tion: 
? ? ( )/ ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 .
( )
C
D
tdC dt C t N C t C t
N t
?? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
6
We can now analyze how the behavioral composition of resource users in the population affects 
the size of the resource stock, and vice versa. Suppose there are 
 (3.12) 
( )C t  cooperators at time t  (and 
hence ( )N C t?  defectors). In equilibrium, we have (i) / 0dX dt ? , and (ii) / 0dC dt ? ; see equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.12), respectively. The number of cooperators does not change over time 
( / 0dC dt ? ) if the number of cooperators defecting equals the number of defectors being per-
suaded to act cooperatively:  
? ? 1 CDC N C CN
? ?? ?
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
 (3.13) 
 and / 0dX dt ?  requires that  
? ? ? ?? ?1 .C DrX X qX Ce N C e? ? ? ?  (3.14) 
We proceed as follows. In section 3.3 we analyze the case where there is no alternative economic 
activity ( 0)w ?  so that the resource good is the only source of income for the community. This 
assumption allows us to derive analytical results because / /C D C De e? ? ?  (cf. (3.2)), thus consi-
derably facilitating the analysis of (3.12) and (3.13). With 0w ?  analytical results cannot be ob-
tained, and hence we resort to a numerical analysis presented in section 3.4. 
 
6 If the success rate of convincing defectors is too low (more specifically, if ? ?1 / 2 ),N N? ?? ?  cooperators will com-
pletely disappear from the population – as shown in section 3.4.2. Inserting 0C ?  in equation (3.12) it is easy to see 
that the disappearance of cooperators results in / 0dC dt ?  independent of whatever policy intervention a regulator 
may want to undertake. This is neither plausible nor very interesting, and hence we assume that ? ?1 / 2 .N N? ?? ?  
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3.3 The coevolution of the resource stock and cooperation without an outside option  
Suppose the community is self-sufficient and there is no alternative economic activity. The ab-
sence of an alternative economic activity can be captured by setting 0w ? , which can be inserted 
directly into equations (3.1)–(3.14). 
3.3.1 The steady states of the social-ecological system 
Combining (3.4) and (3.11) and setting 0w ? , we can identify three regimes (R1–R3).  
If ˆ2 ,vNeX
Pq
?  we have ˆ.C De e e? ?   (3.15.R1) 
If ? ?? ?
ˆ2 1 ˆ2 ,
2
vN N C e vNeX
Pq N C Pq
? ? ? ??  we have 2
C PqXe
vN
?  and ˆ.De e?   (3.15.R2) 
If ? ?? ?
ˆ2 1
0 ,
2
vN N C e
X
Pq N C
? ?? ? ?  we have 2
C PqXe
vN
?  and ? ?? ?
2
.
2 1
D PqX N Ce
vN N C
?? ? ?  
(3.15.R3) 
Before analyzing the three regimes, let us first have a closer look at the two boundaries separating 
the three regimes. As is evident from (3.4), the boundary between regimes 1 and 2 is  
1/ 2
ˆ( ) 2 / ( )
R R
X C vNe Pq?   (3.16) 
and this is a horizontal line in the ( , )C X  space. For all 
1/ 2
( )
R R
X X C?  every agent in the com-
munity chooses the maximum effort rate eˆ , while the cooperative agents always choose interior 
harvesting effort rates when 
1/ 2
( ) .
R R
X X C?  As implied by equation (3.11), the boundary separat-
ing regimes 2 and 3 is given by  
2/ 3
ˆ2 ( 1)( )
(2 )R R
vNe N CX C
Pq N C
? ?? ?  (3.17) 
and this boundary is downward-sloping and concave in the ( , )C X  space. For any number of 
cooperators C , defectors continue harvesting at the maximum effort rate eˆ  for all 
2/ 3
( )
R R
X X C? , whereas every community member chooses interior harvesting effort rates when 
2/ 3
( )
R R
X X C? .  
 Let us now turn to analyzing the dynamics of the size of the resource stock and of the 
number of cooperators in the three regimes. All results are summarized in Table 3.1. Row A of 
this table contains the regime boundaries (3.16) and (3.17), while rows B and C represent ( )Ce X  
and ( , )De X C  respectively, in each of the three regimes; cf. (3.15.R1)–(3.15.R3).  
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Defining ( , ) ( ) ,C DE X C Ce N C e? ? ?  the community’s aggregate effort in each of the three re-
gimes are presented in row D. It is then straightforward to calculate both the relative change in 
the size of the resource stock 1 dX
X dt
? ?? ?? ?  and the relative change of the number of cooperators 
1 dC
C dt
? ?? ?? ?  in each of the three regimes by inserting ( , )E X C  into the associated differential equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.12) – see rows E and G. Then, we calculate the combinations of X  and C  that 
give the isoclines / 0dC dt ?  and / 0dX dt ?  (see equations (3.13) and (3.14)) – the so-called 
nullclines for the two state variables X  and C ; see rows F and H, respectively. 
 Let us first have a look at the nullcline of the resource stock in the three regimes; see row 
F in Table 3.1. We only have / 0dX dt ? for 0C ?  in regime 1 if the community’s aggregate time 
endowment is too small – given the other parameter values – for the agents to collectively draw 
down the stock to ˆ2 / ( );X vNe Pq?  see also equation (3.9). 7
2
/ˆ .
2
rPq Ne
rv Pq
? ?
 To have the system reach regimes 2 
and 3, we need  If that is the case, the nullcline of X  in regime 2 is equal to 
? ?
2
ˆ2
( )
2
vN r qe N C
X C
vNr Pq C
? ? ? ?? ?? ? , and is hence an upward-sloping and concave function of the num-
ber of cooperators, C ; see row F for regime 2 in Table 3.1. Finally, the nullcline of X  is upward-
sloping and concave in regime 3, as given by 2( ) ,( )
vrX C
Pq Z C vr
? ?  where 
/ 2( ) .
1
N C C NZ C
N C
? ?? ? ?  Because ( ) 1Z C ?  if C  is small relative to N , the nullcline is almost ho-
rizontal in regime 3. Finally, there is a trivial nullcline at 0X ?  (not shown): once the renewable 
natural resource is fully extinct, it will never recover.  
 The nullcline of the resource stock can also be depicted graphically; see panel A of Figure 
3.1. In this panel the regime boundaries (3.16) and (3.17) are shown. We do not show the case of 
2
/ˆ
2
rPq Ne
rv Pq
? ?  
because from Table 3.1 we know that the system then has only one non-trivial 
steady state in total (which is located in regime 1, with all community members being coopera-
7 If 2
/ˆ
2
rPq Ne
rv Pq
? ? , the steady state resource stock in regime 1 is equal to ? ?ˆ / .r eNq r?  If 2
/ˆ
2
rPq Ne
rv Pq
? ?
 
instead, 
/ 0dX dt ?  for all 0C ?  in regime 1 because all agents harvest at maximum effort. 
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tors). Instead, Figure 3.1 depicts the more interesting case of 2
/ˆ
2
rPq Ne
rv Pq
? ? .  In this case, as indi-
cated by row F of Table 3.1, the nullcline for X  is an almost horizontal line in regime 3, it is 
concave and upward-sloping in regime 2, and in regime 1 we always have / 0dX dt ?  for all 
0 .C N? ?   
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Figure 3.1. The nullclines of the resource stock (panel A) and of the number of cooperators (panel B).8
 
  
8 Trivial nullclines / 0dC dt ?  and / 0dX dt ? are not shown. Unless stated otherwise, all figures are drawn using the 
following parameter values: ˆ 0.71, 100, 50000, 0.01, 0.8, 0.1, 0.2.e N P q r ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?        
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Finally, the dynamics of the resource stock are indicated in this figure by means of arrows; for all 
stocks above (below) the nullcline of X , the resource stock is declining (increasing) over time. 
Next, let us analyze the location of the / 0dC dt ?  isocline in the three regimes; see row H and 
also panel B in Figure 3.1. There is a trivial nullcline at 0C ?  (not shown); if there are no coope-
rators, nobody is available to convince the defectors of the desirability of acting cooperatively. In 
addition, the nullcline of C  is vertical at C N?  in regime 1: because ˆ( ) ( , )C De X e X C e? ? , all 
agents are cooperators if ˆ2 /X vNe Pq? . Next, in regime 2 the nullcline of C  is a linear upward-
sloping function of :X  ? ? ? ?ˆ ˆ( ) (2 ) 2 .C X v Ne PqX ve? ? ? ?? ? ? /  Finally, the nullcline of C  is 
vertical in the ( , )C X  space in regime 3: 23 1 4( ) ( 1) 0
2 2
NC X N N N??? ? ? ? ? .
9
 As was the case with the resource stock in panel A of Figure 3.1, we can graphically de-
pict the dynamics of the number of cooperators in the community; see panel B of Figure 3.1. For 
all numbers of cooperators left (right) of the non-trivial nullcline of 
  
C  (as defined in row H of 
Table 3.1), the number of cooperators in the community increases (decreases) over time. Let us 
now determine the steady states of the system in the three regimes, which requires calculating the 
intersection points of the / 0dX dt ?  and / 0dC dt ?  isoclines (see also Appendix 3.A). Both the 
number of equilibria as well as their location in the various regimes depend on the relative sizes 
of all parameters of both the social-economic and ecological subsystems. If 02
/ˆ ˆ
2
rPq Ne e
rv Pq
? ?? , 
the system has one non-trivial steady state, ? ?ˆ( , ) ( , / ),C X N r eNq r? ? and this steady state is lo-
cated in regime 1; see row F in Table 3.1. The case of 0ˆ ˆe e?  can be represented graphically by 
superimposing panels A and B of Figure 3.1; see Figure 3.2. From panels A–C in Figure 3.2 we 
see that there is no steady state in regime 1 if 0ˆ ˆe e? , but there may be 0, 1 or 2 steady states in 
regime 2, and there is maximally one stable steady state in regime 3.10
 We proceed with analyzing the various cases. Regarding the number of steady states in 
regime 2 if 
 
0ˆ ˆ ,e e?  we have zero steady states in that regime if the / 0dC dt ?  isocline is located 
strictly to the North-West of the / 0dX dt ?  isocline for all values of C ; see panel A in Figure 
9 Recall from footnote 6 that we assume ? ?1 / 2 .N N? ?? ?  That means that indeed ( ) 0C X ?  for all 0.X ?  
10 All equilibria with either 0X ?  or 0C ?  are trivial, and all of them are unstable. Because of these reasons, we 
ignore them in the rest of the chapter  
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3.2. In equation (3.A6) of Appendix 3.A we show that this is the case if 1ˆ ˆ ,e e?
 
where 1ˆe  is de-
fined by 
? ? ? ?? ?? ?
2 3
1 2 2 2 2 4
4ˆ .
4 2 4
rP qe
N Pq rv Pq rv rv Pq P q
?
? ?? ? ? ? ?   (3.18) 
Here, 1ˆe  is defined as the effort endowment for which / 0dC dt ?  and / 0dX dt ?  are tangent in 
regime 2. If 1ˆ ˆ ,e e?  there are zero equilibria in regimes 1 and 2, and there is exactly one equili-
brium in regime 3; see E3 in panel A of Figure 3.2.11 0 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? If, however, , there are either one 
or two equilibria in regime 2, and one or zero in regime 3; see panels B and C in Figure 3.2. First, 
the nullclines of X  and C  are tangent if 1ˆ ˆ ,e e?  giving rise to just one equilibrium in regime 2, 
and also one in regime 3 (because of the same argument as presented above for 1ˆ ˆe e? ). Second, 
the nullclines may intersect once or twice in regime 2 in case 0 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? . Note that the nullcline of 
C  in regime 2 is an upward-sloping straight line that intersects the top regime boundary at 
.C N? 12 X Also note that the nullcline of  is upward-sloping and concave in regime 2, and that it 
hits the C N?  axis at resource stock level that is strictly below the top regime.13
C
 That means that 
the two nullclines always intersect twice in regime 2 unless the intersection point of the  
nullcline with the lower boundary is to the South-East of that of the X  nullcline. Using the spe-
cifications of the nullclines of X  and C  from either regime 2 or regime 3, these nullclines inter-
sect at the boundary between regimes 2 and 3 if eˆ  is equal to 2eˆ , where 2eˆ  is derived in equa-
tions (3.A7) and (3.A8) in Appendix 3.A: 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?2 2 2 2ˆ .2 2 1 4 1
rPqe
N rv Pq rNv Pq N N N N rv Pq
?
? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
  
(3.19) 
If ˆ ( )e ? ? 2eˆ  the nullcline of C  intersects the lower regime boundary at a point South-East 
(North-West) of the point where the nullcline of X  hits the lower boundary. Hence, a necessary 
11 This can easily be inferred from panel A of Figure 3.2. The nullcline of C  is vertical in regime 3 while the asso-
ciated nullcline of X  is upward sloping and concave (albeit near–horizontal); see rows F and H in Table 3.1. That 
means that the two nullclines always intersect in regime 3 as long as the nullcline of C  intersects the boundary be-
tween regimes 2 and 3 to the North–West of the point where the nullcline of X  intersects that boundary. This con-
dition is always met if the nullcline of C  is located strictly to the North–West of the nullcline of X  in regime 2 – 
because the nullcline of C  is an upward–sloping and straight line in regime 2 while the associated nullcline of X  is 
upward–sloping and concave. 
12 This can be verified by inserting ˆ2 / ( )X vNe Pq?  into ? ? ? ?ˆ ˆ( ) (2 ) 2C X v Ne PqX ve? ? ? ?? ? ? /  in row H, Table 3.1. 
13 This can be verified by inserting C N?  into ? ?2ˆ2 ( )( ) 2
vN r qe N C
X C
vNr Pq C
? ?? ?  in row F of Table 3.1. 
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condition for having two equilibria in regime 2 and one in regime 3 is that 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? , while a ne-
cessary condition for having just one equilibrium in total is that 2ˆ ˆe e?  (where the equilibrium is 
located in regime 1 if 0ˆ ˆe e? , and where it is located in regime 2 if 0 2ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? ).  
 
C
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Regime 3
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dC/dt=0 Regime 2
stable equilibrium
unstable equilibrium
A Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 3
B
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E3E3
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dX/dt=0
dC/dt=0
Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 3
C
X
E1
Figure 3.2. Phase planes for different values of eˆ  giving rise to either no non-trivial equilibrium in regime 
2 and one in regime 3 (panel A), two equilibria in regime 2 and one in regime 3 (panel B), or one equili-
brium in regime 2 and none in regime 3 (panel C).14
 
 
So we can now fully describe all possible equilibrium constellations for all possible levels of effort 
endowments. First, if 0ˆ ˆe e? , there is one stable equilibrium in regime 1 (not shown in Figure 3.2). 
Next, if 0 2ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? , the system still has just one stable equilibrium, 1E , and this equilibrium is lo-
cated in regime 2; see panel C of Figure 3.2. If 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? , we have three equilibria in total; a sta-
ble and an unstable one in regime 2 ( 1E  2Eand , respectively), and a stable one 3( )E  in regime 3 
14 Values for all parameters as before, except for the focal parameter eˆ , which is 0.75 (panel A), 0.713, (panel B) 
0.689 (panel C). Again, the trivial nullclines are not shown. Note that the intersection point of / 0dC dt ?  and the 
horizontal axis 0X ?  and the intersection point of / 0dX dt ?  and the vertical axis 0C ?  are equilibria too, and so 
is the origin of the system; cf. (3.13) and (3.14). As these three equilibria are unstable, we omit them in this figure.  
1ˆ ˆe e? 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ?
2ˆ ˆe e?
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– as depicted by panel B in Figure 3.2. Finally, if 1ˆ ˆe e? , there is just one stable equilibrium in re-
gime 3, as depicted in Panel A of Figure 3.2. 
 The stability properties of the situations depicted for 1ˆ ˆe e?  (Panel A) and 0 2ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ?  
(Panel C) are straightforward, but they are slightly more complicated in case of 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ?  (Panel 
B). The phase diagram associated with the latter case is presented more clearly in Figure 3.3. Pan-
el A of that figure shows that equilibria 1E  3Eand  
2E
are locally stable nodes, while they are sepa-
rated by an unstable saddle-point . Panel B of that figure shows that if the system is in the 
“good” equilibrium 1E  3E(“bad” equilibrium ), a shock that reduces (increases) the number of 
cooperators can move the system to the “bad” equilibrium 3E  1E(“good” equilibrium ), but only 
if the shock is sufficiently large to make the system jump into the basin of attraction of 3E 1( )E 
2E
 
beyond the separatrix going through the unstable intermediate equilibrium .  
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Figure 3.3. A phase diagram of the system with alternative stable states (panel A) and the asso-
ciated trajectories towards these steady states (panel B).  
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So, our social-ecological system can be in a variety of steady states, and the number of steady 
states depends on the parameters of the system. 
 Figure 3.4 shows a conceptual figure of the feedback structure of the system and explains 
which mechanisms cause these multiple equilibria. Moral persuasion is stronger if there are more 
cooperators, but so is the temptation to defect – because the best-response function of a defector 
is a decreasing function of the aggregate effort put in by the other community members; cf. (3.7). 
The two effects stabilize each other, and the interaction of cooperators and defectors alone does 
not cause multiple equilibria. Rather, it is the fact that individual harvesting effort can never be 
larger than eˆ  that produces these alternative stable states. Because individual labor is in limited 
supply, a positive feedback arises between the size of the resource stock and the number of de-
fectors. The smaller the resource stock, the larger the payoffs of defectors relative to those of 
cooperators (see the dotted line between the resource stock and the number of defectors in Fig-
ure 3.4). And the more defectors there are, the smaller is the resource stock (see the uninter-
rupted line between the resource stock and the number of defectors in Figure 3.4).  
 
 
Figure 3.4. The social-economic dynamics are driven by moral persuasion and temptation. The presence 
of the effort endowment leads to a non-linearity, giving rise to alternative stable states. Positive feedbacks 
are indicated by arrows and negative feedbacks are depicted by bars.  
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This positive feedback produces alternative stable states and may lead to a catastrophic transition 
in the end. Without the effort constraint, the relative change in effort rates of cooperators and 
defectors would be the same, keeping the payoff ratio, and hence the temptation to defect, con-
stant. Therefore, multiple equilibria would not occur. 
 
3.3.2 The availability of effective labor time and system collapse 
In the previous sub-section we have shown that the social-ecological system exhibits alternative 
stable states. In principle, the system can be moved from one stable equilibrium to another be-
cause of exogenous changes in the harvesting technology ( )q , the size of the community ( )N , 
the agents’ time endowment ˆ( ),e  or other parameters in either the ecological or the social-
economic system. In this subsection we analyze how the system is affected when exogenous de-
velopments increase the community’s aggregate time endowment available for resource harvest-
ing. Here, eˆ  may change because of efficiency improvements in household chores. Admittedly, 
from the list of potential drivers of system collapse this is the least plausible one, but analytically 
it is the easiest one. Therefore, we focus on the impact of changes in eˆ  in this subsection, but we 
present the full analysis of the consequences of, among others, population growth and technolo-
gical progress in section 3.4.2.  
 The typical pattern for the equilibrium values of C  and X  as a function of eˆ  (keeping all 
other parameters constant) are presented in panels A and B of Figure 3.5, respectively. Starting 
from the point where agents have time endowments less than 0ˆ ,e  the aggregate effort available 
ˆNe  is insufficient for the community to reduce the resource stock below ˆ2 /X vNe Pq?  (cf. 
(3.16)) even if all community members spend all their effort on resource harvesting, and hence all 
agents harvest at eˆ  (see also rows B and C in regime 1 of Table 3.1). Because defectors and coo-
perators all harvest at the maximum rate, temptation to defect is absent and hence C N?  for all 
values of eˆ  below 0ˆ ;e  see panel A of Figure 3.5. The equilibrium resource stock is equal to 
ˆ( ) /X r Nqe r? ? , and hence the size of the resource stock is falling linearly as a function of ˆ;e  
see panel B of Figure 3.5. This is the case for all 0ˆ ˆe e?  and the steady states associated with each 
effort endowment are all located in regime 1. 
 So, for 0ˆ ˆe e? , the system displays a gradual decline of the resource stock X  if eˆ  increas-
es. However, changes in eˆ  affect the system in multiple respects; all proofs are presented in Ap-
pendix 3.B. First, any increase in eˆ  results in the boundary between regimes 1 and 2 shifting up 
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(the cooperators switch to interior harvesting effort rates at larger remaining stock sizes if eˆ  in-
creases), while the boundary between regimes 2 and 3 rotates to the North-East (see (3.16) and 
(3.17), but also equations (3.B1) and (3.B2) in Appendix 3.B). Second, the locations of the 
/ 0dX dt ?  and / 0dC dt ?  isoclines are also affected by changes in eˆ . From row F in Table 3.1 
we see that the nullcline of X  shifts down in regime 2 if the agents’ time endowment increases, 
while the nullcline of C  shifts to the left in that regime – as shown in row H in Table 3.1 (see 
also equations (3.B3) and (3.B4) in Appendix 3.B). When eˆ  becomes larger than 0eˆ  and contin-
ues to increase, the system moves through the phase diagrams and equilibria as presented in pa-
nels A–C in Figure 3.2 – but in reverse order. So, for 0 2ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? , the two nullclines intersect zero 
times in regimes 1 and 3 and just once in regime 2, and the associated equilibrium, 1E , is globally 
stable; see panel C of Figure 3.2. If eˆ  continues to increase, the / 0dX dt ?  isocline shifts further 
down while the / 0dC dt ?  isocline shifts further to the left, and hence 1E  moves to the South-
West. That means that C  and X  continue to gradually decline if eˆ  continues to increase in the 
range 0 2ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? ; see Figure 3.5. In regime 2 the cooperators reduce their effort rates below eˆ , 
and the more so the smaller is X ; see row B in Table 3.1. The defectors, however, keep on har-
vesting at the maximum rate, and hence the difference in profits between cooperators and defec-
tors increases with eˆ . As a result C  falls, but the fall in X  is less pronounced because the coo-
perators reduce their harvesting effort.  
 If eˆ  continues to increase so that it moves into the range 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ? , the nullclines have 
shifted such that they intersect twice in regime 2; see panel B of Figure 3.2. Now two new equili-
bria emerge, in addition to the initial (and locally stable) equilibrium 1E : the unstable equilibrium 
2E , located in regime 2, and the locally stable equilibrium 3E , located in regime 3. The three equi-
libria are represented in Figure 3.5 – with the stable equilibria being connected by continuous 
lines and the unstable equilibria being connected by the dotted line. As long as 1ˆ ˆe e? , the system 
remains in the good equilibrium 1E , and further exogenous increases in eˆ  just move the nullcline 
of C  more to the left while the nullcline of X  continues to shift down. That means that 1E  con-
tinues to gradually move to the South-West. This implies that the basin of attraction of the 
“good” equilibrium shrinks. Unnoticed the system loses resilience.  
 
64
C
ê2 ê1
A
ê0
X
ê2 ê1
B
ê0
Figure 3.5. Bifurcation diagram showing internal equilibria of the number of cooperators C  (panel A) 
and the resource stock X  (panel B) for different values of the effort endowment ˆ.e  Stable equilibria are 
shown by solid lines, unstable equilibria are shown by dotted lines. Dots denote the two tipping points 1ˆe  
and 2eˆ  and the point 0eˆ  where the social dilemma materializes. 
While the decline in resource conservation and cooperation is thus gradual for increases in eˆ  as 
long as 1ˆ ˆe e? , the system collapses at 1ˆ ˆ .e e?  At this critical threshold (or tipping point), there is 
just one equilibrium in regime 2 (and also one in regime 3), and even an infinitesimally increase in 
eˆ  beyond 1ˆe  results in equilibrium 1E  vanishing, moving the system to the one remaining equili-
brium, 3E , in regime 3; see panel A in Figure 3.2. The system collapses, and in Figure 3.5 the 
equilibrium values of C  and X  drop to the lower branches. During the transition from the good 
equilibrium 1E  to the bad equilibrium 3E , the profits of cooperators fall with an increase in eˆ
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because (i) they reduce their effort rates and (ii) the return on whatever effort they decide to put 
in, falls too. Profits of the defectors fall too, but less so because they do not reduce their effort 
yet – and hence only suffer from the lower returns to effort. Hence, the temptation to defect 
continues to increase, the more X  falls. Eventually, the system comes to a halt at the bad (but 
stable) equilibrium, 3E . Because of the fact that the / 0dX dt ?  isocline is almost horizontal in 
regime 3, the equilibrium size of the resource is very close to the steady state resource stock ab-
sent any cooperation, as defined in equation (3.9). In regime 3, all agents harvest at interior effort 
rates, and hence subsequent increases in the effort endowment beyond 1ˆe  neither affects the 
number of cooperators, nor the size of the resource – as is also shown in Figure 3.5. 
 This analysis has important implications for policy makers as it makes clear that choosing 
the moment to intervene is of crucial importance to prevent the collapse of the social-ecological 
system. As shown in panel B of Figure 3.5, we find that increases in the time endowment result in 
intermediately fast decreases in the size of the resource stock if it is sufficiently plentiful (if eˆ  in-
creases in the range 0ˆ ˆ0 e e? ? ). If eˆ
 
continues to increase in the range 0 1ˆ ˆ ˆe e e? ?  the rate of re-
source depletion actually decreases until eˆ  reaches 1ˆe , at which point the resource suddenly col-
lapses. This pattern makes it hard for a potential manager of the resource (the regulator, or the 
government) to decide when to intervene. When observing resource depletion tapering off, the 
manager may falsely conclude that the system is stabilizing so that it becomes less urgent to inter-
vene, while in fact the system is getting closer to collapse. 
 So what can the manager do once the system has collapsed? In this model the system col-
lapse is reversible, but at substantial cost. Reducing effort back to 1ˆe  is not enough to restore the 
system to the good equilibrium 1E . The equilibria 1E  and 2E  in regime 2 re-emerge when eˆ  falls 
below 1ˆe  (see panel B of Figure 3.2) but the system does not jump from 3E  to 1E  because the 
community is “trapped” in the basin of attraction of the “bad” equilibrium 3E ; see also Figure 
3.3. The system only flips back to 1E  if eˆ  is decreased below 2eˆ , so that 3E  disappears again. 
Hence, 2eˆ  is the second tipping point of the system.  
 
3.4 Model extensions 
The analysis in section 3 focused on the impact of changing the time endowment, eˆ , on the so-
cial-ecological system, when resource harvesting is the community’s only source of income. The 
assumption of 0w ?  was introduced to obtain analytical results, not because it is more plausible 
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than the case of 0w ? . Also, exogenous changes in eˆ  are not likely to be the most important 
driver of change in the use of renewable resource systems. We remedy these two shortcomings 
by presenting a numerical analysis of the impact of changes in eˆ  when 0w ?  in subsection 3.4.1, 
and by subsequently analyzing (in subsection 3.4.2) whether the same patterns of gradual change 
and sudden collapse can emerge if other parameters in the social-ecological system are subject to 
exogenous change, such as technological progress and population growth.  
  
3.4.1 The role of outside labor market in the resilience of the social-ecological system  
If labor markets are present and 0w ? , analytical solutions can no longer be obtained. The main 
reason for this is that with 0w ?  we no longer have / /C D C De e? ? ?  (cf. (3.2)), which proved to 
be very convenient in working with equations (3.12) and (3.13). For the case of 0w ?  we resort 
to a numerical analysis, showing that the presence of labor markets leads to results that are quali-
tatively very similar to those obtained in section 3.3. Figure 3.6 shows the internal equilibria of 
the two state variables C  and X  for different values of the effort endowment ˆ.e  As before, for 
sufficiently small time endowments there is no social dilemma, and hence the temptation for 
cooperators to defect is absent; C N?  in panel A of Figure 3.6. Larger time endowments do 
imply, however, that more can be harvested at every time t , and hence the resource stock de-
creases linearly; see panel B of Figure 3.6. If the time endowment of individual agents continues 
to increase, the social-ecological system moves into regime 2 where cooperators start using less 
effort for harvesting than is available, while the defectors continue to harvest at the maximum 
rate. If the time endowment increases even more, the social-ecological system collapses in exactly 
the same way as described in section 3.3. A positive feedback emerges because a reduction in the 
size of the resource stock results in cooperators reducing their effort rates while defectors do not, 
and the subsequent relative increase in defection payoffs reduces the number of cooperators, 
which, in turn, reduces the moral pressure to act cooperatively, and hence the resource stock falls 
even more. That means that all qualitative results obtained analytically assuming 0w ?  carry over 
to the case of 0w ? , and also the policy implications remain unchanged. If the resource stock 
seems to stabilize at an intermediately high level this is no guarantee that the system is resilient 
against shocks. And if the system has collapsed, restoring the system to the good equilibrium re-
quires a reduction in the individual time endowments to a level that is (much) lower than the level 
at which the system was observed to collapse. 
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 The only novel insight obtained from this analysis using 0w ?  is that cooperation in-
creases if the time endowment continues to increase after collapse; see panel A of Figure 3.6. 
This increase in cooperation materializes because ˆlim / 1C De ? ?? ? ?  if 0w ? . If 1ˆ ˆ ,e e?  the social-
ecological system is in equilibrium E3 
w
located in regime 3 (where all agents choose interior har-
vesting effort levels), and hence increases in  only increase the amount of money earned at the 
external labor markets, where the same wage rate applies to cooperators and defectors alike. 
Hence, the larger eˆ , the larger the income share of wages earned at the external labor market, 
and hence the closer the payoff ratio is to 1 (cf. equation 3.2).  
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Figure 3.6. Bifurcation diagram showing internal equilibria of the number of cooperators C  (panel A) 
and the resource stock X  (panel B) for different values of the effort endowment eˆ  and with 0.1.w ?  
Dots denote the two tipping points. 
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That means that the increase in cooperation following environmental collapse should not be in-
terpreted as a sign that the system is moving back to a better equilibrium; it is purely the result of 
a decreasing difference in payoffs between acting cooperatively and non-cooperatively, resulting 
in less temptation to defect. Similarly, if the system has collapsed, the regulator should not be 
concerned about the fact that policies aimed at reducing the agents’ time endowment actually re-
sults in a decrease in cooperation – reducing the time endowment of all agents reduces the wage 
share in total income and hence the payoff ratio between cooperators and defectors falls, so that 
it becomes more tempting to defect. As was the case in section 3.3, the system only flips back to 
the good equilibrium if the time endowment is reduced to a level well below the one that trig-
gered collapse in the first place. 
  
3.4.2 The role of other drivers in ecosystem collapse 
Changes in the agents’ time endowment is not the most plausible development driving the social-
ecological system; population growth (an increase in N ) and technological progress regarding the 
effectiveness of harvesting effort ( )q  are likely to be more relevant in practice. In addition, it is 
interesting to see how the system is affected by increases in the crowding externality ( )v  and in 
the strength of moral persuasion ( )? . Let us discuss each of these four in turn (while maintaining 
the assumption of 0w ? ); see Figure 3.7. In panels A and B of Figure 3.7 we show the impact of 
increases in the harvesting technology parameter, q , on the steady state levels of C  and X , re-
spectively. The patterns are very similar to those presented in Figure 3.6, including the observa-
tion that cooperation increases if q  continues to increase after collapse. The only difference is 
that in this case the steady state resource stock continues to fall with increases in q . Higher levels 
of q  increase the marginal productivity of resource harvesting and hence agents allocate more 
labor to resource harvesting, and the resulting fall in X  then restores the equilibrium between 
the net marginal productivity of resource harvesting and its opportunity cost, the outside wage 
rate w . In panels C and D we show the impact of increases in population size ( )N on C  and X . 
The consequences of increases in N  (for given eˆ ) are qualitatively identical to the ones observed 
in Figure 3.6 (resulting from an increase in eˆ  for a given N ). Indeed, increases in N  affect re-
source exploitation in essentially the same way as increases in eˆ : both result in the increase in the 
community’s available harvesting time while leaving the marginal productivities unaffected. 
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 Next, let us analyze how the system responds to increases in v , the external crowding 
parameter. Not surprisingly, the size of the resource stock increases with v  (see panel F) – if the 
crowding externality is not very severe. The reason is that a higher v  reduces the returns from 
resource harvesting, and hence agents spend more time at the external labor market, the larger is 
v . The consequences for cooperation, however, are surprising: the higher v , the higher the need 
for cooperation, but panel E shows that this does not generally translate into larger numbers of 
cooperators. The reason is that the cooperators tend to attach much larger weight to the crowd-
ing externality than do the defectors, and hence the profit ratio /C D? ?  is decreasing in v .  
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Figure 3.7. Bifurcation diagrams showing the internal equilibria of the number of cooperators and the re-
source stock for different focal parameters. Dots denote the two tipping points. 
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If the crowding externality becomes really large, the temptation to defect becomes very large too, 
and the social-ecological system collapses. In this case, however, continued increases in the 
crowding externality beyond the tipping point now result in higher levels of resource conserva-
tion, even though cooperation remains at a very low level – because the higher crowding costs 
continue to decrease profitability of resource harvesting, inducing defectors to allocate an increa-
singly large share of their labor time to working at the external labor market. 
 Finally, we analyze the impact of increases in the strength of the moral persuasion para-
meter, ? , in panels G and H of Figure 3.7. These panels show that for low initial levels of ? , 
increases in the strength of persuasion does not have much impact on either cooperation or the 
size of the resource stock – until ?  reaches a critical threshold. After crossing this threshold the 
system jumps to a much higher level of both cooperation and resource conservation, and the sys-
tem is also quite robust against possible weakening of moral persuasion: if ?  has increased suffi-
ciently for the system to flip to the good equilibrium, ?  can fall substantially before the system 
flips back to the bad equilibrium. Again, this is a direct result of the properties of systems exhibit-
ing alternative stable states. 
 So, exogenous developments in population size, state of the technology, and the severity 
of the harvesting externality all give rise to the same dynamics as do changes in the time endow-
ment itself – as analyzed analytically in section 3.3.2. Note that while the drivers analyzed in sec-
tion 3.4.2 do not directly affect the agents’ nominal time endowment, they do affect the effective 
time endowment. Better technologies or less severe harvesting externalities increase the marginal 
productivity of resource harvesting, and hence increase the relative scarcity of time. This shows 
that not the change, but the mere presence of constraints on economic activity is sufficient to 
produce multiple equilbria. Technological development, influx of agents from outside the com-
munity, small changes in the defectors’ susceptibility to moral persuasion, all these changes can 
give rise to a sudden collapse. A gradual change in the key parameters may reduce the resilience 
of the system, thus paving the way to a catastrophic transition.  
3.5 Conclusions 
We developed a model of renewable resource use in which agents can decide to act cooperatively 
with respect to resource harvesting, or not. Social harvesting norms can spread through the 
community because of interpersonal relationships between cooperators and defectors (because 
the former try to convince the latter of the social desirability of acting cooperatively), but com-
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munity members also always face the temptation to act non-cooperatively – because of the higher 
profits. The resulting social-ecological system is characterized by multiple equilibria, so that small 
changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological 
progress) can trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to wide-
spread norm violation – causing the demise of the resource. Our setup is unique in that (i) it does 
not need to assume the ecological system to be highly non-linear to generate multiple equilibria, 
and (ii) tipping points emerge even though both the ecological and the social-economic systems, 
by themselves, are inherently stable.  
 In our social-ecological system, tipping points arise not because we introduce them expli-
citly in the differential equations, but because of the interaction between the ecological and so-
cial-economic subsystems. Here, positive feedback relationships occur because of the fact that, in 
closed communities, the amount of labor a community member can allocate to resource harvest-
ing is necessarily finite because the common property regime usually does not allow members to 
hire external labor. If, for whatever reason, the resource becomes scarcer, the cooperators in the 
community decrease their harvesting effort while defectors continue to allocate all their available 
time to harvesting – if the net private marginal benefits of harvesting are strictly positive. A de-
crease in the size of the resource thus increases the relative profitability of defecting, and cooper-
ation starts to decrease. Reduced cooperation further reduces the resource stock, thus reinforcing 
the temptation to defect, and also reduces the moral pressure on the non-cooperators. Thus, a 
positive feedback between the resource stock and the number of cooperators emerges endoge-
nously in our system – possibly resulting in the collapse of the social-ecological system. And if 
the exogenous development is reversed (possibly because of government intervention), the sys-
tem may flip back to the good equilibrium because of an opposite positive feedback loop. A larg-
er resource stock induces cooperators to increase their harvesting effort, while defectors are still 
harvesting at the maximum rate. As a result, the relative profit difference falls, and so does the 
temptation to defect. Lower temptation increases the number of cooperators, which increases the 
resource stock, and lowers temptation even more. However, while a small change in the driver 
may cause the system to collapse, a non-marginal change in the driver is needed to restore the 
system to its good state. Hence, the system is characterized by hysteresis. 
 Our model thus shows that even if the system looks smooth on the outside, the regulator 
must be aware of potential collapses of cooperation in communities having access to renewable 
common pool resources. In that sense, this chapter is complementary to the literature analyzing 
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inherently non-linear natural resource systems (such as shallow lakes and grazing lands) as includ-
ing non-linear resource dynamics in our model would render the system even more complex.  
 While our model is purely theoretical in nature, it does give rise to one important policy 
implication. A regulator monitoring the ecological system should not be led to believe that any 
decrease in the rate of depletion of a natural resource is evidence of the system stabilizing. The 
decrease in depletion rates may be caused by some agents reducing their effort levels while others 
do not. If so, the subsequent relative increase in the returns to defecting may trigger a positive 
feedback between increased defecting and ever lower resource stocks, ultimately resulting in a 
sudden collapse of the resource stock. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.A: Derivation of the equilibria and tipping points for all possible values of eˆ
 
 
Deriving the non-trivial equilibria in each of the three regimes requires identifying the intersec-
tion points of the X  and C  nullclines as provided in rows F and H in Table 3.1. Consider first 
the case where 02
/ˆ ˆ .
2
rPq Ne e
rv Pq
? ??  Noting that C N?  in regime 1, the system then has only one 
non-trivial equilibrium with the following coordinates: 
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Next, consider the case where 02
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? ??  Then there are zero steady states in regime 1. 
The steady states in regime 2 can be identified by equating ? ?2ˆ2 ( )2
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(3.A5) 
Here, 1 1( , )C X  and 2 2( , )C X  are the coordinates of the equilibrium points 1E  and 2E , respective-
ly; see panel B of Figure 3.2 and also Figure 3.3. Whether these equilibria exist depends on the 
parameter constellations. We find that 1 2X X?  and 1 2C C?  (so that 1E  and 2E  coincide) if  
? ? ? ?? ?? ?
2 3
12 2 2 2 4
4ˆ ˆ .
4 2 4
rP qe e
N Pq rv Pq rv rv Pq P q
?
? ?? ?? ? ? ?   (3.A6) 
Solutions 1 1( , )C X  and 2 2( , )C X   only have real solutions if 1ˆ ˆ .e e?  In fact, 1ˆe  is a so-called tipping 
point because the equilibria 1E  and 2E  eˆvanish if  is infinitesimally larger than 1ˆ.e  So, if 1ˆ ˆe e?  
there are no equilibria in regimes 1 and 2, and the only equilibrium is 3E  located in regime 3. 
Equilibrium values 3X  and 3C  are equal to:  
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(3.A8) 
The equilibrium in regime 3 only exists if 3 3( , )C X  as defined by (3.A7) and (3.A8) is located be-
low the regime boundary separating R2 from R3. Therefore an equilibrium in R3 only exists if 
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Appendix 3.B: Analysis of the consequences of a change in the endowment of effort  
Taking the first derivative of (3.16) and (3.17), we have 
1/ 2
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So, if eˆ  increases, both regime boundaries shift upward in the ( , )C X  space. Because 
2
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an increase in eˆ  induces the R2/R3 boundary to rotate to the North-East.  
 Next, we analyze the consequences of increasing eˆ  for the two nullclines. Taking the first 
derivatives of the nullclines of X  and C  (as presented in rows F and H of Table 3.1) with re-
spect to eˆ , we have: 
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Hence, the / 0dX dt ?  isocline shifts down in ( , )C X  space in regime 2 while the vertical inter-
cept in regime 3 remains unchanged. The / 0dC dt ?  isocline shifts to the left in the ( , )C X  space 
in regime 2 while the horizontal intercept in regime 3 remains unchanged.  
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Egocentric sanctions evolve spontaneously to 
overcome social dilemmas
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Abstract
Social sanctions are powerful mechanisms for enforcing social norms that stabilize cooperation, 
especially when reward and punishment are combined. In many cases these social sanctions ef-
fectively overcome a social dilemma, as joint access to a common pool resource. In principle, 
sanctioning institutions can stabilize cooperation, but often they are inefficiently costly or may be 
used for other purposes than increasing group payoff. The question whether social sanctions are 
able to overcome social dilemmas efficiently, is therefore still unsolved. In our model, institu-
tions, such as a moral value system, change slower than economic decision and both evolve en-
dogenously from a continuum of strategies. With agent-based simulations and an analytical mod-
el, we show that a combination of punishments and rewards will effectively overcome any social 
dilemma if own behavior is used as a moral demarcation line between good and bad behavior. 
This is even the case if social sanctions are weak or costly, and if individuals make mistakes, or 
some harvesting activity may stay undetected.  
 
 
This chapter is a modified version of: Richter, A.P., Å. Brännström and U. Dieckmann, 2011, Egocen-
tric sanctions evolve spontaneously to overcome social dilemmas. Manuscript. We are grateful to Jo-
han Grasman, Daan van Soest, Karl Sigmund, Karine Nyborg, Elinor Ostrom, and Herbert Gintis for 
valuable comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.
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4.1 Introduction 
A social dilemma occurs if private interests do not coincide with collective interests. Typically, 
the actions of one agent give rise to an – unintended –  externality that affects the payoff of other 
individuals. Such an externality can be positive (when contributing to a public good) or negative 
(when harvesting a common pool resource). If agents do not take this externality into account, 
the outcome of their actions will be socially sub-optimal. Social dilemmas, such as sharing a re-
source or contributing to a public good are ubiquitous in daily life.  
 However, often those dilemmas can be overcome without central intervention with the 
help of social sanctions, for instance when individuals jointly manage a common pool resource 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Bischi et al., 2004; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006; Noailly et al., 2003; 
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1992; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). Therefore, social sanctions are 
powerful mechanisms for enforcing social norms that stabilize cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 
2002; Gächter et al., 2008; Gurerk et al., 2006; Sigmund, 2007), especially when reward and pu-
nishment are combined (Andreoni et al., 2003; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). What makes so-
cial sanctions so powerful is the fact that norms of cooperation can be enforced even when single 
individuals do neither understand the reason, nor the exact functioning or the history behind 
these norms. According to Hayek (1978, p.12),  
In spite of this, social sanctions fail to raise group payoff in some cases. While sanctioning insti-
tutions can stabilize cooperation, they are often inefficiently costly or may be used for other pur-
poses than increasing group payoff (Dawes et al., 2007; Dreber et al., 2008; Efferson et al., 2008; 
Fehr et al., 2008; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fowler et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 
2008; Johnson et al., 2009). The question whether social sanctions are able to overcome social 
dilemmas efficiently, is therefore still unsolved (Dreber et al., 2008; Gächter et al., 2008; 
Herrmann et al., 2008; Ohtsuki et al., 2009).  
this adaptation to the general circumstances […] is brought about by his observance of rules which he has 
not designed and often does not even know explicitly, although he is able to honour them in action. 
 Additionally, norm compliance alone neither answers the question which social norms 
evolve, nor explain how beneficial such an evolving norm is. Indeed, individuals that blindly en-
force any social norm may sustain a cooperative equilibrium, but may also prevent cooperation 
from arising by enforcing an anti-social equilibrium – or for that matter, enforce any other equili-
brium (Boyd and Richerson, 1992). While some norms are indeed maladaptive (Elster, 1989), it 
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seems that most social norms do serve a clear purpose, at least at the time they have evolved. Ac-
cording to Coleman (1990, p. 241) norms do not emerge randomly, but evolve for a reason. This 
sounds plausible, but what is the underlying mechanism?  
 Two explanations are currently available why social norms may evolve towards a level 
that maximizes group welfare. First, if groups that hold different social norms compete with each 
other, this can explain why the community with the most group-beneficial social norm survives 
(Henrich, 2004; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Wilson, 1975). This mechanism is known as group 
selection or multi-level selection. Second, group-beneficial social norms do not come automati-
cally. Instead, it requires some form of enlightenment to achieve a sensible system of social 
norms. This argument, going back to Immanuel Kant, says that the more individuals know about 
the consequences of their actions, the better they know which behavior is appropriate (Ayala, 
2010; Hauser, 2006). Knowing how to solve a social dilemma obviously facilitates the possibilities 
to find a way to coordinate to that equilibrium, even though it still may not happen. In any case, 
this explanation cannot answer the question how group-beneficial social norms evolve when in-
dividuals are fully unaware of the consequences of their actions, such as in the situation sketched 
by Hayek (1978). In this chapter we show that neither group selection, nor enlightenment is 
needed to explain the evolution of group-beneficial norms.  
 In economics, the replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) is the standard tool to 
describe evolutionary processes. This approach requires a discrete set of strategies: mutations and 
the emergence of new strategies are usually not considered. Also the use of continuous strategies 
in the form of mixed strategies is problematic (Dieckmann and Metz, 2006). Adaptive dynamics 
is a modeling tool that can analyze continuous strategies and does not require assuming a priori 
any discrete strategies (Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008; Doebeli et al.; Geritz et al., 1998; Hofbauer 
and Sigmund, 1990; Kisdi and Geritz, 2010; Metz et al., 1996; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990). Usual-
ly adaptive dynamics makes use of the assumption that evolutionary processes are slower than 
ecological processes. Here, we assume that institutions (a system of moral preferences) change 
slower than economic decisions. We are aware of two studies that have used adaptive dynamics 
in the field of economics before. The first is a study on technological change, in which markets 
are assumed to clear rapidly, while innovations by individual firms are rare (Dercole et al., 2008) 
and the second investigates the coevolution of trade and human speech (Horan et al., 2008).  
 The assumption that agents change their private investments much more frequently than 
their social preferences builds on the tradition of new institutional economics, which has estab-
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lished that institutional layers are nested (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). In our model, invest-
ment decisions are nested within informal institutions – in this case an enforcement mechanism 
based on sanctioning preferences. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that the institutional time 
scale (the sanctioning preference) changes infinitely slower than the effort allocation time scale 
(the investment decision). Therefore, a change in the sanctioning preference is analyzed when 
every agent is behaving optimally in the current environment, i.e. playing the best response, given 
the set of sanctioning preferences in the community. This assumption is in line with the standard 
economic assumption that agents are rational and make optimal choices.  
 Many social dilemmas do not have a temporal dimension, and can be well described with 
a static model. Polluting a river, for instance, affects all other individuals instantaneously, even 
though the effects may be long lasting. In our model, we will assume in most cases that actions 
have immediate consequences, but we will also investigate whether a time lag between actions 
and arising consequences is an obstacle for the evolution of cooperative norms.  
 This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we present a coherent ma-
thematical framework that formalizes the tradition of new institutional economics, in which insti-
tutional levels are nested within each other (North, 2005; North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). We 
build on the observation that institutions, such as a moral value system, change slower than eco-
nomic decision. Economic actions are embedded in informal constraints or institutions, which 
change typically very slow (Granovetter, 1985). Second, most evolutionary models are based on 
the replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) and impose discrete strategies, such as coopera-
tion and defection, into the model. In our model, the chosen amount of exploitation and peer 
pressure evolve endogenously from a continuum of strategies (Doebeli et al., 2004; Le Galliard et 
al., 2005; Nakamaru and Dieckmann, 2009). Third, we show that evolving social sanctions can 
guide the community towards socially optimal behavior, even if single individuals are myopic and 
can neither observe the resource stock, nor know what would be optimal. Fourth, and most im-
portant, our model shows that group selection is not needed to explain the evolution of optimal 
social sanctions. Instead, our mechanism makes use of the assumption that social preferences 
change slower than economic decisions. With agent-based simulations and an analytical model, 
we show that a combination of punishments and rewards will effectively overcome any social di-
lemma if own behavior is used as a moral demarcation line between good and bad behavior. Un-
expectedly we find that social sanctions will be much less efficient when not own, but group be-
havior is used as a moral yardstick. Furthermore, the evolving sanctioning system will compen-
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sate for obstacles such as large group size or high profits that can be made by not cooperating, 
but it does so usually only up to a certain level. Then, sanctioning suddenly collapses and the 
community switches drastically from socially optimal exploitation to massive overexploitation if 
key parameters, such as perception errors or lack of appreciation for social sanctions,  pass a crit-
ical threshold.  The setup of this chapter is as follows. In section 4.2 we develop an analytical 
mini-model that captures the essence of the enforcement mechanism presented in this chapter. 
In section 4.3, we corroborate these findings with agent-based simulations that include mistakes, 
noise, and a very realistic utility function (a detailed description can be found in the Appendix). 
These simulations show that when agents make few mistakes and noise is low, the emerging 
sanctioning preference will evolve towards a level that overcomes the social dilemma. This is 
even the case if individuals value profits from harvesting much more than the effects of social 
sanctions. The simulations further reveal conditions under which social sanctions break down, 
indicating limits of peer pressure. In section 4.4 we use an extensive analytical model to show that 
this mechanism is generic and works in groups of arbitrary size, even when sanctioning is very 
costly. These findings hold both in common pool resource games and also public goods games. 
Finally, section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 The analytical mini-model 
In the simplest case we consider a situation where only two agents i  and j  face a symmetric so-
cial dilemma. Each agent invests individual effort e  that negatively affects the payoff of the other 
agent. Individual i  chooses effort level ie , which delivers marginally decreasing private income 
ln( )i ie Ce? , while it gives rise to an externality cost iEe  for agent j . Furthermore, we assume 
that agents have the possibility to punish and reward each other – both will be referred to as so-
cial sanctions. Each individual holds a sanctioning preference ?  which determines punishments 
or rewards given to the other agent, depending on both effort levels. Agents ignore the externali-
ty that they impose on each other, while they are sensitive towards social sanctions. We assume 
that punishments and rewards are used symmetrically and that own behavior is used as the moral 
benchmark. This dichotomy of the good and the bad (or the right and the wrong), together with 
the emphasis on own behavior is rooted in many moral systems. A good example is the stylized 
picture of two shoulder angels whispering advice into a person’s ear. Hence, individual i  may 
receive sanctions in the form of punishments or rewards from agent j  given by ( ).j j ie e? ?   
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 In our model, the decision to allocate resources towards the investment in a common 
good or the extraction from a common pool resource is embedded in a social context 
(Granovetter, 1985). Mathematically the preference is then an argument in the effort function, as 
given by ( )e ? . In the analytical work we assume that effort levels are chosen optimally when a 
change in the sanctioning preference occurs. The idea that individuals make optimal choices, 
while preferences change only slowly is common in many economic models (Güth and Kliemt, 
1998). This implies that economic decisions are optimal, given the enforcement mechanism in 
place, i.e. the sanctioning preferences of both agents. For example, if both individuals are indiffe-
rent towards sanctioning each other ( 0)? ? , no enforcement takes place. In such a case, the open 
access Nash equilibrium would occur.  
 Total utility of individual i  is given by ln( ) ( ),i i i j j j iU e Ce Ee e e?? ? ? ? ?  while agent j  
receives ln( ) ( ).j j j i i i jU e Ce Ee e e?? ? ? ? ?  Privately optimal choices for agent i  require 
/ 0,i iU e? ? ?  so that the effort allocation equilibrium is identified as 1/ ( ).i je C ?? ?  Note that the 
effort level of both individuals in the absence of any enforcement mechanism is given by 
, 1 /i je C? , while the socially optimal effort level is , 1 / ( ).i je C E? ?  The slow institutional dynam-
ics will be in equilibrium when a change in the sanctioning preference i?  cannot increase utility, 
as given by ? ?? ? ? ?? ?/ / / / 0.i i i i i j j iU e de d U e de d? ?? ? ? ? ? ?  If the effort allocation is privately op-
timal, the institutional equilibrium requires that ( ) / 0.j j iE de d? ?? ?  Provided that sanctions have 
an effect and / 0,j ide d? ?  institutions are in equilibrium if , .i j E? ?  This preference value is the 
one that will induce individuals to deliver the socially optimal effort level. In section 4.4 we show 
that this equilibrium is the only evolutionarily stable one. As a result, the social dilemma will be 
solved.  
 
4.3 The agent-based model 
Our starting point is a small community consisting of n  individuals who harvest a common pool 
resource; see the Appendix for a detailed description of the agent-based model. We follow the 
Gordon-Schaefer-model (Clark, 1990), in which harvests depend linearly on the amount of effort 
ie , the size of the resource stock X , and a technology parameter ? , while the resource exhibits 
logistic growth. The constant price per unit of harvested biomass p  and unit costs of effort c  
are assumed to be exogenous. Consequently, in each time step agent i  receives income 
( )i iM e p X c?? ? . In principle, all actions are observable, but agents make mistakes in perceiving 
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each other’s effort levels or in implementing their intended sanctions. Sanctions have a direct ef-
fect on the utility an agent obtains. This could reflect punishments or rewards having direct mon-
etary consequences, such as destruction of equipment or a gift, but one could also think about a 
gain or loss of social esteem or social status affecting utility. Therefore, we will refer to the sum 
of all social sanctions as the social status of one individual. We assume that imposing a punish-
ment and giving a reward are equally costly. In our agent-based simulations, we use the Stone-
Geary Cobb Douglas utility function. This utility function assumes that individuals may not only 
receive income from resource harvesting, but also from other economic activities. Furthermore, 
it takes into account that income and social status are imperfect substitutes.  
 Individuals increase their welfare by adjusting their effort levels through trial and error. 
Randomly selected agents first evaluate the utility that their current effort level gives. Then, they 
evaluate a slightly modified exploitation strategy and choose the one that offers higher utility. If 
agents change their behavior often enough, this will lead to the well-known Cournot-Nash equili-
brium which can be analytically determined by maximizing utility with respect to individual effort 
for each agent. The social preference is imitated, as is typically the case in cultural learning (Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005; Henrich and McElreath, 2003). A focal player is randomly selected and 
matched with a co-player. If the co-player currently enjoys a higher utility, the focal agent adopts 
the other player’s sanctioning preference. Alternatively, we have implemented simulations where 
the criterion for success was the average utility obtained since the last comparison round. Cultural 
learning also has a random component: after each encounter, there is a small probability that the 
social preference of the focal individual faces a small and random variation, analogous to a muta-
tion in genetic evolution. We find that the emerging sanctioning preference leads to socially op-
timal exploitation (Fig. 4.1a). Consequently, the resource stock is close to what would be socially 
optimal (Fig. 4.1b).  
 The literature has identified several factors that can hinder self-governance (Ostrom, 
2003; Ostrom, 2010). Figure 4.2 shows long-term values of the sanctioning preference and re-
source stock for different parameter configurations; see the Appendix for a description of the 
agent-based model and its parameters. If exploiting the resource is very profitable, a stronger 
sanctioning preference evolves, compensating for the increased private incentive to exploit (Fig. 
4.2a). If sanctioning is very costly, cooperation persists, even though very high costs can lead to 
overexploitation, given that individuals make errors (Fig. 4.2b). If we relax the assumption of per-
82
fect symmetry between utility obtained from punishments and rewards ( 1? ? ), the results are still 
robust for small deviations from 1? ?  (Fig. 4.2c). Note that if punishments have a stronger ef-
fect than rewards on an individual’s utility, the outcome is sub-optimal, but not far from the so-
cial optimum. If, on the contrary, individuals are less sensitive towards punishments than re-
wards, the enforcement mechanism suddenly collapses below a critical value. 
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Figure 4.1. Sanctioning evolves towards a level that leads to socially optimal effort. a, The average sanc-
tioning preference evolves towards a level that enforces an effort level that is socially optimal. b, As a re-
sult, the resource level is very close to the social optimum. In the absence of a sanctioning institution, sel-
fish agents would overexploit, leading to the open access Nash equilibrium resource level. See Appendix 
for parameter values. 
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Figure 4.2. The resulting values after a fixed large number of time steps are robust towards changes in key pa-
rameters that make cooperation more difficult. a, If the private benefits from exploiting increase, a higher sanc-
tioning preference compensates and assures optimal effort levels. b, If the costs of sanctioning increase overex-
ploitation occurs, but for low costs the social optimum is maintained. c, If punishments and rewards affect the 
utility of the receiver in a non-symmetric way, the results are fairly robust. If sensitivity of utility towards pu-
nishment drops below a critical level, cooperation drastically collapses. d, If punishments and rewards affect the 
utility of the sender in a non-symmetric way, the results are robust. e, Even when individuals assign little impor-
tance to social status compared to income, the harvesting level will be very close to the social optimum. f, If 
agents make implementation errors and deviate from what their sanctioning preference dictates, results are ro-
bust. But again, there is a critical level, above which cooperation collapses. The figure shows values of the sanc-
tioning preference and the resource level after 3000 time steps. See Appendix for parameter values. 
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 In principle, punishing can either be more expensive or cheaper than rewarding, because indi-
viduals may fear retaliations and feel stressed by punishing or they may enjoy “sweet revenge” 
(Knutson, 2004). Relaxing the assumption that punishments and rewards are equally costly 
( 1? ? ) does not alter our results substantially (Fig. 4.2d). Even if individuals assign little impor-
tance to social status, and much more to income, the harvesting level will be very close to the so-
cial optimum (Fig. 4.2e). If individuals make mistakes in implementing a sanction as dictated by 
the sanctioning preference, the results are fairly robust (Fig. 4.2f). Again, the emerging pattern is 
non-linear. Above a critical error level, the enforcement system collapses and the community 
switches drastically from almost socially optimal exploitation to the open access exploitation lev-
el.  
 The egocentric sanctioning mechanism works because the incentive structure of all agents 
is altered in such a way that an institutional equilibrium is reached, in which marginal private ben-
efits from resource extraction equals marginal social costs from depleting the resource stock (Fig. 
4.3). The effort allocation time scale, which reflects economic and social decisions and outcomes, 
is in equilibrium when utility cannot be raised by changing the exploitation strategy. This implies 
that marginal private benefits from harvesting equal marginal private benefits (or costs) from so-
cial sanctions caused by a change in own effort level. In the institutional equilibrium economic 
choices are optimal. In that case, a change in the sanctioning preference i?  is only beneficial if 
the utility iU  is increased due to choices made by other agents.  
 Figure 4.3 shows how a change in the sanctioning preference of focal individual i  induc-
es other individuals to change their effort level, which feeds back on the utility of agent i  
through the resource abundance and the social status. The institutional equilibrium is reached 
when the marginal utility change due to these two effects (change in resource abundance and so-
cial status – both due to altered behavior of other agents) balance each other out. This implies 
that the marginal utility gain from increased resource abundance equals the marginal loss in social 
status, where both are caused by changes in effort levels of other agents. If punishments and re-
wards are used symmetrically and own effort level is used as a moral benchmark, a change in ef-
fort of agent i  has the opposite marginal effect on the social status of i  than a change in effort 
of a co-player. This effectively links the effort allocation and the institutional equilibrium. If a 
change in the resource stock affects all agents in the same way, marginal private benefits from 
exploitation equal the marginal resource externalities imposed on others. This is a necessary and 
sufficient condition to overcome a social dilemma. Our findings are in line with earlier work that 
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has shown that if evolutionary processes change slower than behavior, cooperation can be sus-
tained (Akçay et al., 2009). 
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Figure 4.3. The feedback structure of a higher sanctioning preference of agent .i  Positive feedbacks are 
indicated by arrows, while negative feedbacks are indicated by bars. Choices made by agent i  are depicted 
by solid lines, while actions beyond the control of agent i  are depicted by dotted lines. In response to a 
higher sanctioning preference, all individuals reduce their effort levels (squared box), while agent i  re-
sponds to this by increasing his own effort. These decisions affect social and economic outcomes. If the 
other agents hold, on average, a positive sanctioning preference, agent i  suffers a loss of social status due 
to higher effort (1). Higher effort leads to more income for agent i  (2), but a lower resource level partly 
squanders income of agent i  (3). The marginal losses from a change in social status (1) will equal the mar-
ginal gains from an increase in income (2 and 3) if decisions are optimal. What remains, are economic re-
percussions beyond the control of agent .i  The reduced effort by other agents leads to a loss of social sta-
tus of agent i  (4), while income is raised due to a higher resource level (5). In the institutional equilibrium 
the marginal gains from a change in social status (4) equal the marginal gains from a higher resource stock 
(5). The social dilemma will be overcome if the marginal effects of a change in private income by harvest-
ing, given by (2) and (3), equal the marginal social costs, given by (5). This condition is met if punishments 
and rewards are used symmetrically with own effort as a moral benchmark, and the marginal effects of (1) 
and (4) sum up to zero. 
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We have already identified key parameters that may form obstacles for the evolution of a success-
ful enforcement mechanism. Additionally, we find that the sanctioning preference compensates 
for the fact that harsher sanctions are required to sustain cooperation in larger groups (Fig. 4.4a). 
However, beyond a certain group size, overexploitation occurs, given that strong sanctions are 
too costly if agents make mistakes. If there is a chance that some harvesting goes undetected, 
overexploitation occurs (Fig. 4.4b). This shows, like earlier work (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), 
that a lack of monitoring possibility can undermine cooperation. In a similar vein, an error term 
that reflects the failure to perceive the correct effort levels, and send each partner a sanction at 
random (dictated by a fraction of their sanctioning preference) forms a critical obstacle (Fig. 
4.4c).  
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Figure 4.4. Several key parameters can be identified that undermine cooperation and affect the long-term re-
sults. a, If group size increases above a critical level the social optimum will not be achieved. b, If monitoring is 
imperfect and some harvesting activity goes undetected, massive overexploitation occurs. c, If agents make 
errors in perceiving exploitation and deviate from what their sanctioning preference recommends them to do, 
overexploitation occurs. d, If income from resource harvesting is much more important than social status com-
ing from that activity, harsher sanctions evolve. There is a point where the required sanctions are too high and 
cooperation cannot be sustained. The figure shows values of the sanctioning preference and the resource level 
after 3000 time steps. See Appendix for parameter values. 
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Also the fact that individuals have outside options (Tarui, 2007) that deliver income and social 
status is important. If income from resource harvesting is much more important than social sta-
tus coming from that activity, harsher sanctions are required and the sanctioning system may not 
evolve to these high levels (Fig. 4.4d). 
 
4.3.1 Robustness of the agent-based model 
Here, we relax the assumption that the resource system is always in equilibrium by introducing a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????pproaches 
a steady state. Resilience ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e-
rates from 1% of carrying capacity to 90% of carrying capacity. The other extreme is no resilience 
at all; the resource never regenerates and would stay at 1% of carrying capacity. In between we 
have divided the actual regeneration by the maximum (90%) to obtain a measure between zero 
and 1. We find that only when resilience is very weak, the enforcement mechanism collapses (Fig. 
4.5a). Furthermore, we have analyzed the case where each agent has only a small number of trials 
to learn about appropriate effort levels. Even if this is the case, the results are still very close to 
the social optimum (Fig. 4.5b).  
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Figure 4.5. Relaxing the assumption that the system is in equilibrium. a, If the resource responds slowly 
to exploitation and resilience is very low, too much of the resource is extracted. At a critical level, coopera-
tion breaks down, and massive overexploitation occurs. b, If individuals have only few trials to revise their 
strategy, the resource is still only moderately exploited. The figure shows values of the sanctioning prefe-
rence and the resource level after 3000 time steps. See Appendix for parameter values. 
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Surprisingly, if not own behavior, but group behavior is used as a benchmark for deciding whom 
to punish or reward, the emerging harvest scenario is further away from the social optimum, 
compared to a situation when only own behavior is used (Fig. 4.6).  
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Figure 4.6. Not own behavior, but group behavior is used as a moral benchmark. If individuals do not use 
own effort levels (solid lines), but average effort in the population (diamonds) as a moral benchmark, the 
evolving sanctioning preference and effort levels will be further away from the social optimum. This is es-
pecially the case if the costs of sanctioning go up. The figure shows values of the sanctioning preference 
and the resource level after 3000 time steps. See Appendix for parameter values. 
 
Interestingly, if individuals do not imitate each other’s sanctioning preferences, but infer them 
through trial and error, the emerging exploitation level will still lead to optimal resource abun-
dance (Fig.4.7b). However, the individuals in the community will not hold the same sanctioning 
preference. Instead we see social polymorphisms arising, ranging from high sanctions to negative 
preference values (Fig. 4.7a), which reflect anti-social punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008). Ana-
lytically, this can indeed be identified as a branching point. 
 
Egocentric sanctions evolve spontaneously to overcome social dilemmas ? 4
89
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time steps
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
S
an
ct
io
ni
ng
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e
Optimal sanctioning preference
a
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time steps
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
E
ffo
rt
Optimal effort level
b
Figure 4.7. The sanctioning preference is learned through trial and error. a, If individuals do not imitate 
each other’s sanctioning preferences, but infer them through trial and error sanctioning preferences di-
verge. On average, sanctioning preferences will still be optimal, but while some individuals have a very 
strong preference, others have a very weak one. b, In spite of holding different sanctioning preferences, 
individual effort levels are homogenous and close to the optimum. 
 
4.4 A general analytical model 
We start our analysis with assuming that two agents face a social dilemma. Later, this will be ex-
tended to a community consisting of 2n ?  individuals. In that case, some simplifying assump-
tions are necessary to keep the system analytically tractable. Since changes in moral preferences 
are rare, we assume that everyone in society holds the same sanctioning preference when a single 
individual changes his mind and a new preference occurs (through mutation). This assumption is 
obviously more realistic for small communities with little contact to the outside world, where so-
90
cial cohesion is typically strong, but it may also occur in large societies.15
i?
 This analytical frame-
work allows us to analyze a continuum of strategies. The analysis is feasible, because we only 
compare two strategies at the same time. In our model each individual holds a sanctioning prefe-
rence  that evolves over time. If a new sanctioning preference occurs, the new strategy may 
offer a higher utility than the old one. In such a case, it is likely that the new strategy “invades” 
and spreads in the population. We assume that a better strategy always replaces an inferior strate-
gy. If one wants to analyze more rigorously the role of stochastic processes in small populations 
one could rely on Nowak et al. (2004). In our setup, evolution of the sanctioning preference 
comes to a halt, when a preference change of agent i  will not increase utility iU
 
anymore and 
/ ,i idU d?  also referred to as the selection gradient ( ),iD ?  is equal to zero. This will be analyzed 
in section 4.4.2.
 
While the assumption that individuals maximize their own utility is common in 
economics, it is less clear whether this also holds for the willingness to discipline peers, or for a 
moral system in general. More often, individuals compare their own social norms or moral prefe-
rences with norms of other community members and try to outcompete them, striving for rela-
tive superiority of their moral values. In that case, the selection gradient may be defined as 
( ) /i j id U U d?? , as will be assumed in section 4.4.3. As long as the selection gradient is positive, 
the strategy i  will be established in the population. Therefore, the selection gradient allows us 
not only to find the evolutionary equilibria, but also the evolutionary dynamics themselves. The 
change of the sanctioning preference ?  over time can be expressed as an ordinary differential 
equation known as the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics (Champagnat et al., 2002; 
Dieckmann and Law, 1996) of the type  
,
,/ ( )
i j
i jd dt kD ? ? ?? ? ??  (4.1) 
where ,( )i jD ?  is given by either ( ) /i j id U U d??  or / .i idU d?  Parameter k  scales the rate of evo-
lutionary change and depends on the probability of a mutation, the number of individuals, and 
the variance of a mutation. For constant population sizes, it can be set to 1 without loss of gene-
rality (Doebeli et al., 2004). At / 0d dt? ?  the so-called fitness landscape is flat and therefore evo-
lution may come to a halt, depending on the stability conditions that will be derived following 
Geritz et al. (1998). An evolutionary endpoint is reached if the following two conditions are met. 
First, an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is required, i.e. the selection gradient is at a (local) 
maximum. Second, that equilibrium needs to be a convergent stable strategy (CSS), i.e. that equi-
15 Think about Holden Caulfield in J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. 
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librium needs to be an attractor. If a strategy is CSS and ESS, it can be identified as an evolutio-
nary endpoint known as a continuously stable strategy. We analyze the stability of the evolutio-
nary process in section 4.4.4. 
4.4.1 A model of a general social dilemma 
A community consisting of 1n ?  individuals faces a social dilemma. Individuals invest effort in 
an activity that has repercussions on the income of all other community members. The externali-
ty coming from this activity may be positive, in the form of a public good, or negative, in the 
form of a common pool resource. Self-interested individuals typically ignore this externality giv-
ing rise to the so-called Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). As a result, community payoff 
will be sub-optimal. 
 In a fairly generic model of a social dilemma, agent i  chooses individual effort ie  that 
delivers private benefits (or costs) iB , while it bears a negative (positive) externality jij i E??  on 
each of the other agents present. Note that jiE  is the externality that agent i  imposes on agent 
.j  If / 0i iB e? ? ?  and / 0ji iE e? ? ?  the social dilemma can be considered a common pool re-
source game. If / 0i iB e? ? ?  and / 0ji iE e? ? ?  the social dilemma resembles a public goods game. 
A selfish agent would choose effort such that his private benefits are maximal and / 0,i iB e? ? ?  
while it would be socially optimal if everyone chose  
/ / 0i i ji ij iB e E e?? ? ? ? ??   (4.2) 
 
4.4.2 The evolution of a sanctioning institution for a general social dilemma when abso-
lute utility determines the evolutionary success 
In this sub-section we analyze the situation where absolute utility is the criterion for evolutionary 
success. If a new sanctioning preference enhances the utility of an agent, it will be pursued. 
Therefore, the selection gradient is given by / .i idU d?  
 
The two player case  
In the simplest case we ignore that imposing sanctions is costly and look at a situation where only 
two agents face a social dilemma ( 2).n ?  Individual i  holds a sanctioning preference i?  that de-
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termines the size of sanctions or rewards ( , , )ji i j iS e e ?  agent i  gives to agent ,j  depending on the 
effort level of the two agents. Total utility of agent i  is given by  
,( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ),i i j j i i ij j ij i j jU e e B e E e S e e? ?? ? ?  for ? ?, 1,2i j ?
 
and i j? 16
Agents ignore the externality that they impose on others, but they are sensitive towards the social 
sanctions that are imposed on them. Therefore, decisions are embedded in a social context. Giv-
en the presence of social sanctions, privately optimal choices require  
.  
0iji i
i i i
SU B
e e e
?? ?? ? ?? ? ? . (4.3) 
The first order condition in (4.3) gives the effort allocation equilibrium. Comparing (4.2) with 
(4.3) reveals that the social optimum will be achieved if and only if 
.ij ji
i i
S E
e e
? ??? ?  (4.4) 
We assume that agents change their private investment much more frequently than their sanc-
tioning preference. Mathematically, this implies that effort is a function of the sanctioning prefe-
rence, as given by ( )e ? . The slow institutional dynamics are in equilibrium when a change in the 
sanctioning preference does not increase utility anymore, as given by  
0ij ij j ij ji i i i
i i i i i j i j i
S E de S dedU B de de
d e d e d e d e d? ? ? ? ?
? ? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? .  (4.5) 
Since preferences change much slower than economic decisions, we assume that condition (4.3) 
is met when (4.5) is evaluated. Therefore, (4.5) simplifies to  
0.ij ij j
j j i
S E de
e e d?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
 (4.6) 
Given that / 0j ide d? ? , institutions are in equilibrium when  
0ij ij
j j
S E
e e
? ?? ?? ? .  (4.7) 
If the nature of the externality each individual imposes on the other is only dependent on indi-
vidual effort levels but not on other specific characteristics, we can assume that 
.ij ji
j i
E E
e e
? ??? ?  (4.8) 
16 From now on, arguments will be omitted, unless omitting them may cause confusion.  
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Comparing (4.7) and (4.8) with (4.4) shows that the social dilemma will be solved when the fol-
lowing symmetry condition is met: 
ij ij
i j
S S
e e
? ?? ?? ? . (4.9)  
In that case, / / 0,i i ji iB e E e? ? ? ? ? ?  which is the condition for social optimality. The symmetry 
that is required in condition (4.9) is met if social sanctions are based on punishments and rewards 
for which the own behavior is used as a moral benchmark. This equilibrium involves both players 
delivering the socially optimal amount of effort. In section 4.4.4 we show how this mechanism 
works for a common pool resource game and in section 4.4.5 for a public goods game. We also 
demonstrate that this equilibrium is the only evolutionarily stable one.  
 
The n>2 player case and costly sanctions 
We assume that the community consists of 2n ?  agents. Additionally, we assume that decentra-
lized sanctioning occurs bilaterally and is costly. As a result, agent i  receives sanctions 
( , , )ij i j jS e e ?  from agent j , while paying costs ( , , )ij i j iC e e ?  for any sanctions he may impose on 
j . Consequently, the utility function iU  of agent i  is given by 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , , ).i i i ij j ij i j j ij i j ij i j i j iU e B e E e S e e C e e? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?  (4.10) 
Besides, we analyze the case where punishments and rewards are used in a symmetric way and 
own effort levels are used as a moral benchmark that separates good from bad behavior. There-
fore, we assume that  
? ? ,ij j j iS e e?? ?  (4.11) 
which implies that / / .ij i ij jS e S e? ? ? ?? ?  Additionally, we assume that costs are non-negative and 
depend on sanctions imposed. For convenience we choose the functional form  
? ?? ?2 ,ij i i jC e e?? ?  (4.12) 
which implies that / / .ij i ij jC e C e? ? ? ?? ?
 
If investment decisions are privately optimal the follow-
ing condition must hold:
 
0.ij iji i
j i
i i i i
S CU B
e e e e?
? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ??  (4.13) 
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The effort allocation equilibrium is reached when (4.13) holds for all n  agents. This will be so-
cially optimal if and only if  
.ij ij ji
j i j i
i i i
S C E
e e e? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?  (4.14) 
Evolution comes to a halt, when a preference change will not increase utility anymore and 
/ 0.i idU d? ?  If effort allocation is optimal and hence in equilibrium, (4.13) holds, and the poten-
tial evolutionary endpoint is given by 
0.ij ij ij j iji
j i j i
i j j j i i
E S C de CdU
d e e e d? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?  (4.15) 
If effort levels of community members are fairly homogeneous and ,i je e?  it follows from (4.12) 
that / 0.ij iC ?? ? ?
 
If individuals are sensitive towards sanctions, i.e. / 0j ide ?? ?  it follows from 
(4.15) that  
0.ij ij ij
j i
j j j
E S C
e e e?
? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ??  (4.16) 
Using (4.8), (4.11), (4.12), and (4.16) yields 
0,ji ij ij
j i
i i i
E S C
e e e?
? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ??  (4.17) 
which can be rearranged to 
.ij ij ji
j i j i
i i i
S C E
e e e? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?  (4.18)  
This is indeed the condition for social optimality; see (4.14). 
4.4.3 The evolution of a sanctioning institution in a general social dilemma when rela-
tive utility determines the evolutionary success 
In this section we analyze the case, where individuals try to outcompete each other. Thus, an evo-
lutionary endpoint of the institutional dynamics may be reached when the selection gradient 
( ) /i j id U U d??  is zero.  
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The two player case 
Let us again start with the case where only two agents are present. Agent i  tries to outcompete 
agent j . Utility of agent i  is given by  
( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , , ).i i j i j i i ij j ij i j j ij i j iU e e B e E e S e e C e e? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  (4.19) 
If effort allocation is optimal, the first order condition for both agents is  
0ij iji i
i i i i
S CU B
e e e e
? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?  
for ? ?, 1,2i j ?
 
and .i j?  (4.20) 
Social optimality will be reached if and only if  
ij ij ji
i i i
S C E
e e e
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
 for ? ?, 1,2i j ?
 
and .i j?  (4.21) 
The institutional equilibrium is given by 
? ?
0.i j j j ji i i
i j i i i i i
d U U de U UU de U
d e d e d? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  (4.22) 
If the sanctioning preferences of the two agents are very similar and i j? ?? , this implies that the 
effort levels are also very similar and .i je e?  From (4.11) and (4.12) it directly follows that in that 
case / 0ji iS ?? ? ?  and / 0.ij iC ?? ? ?  Therefore, (4.22) reduces to  
? ?
0.i j j ji i
i j i i i
d U U de UU de
d e d e d? ? ?
? ??? ? ?? ?   
Using assumption (4.8), (4.11) and (4.12), the institutional equilibrium is given by  
? ?
0.i j j ij ij jii
i i i i i i
d U U de S C Ede
d d d e e e? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
 (4.23) 
Provided that the first bracket on the right hand side is non zero, using (4.23) will lead to the so-
cial optimum; see (4.21).  
4.4.4 An example of a simple common pool resource game 
A community comprises n  individuals that engage in the same economic activity. Individual i  
receives a return b  for each unit of invested effort .ie  We also assume that resource harvesting 
gives rise to a negative externality: the return any agent receives on her effort negatively depends 
on the total effort put in by all community members. The corresponding utility iU  is given by  
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? ? ? ?1ni i jjU e e b c e?? ? ? . (4.24) 
Here, c  can be thought of as the costs of congestion (for example because agents interfere with 
each other or have to compete for the bests spots, but also as any other negative interaction be-
tween contemporaneous harvesting activities (Clark, 1990; Wilson, 1982)). When social pressure 
is absent and every agent maximizes his individual profit, each agent faces the following best re-
sponse function: ( ) / 2i jj ie b c e c?? ? ? . Assuming identical agents, the open access equilibrium 
effort level equals / ( 1) ,Nashe b n c? ?  while the aggregated effort is / ( 1) .nb n c?  If 1n ? , this is 
larger than the socially optimal aggregate, which is / 2 .b c  If a cooperative system with n  users 
agrees on a common effort level to share profits equally, the symmetric individual effort level 
would be / 2 .opte b cn?  
 
Effort allocation  
We assume that utility for agent i  is given by 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )i i i ij j ij i j j ij i j ij i j i j iU e B e E e S e e C e e? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? , (4.25) 
where 
1( ) ( ),i i i iB e w e b ce? ?  (4.26) 
1( ) ,ij j i jE e w ce e? ?  (4.27) 
2( , , ) ( ),ij i j j j j iS e e w e e? ?? ?  (4.28) 
? ?23( , , ) ( ) .ij i j i i i jC e e w e e? ?? ?  (4.29) 
The parameters 1 2 3, ,w w w  are weights in the utility function that determine the preference for in-
come, social appreciation, and the burden of sanctioning others. The components for private 
benefits (4.26) and the negative externality (4.27) come directly from the common pool resource 
game (4.24). The utility obtained from receiving and sending sanctions is modeled in the same 
way as before; see (4.11) and (4.12). A necessary condition for private utility maximization is 
0.ij ij iji i
j i
i i i i i
E S CU B
e e e e e?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ??  (4.30) 
To keep the system analytically tractable, we assume that the community is initially in equilibrium 
and all individuals hold the same sanctioning preference r?  (referred to as the preference of the 
resident). Then, one individual changes his sanctioning preference (referred to as the preference 
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of the mutant). In what follows, we will determine whether this new sanctioning preference – 
denoted by m? – can spread in the population. (4.30) can be rewritten for the mutant and the resi-
dent as  
? ?1 0,m m mr mr mr
m m m m m
U B E S Cn
e e e e e
? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
 (4.31) 
? ?2 0,rm rm rmr r rr rr rr
r r r r r r r r
E S CU B E S Cn
e e e e e e e e
? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
 (4.32)
 
where indices with a bar refer to the ( 2)n ? other residents that are present in the community 
(vis-à-vis a random resident). Given that all agents are assumed to make decisions at the same 
time, their effort level will converge to the same level and therefore .r re e?  Combining (4.26)-
(4.29) and (4.31)-(4.32) yields the optimal exploitation strategies for the mutant and the residents. 
Thus, (4.31) and (4.32) can be given as  
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?21 2 31 2 1 2 1 0m r m r m m r
m
U w b n ce ce w n w n e e
e
? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ??   (4.33) 
and 
? ? ? ? ? ?21 2 2 32 2 0.r r m r m r r m
r
U w b c ne e w n w w e e
e
? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ??  (4.34) 
This allows us to derive the reaction function for the two different strategies: 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
2
1 1 3 2
2
1 3
1 2 1 1
,
2 2 1
r m r
m
m
w b e w c n w n w n
e
w c w n
? ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?  (4.35) 
 
? ? ? ?21 1 3 2 2
2
1 3
2 2
2
m m r m
r
r
w b e w c w w n w
e
w cn w
? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?? ? . (4.36) 
The effort differences are given by 
? ?
? ?? ?2 2 2 21 32 m rm r m r m
w
e e
w c w n
? ?
? ? ?
?? ? ? ? ? . (4.37) 
If the two sanctioning preferences are very similar and m r? ?? , this implies that the effort levels 
are also very similar and .m re e?  Then the equilibrium effort level is given by  
? ?
? ?
1 2
1
1
1m r
bw w n
e
cw n? ?
?
?
? ?? ? . (4.38) 
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Comparing (4.38) with the socially optimal effort level derived earlier reveals that a sanctioning 
preference of * 1 2/ (2 )bw nw? ?  would lead to the social optimum. 
The institutional equilibrium   
The starting point of the institutional time scale is the utility function (4.25). In the institutional 
time scale, economic decisions are assumed to be optimal and all individuals with the same sanc-
tioning preference will deliver the same effort level; see (4.35) and (4.36). In that case, a change in 
the sanctioning preference increases relative utility if 
? ? 0.m r m m mr r r
m r m m m m m
d U U U de Ude U U
d e d e d? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  (4.39) 
Using the assumption that m r? ??  and (4.26) – (4.29) gives a potential evolutionary endpoint as 
? ? ? ?1 2
,
0.
m r
m r m mr
m r m m
d U U e dede cw e w
d e d d? ? ?
?? ? ??
? ? ??? ? ? ? ?? ??? ?
 (4.40) 
Provided that the first term on the right hand side is non-zero, (4.40) will be zero when 
1 2/ .cw e w? ?  Using (4.38) shows that the fitness landscape is flat at 1 2/ (2 )bw nw? ? , which is a 
potential evolutionary endpoint. This is indeed the preference value that leads to socially optimal 
exploitation. To make sure that this equilibrium is evolutionarily stable and the sanctioning prefe-
rence will indeed converge towards that value, we will analyze the selection gradient (4.40) more 
thoroughly. The evolutionary process is inherently stochastic, but since mutations are assumed to 
be small ( )m r? ?? , evolutionary trajectories can be described with an ordinary differential equa-
tion; cf. Dercole and Rinaldi (2008) and Dieckmann and Law (1996). The deterministic path of 
the evolutionary dynamics can be directly described by the selection gradient, as given by  
? ?
,
,
m r
m r
m
d U Ud
dt d ? ? ?
?
? ?
??  (4.41) 
see also (4.1). Equation (4.41) shows the direction of the (residential) trait in the population. Note 
that the evolutionary direction does not point into the direction that is best for the resident (or 
the whole community), but what is best for the mutant. Combining (4.36), (4.37), (4.40), and 
(4.41) gives the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics (Champagnat et al., 2002; Dieckmann 
and Law, 1996) as 
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? ?
? ?? ?2 1 2 21 3
2
.
1 2
w bw w nd
dt n cw nw
??
?
? ??? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
 (4.42) 
At / 0d dt? ?  the fitness landscape is flat and therefore evolution may come to a halt. We find 
that / 0d dt? ?  if 1 2/ (2 )bw nw? ?  or ? ? ?? . Following Geritz et al. (1998), the first solution is 
evolutionarily stable, because 
? ?
1 2
2 2
, /(2 )
/ 0
m r
m r m bw nw
U U ? ?? ?? ? ? ? .  (4.43) 
It converges to that equilibrium, because 
 ? ?
1 2
2 2
, /(2 )
/ 0,
m r
m r r bw nw
U U ? ?? ?? ? ? ?   (4.44) 
? ? ? ?
1 2
2 2 2 2
, /(2 )
/ / 0
m r
m r m m r r bw nw
U U U U ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . (4.45) 
Hence, 1 2/ (2 )bw nw? ?  can be identified as continuously stable strategy (Geritz et al., 1998). Re-
peating the same steps for the other solution ? ? ?   reveals that ? ? ?  is evolutionarily stable, 
but it will never converge to that point. Therefore, the adaptive dynamics will lead to the sanc-
tioning preference that maximizes social welfare. 
4.4.5 An example of a public goods game 
Again, a community comprises n  individuals that engage in the same economic activity. Each 
individual receives a return b  for each unit of invested effort by a community member. The unit 
costs c  are, however, private. The corresponding utility iU  is given by  
? ? 2
1
.
n
i j i
j
U e b e ce
?
? ??  (4.46) 
The selfish Nash equilibrium in absence of punishment and reward is: 
/ (2 ),Nashe b c?  (4.47) 
while the socially optimal provision can be given by 
/ (2 ).opte nb c?  (4.48) 
Following the same steps as before, the following canonical equation of adaptive dynamics can 
be identified as 
? ?
? ?2 1 221 3/ .2
w bw w
d dt
cw nw
?? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ? ??? ?
 (4.49) 
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We find that there is one continuously stable strategy 1 2/ .bw w? ? ?  This equilibrium involves all 
players delivering the socially optimal amount of effort.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
With an analytical model and agent-based simulations we have explored the possibilities for a 
small community to overcome the Tragedy of the Commons. Our model formalizes theories 
from new institutional economics, in which moral values are more persistent than economic deci-
sions (North, 2005; North, 1991; Williamson, 2000) and investment strategies and moral values 
evolve endogenously from a continuum of strategies. We neither use group selection as a me-
chanism, nor do we assume that individuals understand the nature of the dilemma. Surprisingly, 
we find that individuals do not need to know about socially desirable behavior as long as deci-
sions are embedded in a social context and a simple moral rule is followed: taking own behavior 
as a benchmark and punishing and rewarding individuals who deviate from that benchmark in a 
symmetric way dictated by a moral preference. This may hint at the evolutionary origins of many 
moral codes that are based upon own behavior as a moral yardstick. Using Adam Smith’s words 
(1759, section 1.3.9):  
Additionally, we find that social sanctions will be much less efficient when not own, but group 
behavior is used as a moral yardstick. Furthermore, the evolving enforcement mechanism com-
pensates for obstacles such as large group size or high profits that can be made by acting against 
the group interest. Interestingly, the enforcement mechanism compensates only up to a critical 
for these obstacles. If disciplining peers is costly and individuals make small mistakes in their de-
cision to sanction or reward, the outcome is inefficient, but still close to the social optimum. 
However, if sanctioning is very costly, individuals make large mistakes, or individuals cannot 
monitor each other sufficiently, the sanctioning system cannot be maintained. If one of these key 
parameters passes a critical threshold, the enforcement mechanism collapses. This sheds interest-
ing light on the limits of community governance.   
When we judge in this manner of any affection, as proportioned or disproportioned to the cause which excites 
it, it is scarce possible that we should make use of any other rule or canon but the correspondent affection in 
ourselves. 
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Appendix 4: Supplementary description of agent based simulations  
 
The agent based simulations were performed in MATLAB. We use the protocol suggested by 
Grimm et al. (2006) to describe the setup of this model. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this model is to understand under which conditions agents that harvest a com-
mon pool resource (CPR) can overcome the so-called Tragedy of the Commons. In particular, 
we analyze the evolution of an enforcement mechanism, based on punishments and rewards. 
State variables and scales  
The community comprises a fixed number of individuals that harvest a CPR and punish or re-
ward each other’s behavior, depending on individual effort levels. Punishments and rewards will 
both be referred to as social sanctions. The model operates at three different time scales: the re-
source regeneration scale, the economic decisions and outcomes scale (effort allocation and im-
plementing sanctions), and the institutional scale (the preference to sanction peers). The resource 
loop is nested within the economic loop, which is nested within the institutional loop. The dy-
namics of the resource stock depend on the aggregated effort level of all agents and will adjust in 
the resource time scale. Each agent pursues a certain exploitation strategy that is revised during 
the economic time scale. Additionally, each agent holds a certain sanctioning preference that may 
be revised during the institutional time scale.  
Process overview and scheduling 
The institutional module proceeds in discrete time steps ( tinstitution ). Within each time step, the 
model processes first the economic module and then the cultural imitation module. The econom-
ic module starts with the resource module, and the payoff module. Then, the decision-making 
module is repeated teconomic  times. The final values for the resource stock, the effort levels, and the 
sanctioning preference values enter the institutional module, and consequently, the cultural imita-
tion module. 
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Design concepts 
Emergence: The resource stock, the effort levels and the sanctioning preference coevolve endoge-
nously. In the basic case, we impose the following moral constraints: Punishment and rewards are 
used in a symmetric way, and each individual uses his own effort level as a demarcation line that 
separates “good” behavior that will be rewarded from “bad” behavior that will be punished. All 
of those assumptions can and will be relaxed. We do not impose any limitation on the nature of 
the sanctioning preference. Therefore, we also allow for no sanctioning at all, or sanctions that 
are anti-social (Herrmann et al., 2008), where individuals with low effort levels are punished and 
individuals with high effort levels are rewarded.  
Adaptation: Individuals can modify their effort level and sanctioning preference.  
Fitness: Concerning economic decisions, individuals compare two different strategies and choose 
the one that yields a higher utility. Concerning the sanctioning preference, each individual com-
pares himself with a randomly drawn partner. If the partner has a higher utility, the focal (i.e. as-
signed) individual adopts the partner’s sanctioning preference.  
Prediction: Individuals are modeled to be myopic and do not anticipate the consequences of their 
social sanctions. This rules out the possibility that individuals are willing to accept a lower payoff 
now, hoping that this investment will pay off in the future.  
Sensing: Individuals can observe each other’s effort levels, while they do not know about the re-
source stock. Agents do not observe each other’s sanctioning preferences directly when deciding 
on effort. Only at the institutional time scale, agents compare each other’s sanctioning prefe-
rences and imitate each other. The assumptions concerning cognitive requirements of the agents 
are therefore not very demanding. Each agent only chooses the best out of two effort levels and 
one out of two sanctioning preferences.  
Interaction: The success of a harvesting strategy depends implicitly and explicitly on the institutions 
in place. Implicitly because harsh sanctioning will induce other individuals to reduce their effort 
level; explicitly, because social sanctions affect payoffs directly of the sender and of the receiver.  
Stochasticity: Individuals make implementation and perception errors when observing and sanc-
tioning each other. Additionally, monitoring is imperfect and there is a chance that harvesting 
activity goes undetected.  
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Initialization 
Different initialization routines have been tried, giving rise to the same emerging patterns. In the 
simulations presented in the manuscript, the initial resource stock 0X  is randomly drawn from a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The initial effort level 0,ie  
is different for each agent and randomly drawn from the same distribution as the resource stock, 
i.e. with a mean 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The initial sanctioning preference 0,i?  is dif-
ferent for each agent and drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 0.1. 
Submodels 
Resource growth: 
Two cases will be distinguished. First, it is assumed that the resource is always in equilibrium, giv-
en the exploitation of all agents. Second, it is assumed that the resource regeneration depends on 
exploitation, but it is not necessarily in equilibrium.  
If the resource and the economic time scales are perfectly separated, the size of the resource is 
given by 
1
1 nt itiX e? ?? ? ? , (4.A1) 
where tX  is the equilibrium resource stock level at time ,t ?  is the catchability coefficient, and 
ite  is effort of agent i  in time step t . We assume that the resource cannot go extinct. If 
1
1 /n iti e ?? ?? , the resource stock is given by 610tX ?? . If the assumption that the resource is al-
ways in equilibrium is relaxed, the resource grows continuously between time 0s ?  and s ?? . 
The new value is defined as ( )tX X ?? . The rate of resource change is given by the following 
differential equation  
? ? 1( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )n iidX X X X eds ? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ,  (4.A2) 
with initial condition 1(0) tX X ??  if 2t ?  and 0(0)X X?  otherwise, as given in the initialization 
subsection. Matlab’s ODE45 solver is used to calculate the new resource level.  
 
Payoff module 
The profits from harvesting itM  are determined for each agent and given by  
( )it t itM p X c e?? ? ,  (4.A3)  
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where p  is the benefit obtained from harvesting one unit of the resource, while c  is the cost of 
one unit of effort. Additionally, all social sanctions are calculated based on bilateral interactions. 
There is a chance that individuals make an error in perceiving the correct effort level of each oth-
er, or make an error in implementing the social sanctions, reflected in the error terms for percep-
tion errors ijt?  and implementation errors ijt? , that are randomly drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of zero and standard deviation of ??  and v? . Consequently, agent i  receives 
the following payoff from social sanctions S  from agent j : 
? ?? ?
? ?? ?
,jt ijt jt it ijt i j
ijt
jt ijt jt it ijt i j
e e e e
S
e e e e
? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ???
  if  
     if ,     
 
(4.A4) 
where the parameter ?  scales the relative strength of punishments compared to rewards. If 1? ?  
( 1? ? ) punishments have a stronger (weaker) effect than rewards. The costs of social sanctions 
jitC  agent i  imposes on agent j  is given by 
2
2
,ijt i j
jit
ijt i j
S e e
C
S e e
?? ??? ? ??
    if  
       if ,     
 
(4.A5) 
where the parameter ?  scales the relative costs of punishments compared to rewards. If 1? ?  
( 1)? ? , sending punishments is more (less) costly than rewards.17
? ? 11 ,1 1it it ijt ijtj i j iwU M M S S Cn n
?? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
 We assume that these utility 
components will enter an individual’s utility function that satisfies Stone-Geary Cobb Douglas 
preferences and can be given as 
 (4.A6) 
where M  and S  respectively are exogenous profits and social status obtained from other activi-
ties than harvesting, and w  and ?  are weighting parameters.18
 
  
 
 
17 We have also tried the cost function 
 if  
    if 
ijt i j
jit
ijt i j
S e e
C
S e e
?? ??? ? ???
, which gave rise to similar patterns. 
18 Alternatively, we have tried the simpler weighted utility function  
2 3
1 1 1
n
it it ijt ijtj i j i
w wU wM S C
n n? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ,where 1 2, 3,w w w  are preference weights in the utility function. This gave 
rise to similar emerging patterns. 
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Decision-making module 
Each individual is assigned once in random order. Updating is asynchronous, i.e. after each indi-
vidual decision the state variables are changed. First, the profits for the focal (i.e. assigned) indi-
vidual are calculated, as given in (4.A3). Then, the corresponding social sanctions are determined, 
as given by (4.A4) and (4.A5). With probability ?  harvesting activity goes undetected. Then the 
corresponding social sanctions ,ijt jitS S , and their costs ,jit ijtC C are set to zero. Finally, the corres-
ponding utility is calculated as given in (4.A6). This obtained utility is used as a benchmark for 
the focal individual for evaluating a slightly different strategy. The new effort level is given by 
, , ,i t i e i te e ?? ?? , where ie?  is the benchmark effort level and , ,e i t?  is a randomly normally distributed 
number with mean zero and standard deviation .e?  If the new effort level would be smaller than 
zero, the effort level will be given by , 0.i te ?  Afterwards the corresponding resource stock is cal-
culated and the corresponding utility is calculated. If the new utility is higher than the benchmark 
level, the individual adopts ,i te  as a new benchmark strategy. The corresponding utility level and 
the new resource stock level are stored. If the new utility is lower, the individual will reject it and 
the old effort ie?  remains the benchmark strategy that the individual will keep choosing.  
 
Cultural imitation module 
Each agent compares his current utility with that of a randomly drawn partner. If the partner has 
a higher utility, the focal individual adopts the partner’s sanctioning preference. If this is not the 
case, the focal individual keeps his own sanctioning preference. Since moral belief systems cannot 
be copied perfectly or change due to experiences unrelated to resource harvesting, we assume 
that there is a probability that a sanctioning preference changes in a stochastic way. With proba-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
, 1 , , ,i t i t i t?? ? ?? ? ? ,  (4.A7) 
where , ,i t??  is a randomly normally distributed number with mean zero and standard deviation 
?? . This new sanctioning preference will be stored.  
106
 
Table 4.A1. Variables and parameters of the agent-based model. 
Parameter Description Value
? Sanctioning preference endogenous
e Exploitation endogenous
X Resource stock endogenous
M Income endogenous
S Payoff from sanctions endogenous
C Costs of sanctioning endogenous
U Total utility endogenous
Deviation from benchmark exploitation endogenous
Deviation from benchmark sanctioning trait endogenous
? Implementation error endogenous
? Perception error endogenous
n Number of agents 20
p Market price 21
c Cost per unit of effort 0.05
? Catchability coefficient 0.05
? Preference for profits 0.7
w Costs of sanctions (Stone-Geary) 1
? relative cost of punishments vs. rewards 1
? relative utility effect punishments vs. rewards 1
w 1 Utility weight income (additive utility) –
w 2 Utility weight sanctions (additive utility) –
w 3 Utility weight costs of sanctions (additive utility) –
? Probability of undetected harvesting 0
? Probability of mutation sanctioning trait 0.02
Exogenous income 1
Exogenous sanctions 1
Standard deviation mutation exploitation 0.02
Standard deviation mutation sanctioning preference 0.03
Standard deviation implimentation error 0.0002
Standard deviation perception error 0.0002
Time steps institutional time scale 4000
Time steps economic time scale 20
Resource speed in equilibrium
??
M
S
economict
institutiont
??
v?
??
e?
e?
??
?
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Towards the optimal management of the 
Northeast Arctic cod fishery
 
 
 
Abstract
 
The objectives pursued by governments managing fisheries may include harvesting the fish 
stocks to maximize profits, to minimize the impact of harvesting on the marine ecosystem, or to 
secure jobs in the fishing industry. These objectives all require adjusting the composition of the 
fishing fleet as the various vessel types differ with respect to their operating costs, their environ-
mental impacts, etc. In this chapter we develop a management plan that allows the regulator to 
determine what fleet structure maximizes her objectives, what total allowable catch to harvest per 
year, and what long-run level of remaining biomass to target. In addition, the management plan 
also allows the regulator to compare the long-run welfare levels between the various management 
options to determine the costs and benefits associated with each. We apply the model to the case 
of Northeast Arctic cod, and econometrically estimate not only the cost and harvesting functions 
of the various vessel types, but also the parameters of the biological model as well as those of the 
demand function for cod. Our study thus provides key insights regarding the optimal manage-
ment of this valuable fish species. 
 
5  
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Stenseth, 2011. Towards the Optimal Management of the Northeast Arctic cod fishery, Manuscript. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The world’s largest stock of Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) is located in the Northeast Arctic, along 
the coast of Norway and in the Barents Sea. The history of the Northeast Arctic (or NEA) cod 
fishery since World War II is one of continued increases in landings, suddenly giving way to a 
near collapse of the fishery in 1989. In response to the cod crisis, a management regime was in-
troduced that imposed a fishing quota on each ocean-going vessel in the industry. The question is 
how to allocate those quotas most efficiently and – even more important – how to set a total al-
lowable catch (TAC) to prevent another cod crisis while meeting broader management objectives. 
 Fisheries management in Norway has a long tradition and regulations and management 
objectives have been considerably changed over time (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002; Hannesson, 
2004; Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 1995; Nakken et al., 1996). Årland and Bjørndal (2002) have identi-
fied the main objectives of Norwegian fisheries regulations as (i) increasing the profitability of the 
fisheries sector, (ii) protecting the resource base, and (iii) securing employment opportunities in 
coastal communities to maintain the settlements along the coast. These different objectives give 
most resource economists a little headache, as optimizing them requires equating the marginal 
costs and benefits – and such data is usually not available. One could still give policy recommen-
dation by constructing a social welfare function that contains preferences for (proxies of) these 
different objectives; see Dankel et al. (2009) for such a model.  
 In this chapter we suggest an alternative by treating these different objectives as con-
straints on fleet activity in the optimization problem of a resource manager. First, we analyze the 
scenario that the policy maker intends to maximize simply the rents from harvesting cod – har-
vesting should take place at lowest costs. Second, we consider the case that a policy maker max-
imizes rents on the condition that only boats are used that have least impact on the ecosystem. 
Third, we take into account that a diverse fleet is preferred (for the sake of regional development 
and cultural diversity). For all of these objectives, we determine the optimal TAC as well as the 
most efficient allocation of individual catch quotas over the various types of fishing vessels for 
various management objectives including maximization of the rents of cod harvesting.  
 Thus, this paper offers a management plan that can be adapted to a variety of govern-
ment objectives. In addition, it allows the decision maker to estimate the costs of pursuing objec-
tives other than cost minimization by comparing maximum financial welfare associated with the 
various objectives to that obtained under cost minimization.  
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 Although the stock of NEA cod lies within the exclusive economic zones of both Russia 
and Norway, we focus our analysis on the Norwegian fleet of ocean-going vessels because it con-
sists of a wide variety of boat types including trawlers, factory trawlers and longliners (Sandberg, 
2006; Standal, 2008). Hence, determining the optimal fleet composition for the various manage-
ment objectives is complex. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal levels of bio-
mass and the associated TAC, and estimate all parameters of the model using data on the NEA 
cod fishery. More specifically, we estimate the cost and production functions of the various vessel 
types in the industry (trawlers, longliners and factory trawlers), the demand function for cod (to 
determine how its value changes with quantity supplied), as well as the parameters of the growth 
function of cod. 
 This study has several unique features. First of all, our model differs from the previous 
studies in its econometric rigor, as it takes into account the many estimation problems associated 
with estimating the harvesting, cost, growth and demand functions including serial correlation 
and endogeneity. In this respect we improve on the earlier work by Arnason et al. (2004) and 
Kugarajh et al. (2006) in estimating the demand function for cod, and by explicitly acknowledging 
that there are not only variable costs associated with harvesting cod, but that there are fixed ad-
justment costs too (Asche, 2009). Second, we combine the empirically estimated functions into a 
model which allows policy makers to infer (i) the steady state levels of biomass that maximize 
their objectives (either unconstrained rent maximization, or rent maximizations taking into ac-
count environmental and/or social constraints), (ii) the associated optimal total allowable catch 
and the allocating thereof over the various vessel types, and (iii) the optimal harvest control rule 
(HCR) that informs the decision maker about the optimal TAC and its allocation over the boat 
types for every level of biomass – independent of whether it is the optimal steady state stock, or 
not. Third, our study also provides a flexible framework to include constraints regarding the 
supply side of fleet composition – the fact that a cost-minimizing long-run strategy cannot be 
implemented instantaneously, as boats that operate at lower costs cannot replace more costly 
ones in the short-run. As a result, our model provides an important bridge between analytical fi-
sheries models that have little empirical content, and highly detailed econometric studies that do 
not deliver any direct policy advice. 
 While an optimal allocation between the coastal and the ocean-going fleet has received 
some attention in the literature (Armstrong, 1999, 2000; Armstrong and Sumaila, 2001), the size 
of an optimal individual quota per boat is usually not addressed. This is somewhat surprising, 
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given that the question how to allocate a TAC over a certain number of boats is one of the most 
obvious management problems a fishery faces. An exception is Asche et al. (2009) who have ad-
dressed this question for the Norwegian trawler fleet. In most bioeconomic models individual 
boats do not exist – often costs are estimated at the aggregated level and hence, the fleet can only 
be analyzed as one entity; see Bromley (2009). This is an obvious shortcoming, as increasing and 
decreasing returns to scale operate at the boat level – not at the industry level. It is sometimes 
argued that a policy maker does not need to worry about how to distribute harvesting rights be-
cause a market for individually tradable quotas will ensure the efficient allocation (Grafton et al., 
2006; Hannesson, 2004). We would like to note that this is not true for two reasons. First, the 
total quota size to be allocated (via grandfathering, or via auctions) crucially depends not just on 
the benefits of selling cod (in terms of revenues or welfare obtained), but also on the costs of 
harvesting it. While the benefits only depend on the quantity supplied to the market (i.e., on the 
TAC), the costs critically depend on the composition of the fishing fleet as some boat types are 
more efficient in catching cod than others. Hence, while a system of ITQs may ensure that actual 
harvesting takes place at minimum cost, we still need to know how the minimum cost solution 
looks like in order to decide on the level of the TAC itself. Second, even if ITQs result in fishing 
activity that operates at least costs, such an outcome would only be socially optimal if society had 
no other objectives than just minimizing harvesting costs. In reality, broader objectives, such as 
ecosystem preservation, the cultural value of a diverse fleet, or equity considerations, are pursued; 
see also chapter 7. Therefore, detailed information on the various vessel types is needed to be 
able to determine whether or not certain boat types should be prohibited from purchasing ITQs 
– in case the government pursues objectives other than just pure cost minimization.  
 Management of the NEA cod fishery is inherently complex, and any useful model – as 
the one developed here – has inevitably to sacrifice certain details. First of all, this study ignores 
important ecosystem effects. In Winter, the mature fish migrate out of the Barents Sea for about 
3 months to spawn, returning to the feeding grounds in Spring. The cod eggs drift up along the 
Norwegian coast and the immature fish stay in the feeding grounds until maturation when they 
start reproducing. Obviously management could be substantially improved by acknowledging the 
age-structure and the productivity of the stock (Diekert et al., 2010a; Sumaila, 1997a). Second, 
and in a similar vein, the fact that older cod tend to cannibalize on younger cod may have man-
agement implications that are ignored here (Armstrong, 2000; Armstrong and Sumaila, 2001). 
Third, if harvesting pressure is very high this may induce an evolutionary response that lead to 
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economic repercussions (Eikeset et al., 2010e); see also Chapter 6. Fourth, food-web interactions 
with other species are important factors driving the cod stock dynamics. For example capelin 
(Mallotus villosus) and Norwegian Spring-Spawning (NSS) herring (Clupea harengus) are two of the 
most important fish species the cod interacts with (Hjermann et al., 2007). Herring feeds on ca-
pelin larvae (Gjøsæter and Bogstad, 1998) and is therefore competing with the cod for the prey 
species capelin. We ignore this effect in this paper, but see Link and Tol (2006) and Sumaila 
(1997b). Fifth, climate plays also an important role in this ecosystem. If new species immigrate 
from the south, this leads to a new food-web structure (Ottersen et al., 2006). Examples of bio-
economic models that have analyzed how climate may affect the management of cod are Han-
nesson (2007b) and Link and Tol (2009). A study that takes both climate change and multiple 
species into account is Eide and Heen (2002). Sixth, climate change may also affect the negotia-
tions and the legitimacy of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishery Commission. If the climate gets 
warmer, this may trigger capelin to migrate further into Russian waters in which the cod may fol-
low (Roderfeld et al., 2008). Our analysis does not touch upon such strategic interactions, as we 
assume that the management authority in place sets and enforces the quota; for examples of stra-
tegic games regarding the NEA cod fishery, see Diekert et al. (2010c), Hannesson (2007a), and 
Sumaila (1997a; 1997b). 
 This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we present an overview of the NEA 
cod fishery. Section 5.3 develops the optimal management plans for a variety of management ob-
jectives. We estimate the model in section 5.4, presenting the parameterizations of the produc-
tion, cost, and demand functions as well as of the biological model. Next, section 5.5 combines 
the theoretical and empirical results and derives an optimal policy, while section 5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 The Northeast Arctic cod Fishery 
The Northeast Arctic cod fishery consists of two parts that are geographically separate: the feed-
ing grounds in the Barents Sea, and the spawning grounds further south along the coast of Nor-
way. Norwegians have been fishing for over thousands of years in predominantly the spawning 
grounds because of their proximity to villages and ports. Since the 1930s (and especially after the 
second world war), technological developments facilitated the use of large ocean-going trawlers in 
the feeding grounds in the Barents Sea, which resulted in an increase in fishing pressure (Godø, 
2003). Until the early 1970s the number of trawlers steadily increased and landings have been as 
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high as one million tonnes per annum – for some years, the harvesting probability for individual 
fish was as high as 70% per year (Eikeset, 2010). 
 In the late 1970s it became clear that the NEA cod fishery was overexploited; see Figure 
5.1. In 1977 the Norwegian government responded by starting to actively enforce the country’s 
exclusive economic zone and by barring the entry of new trawlers (Standal and Aarset, 2008).  
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Figure 5.1. The total landings and corresponding total biomass of Northeast Arctic cod since 1949. 
 
Also, a cap was introduced on the total amount of cod caught per year (the so-called total allow-
able catch, or TAC). Unfortunately, these measures were insufficient to prevent the cod crisis 
that occurred in 1989: the TACs in the 1980s were too lenient – especially because the cod was 
under severe stress already because of the population collapse of one of its main prey species, 
capelin. As a consequence the TAC in 1989 had to be reduced dramatically with disastrous con-
sequences for the cod fishing industry (Hersoug et al., 2000). There was a broad political consen-
sus that a policy change was needed. A system was introduced that gave each ocean-going vessel 
in the industry a quota to catch a certain amount of cod. These quotas were non-transferable at 
first, but later on the regulations were revised to allow vessels to transfer harvesting rights 
(Hersoug et al., 2000; Holm and Nielsen, 2007; Standal and Aarset, 2008). Currently, the fishery is 
Towards the optimal management of the Northeast Arctic cod fishery ? 5
113
managed by the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishery Commission as the feeding grounds of NEA 
cod (in the Barents Sea) are located in the exclusive economic zones of both countries. Since 
2004 a new management plan is in use that determines the annual TAC; more than 90% of the 
quota is allocated to Russia and Norway, while the European Union member states receive the 
bulk of the remaining 10%. The Norwegian TAC is divided between these ocean-going vessels 
and the smaller coastal vessels with a distribution key known as the trawl ladder (Armstrong and 
Sumaila, 2001; Hannesson, 2004, p. 106; Standal and Aarset, 2008). The TAC is adjusted annually 
on the basis of a so-called harvest control rule (HCR) which determines the TAC for any level of 
spawning stock biomass; see Eikeset et al. (2010c) and the next chapter (panel c in Figure 6.1). 
 
5.3 The optimal management of the cod fishery 
5.3.1 Deriving an optimal TAC  
We assume the government aims to maximize the net present value of social welfare as the sole-
owner of the resource. Because about 90% of the cod is exported, welfare maximization can best 
be described by maximizing profits – but see footnotes 26–27 and chapter 6. However, we ac-
knowledge that society may have broader objectives than just maximizing rents from harvesting 
cod. These other considerations may be related to environmental concerns (as some boat types 
are more damaging to the marine ecosystem than others) or social-cultural concerns (the desire to 
maintain a diverse fleet because of cultural considerations). Therefore, we assume that the gov-
ernment aims to maximize Norway’s social welfare (by maximizing the rents of cod harvesting) 
while it may or may not decide to impose constraints on the type of vessels used to address these 
considerations too. We derive the optimal management plan for three different management ob-
jectives. First, we solve the problem assuming that society chooses to use a fleet that is able to 
harvest a specific amount of cod, the TAC, at least total costs. Second, we consider the case in 
which society imposes additional constraints on the fleet composition in order to protect the ma-
rine environment by banning trawlers and factory trawlers, since they are deemed more destruc-
tive to the ecosystem than longliners (Dayton et al., 1995). The third case we consider is the one 
where the government, motivated by employment or cultural considerations, decides to maintain 
a diverse fleet by allocating harvesting rights to a variety of vessel types in the industry – as is cur-
rently done in the Norwegian cod fishery. Throughout the chapter, we follow Salvanes and 
Squires (1995) by assuming that all boats of a specific type are identical.  
114
 The instantaneous flow of profits (or producer surplus) is specified as follows 
( , ) ( ) ( , ),t t t t tX TAC R TAC C X TAC? ? ?  (5.1) 
where tX  is the biomass of cod present in the Northeast Arctic in year t , and tTAC  is the total 
allowable catch set by the government. Furthermore, ( )tR TAC  are the revenues of supplying 
tTAC  to the market, and ( , )t tC TAC X  are the costs of catching .tTAC  The cost function is as-
sumed to be a function not only of the quantity harvested, but also of the amount of cod biomass 
remaining. The reason is that the returns per unit of effort (for example, the number of days 
spent catching cod) may depend on the density of the fish in the sea (the so-called stock effect). 
Also note that the costs of catching fish are obviously also dependent on the types of vessels 
used – in other words, they depend on the fleet composition. In section 5.4, the empirical estima-
tions show that 0XC ?  and 0.TACC ? 19 Regarding the revenue function, we assume a linear in-
verse demand function for cod:  
,t tP a bTAC? ?  (5.2) 
so that ? ?( ) .t t tR TAC a bTAC TAC? ?  The optimal control problem the government faces is as fol-
lows:  
0
max ( , )t t tTACW e X TAC dt
?
?
?? ??  (5.3) 
subject to  
( ) ,t t tX G X TAC? ??  (5.4) 
where dots denote time derivatives, ?  is the discount rate, and ( )G X  is the growth function of 
the cod stock, which is assumed to be logistic : 
( ) 1 ,tt t
XG X rX
K
? ?? ?? ?? ?  (5.5) 
where r  is the intrinsic growth rate, and K  is the maximum amount of cod biomass that would 
materialize in the long run absent harvesting – the so-called carrying capacity. The current-value 
Hamiltonian H  is then given by20 
? ?( ) ( , ) ( ) ,a bTAC TAC C TAC X G X TAC?? ? ? ? ?H  (5.6) 
where ?  is the co-state variable. 
                                                 
19 Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts. Thus X
C C
X
? ??  
20 In the rest of the chapter we omit time subscripts unless doing so could cause confusion. 
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 Using the dynamics of the resource stock (5.4) and applying the maximum principle, we 
obtain the following first-order conditions for an optimum: 
0        2 ,TAC TACa bTAC C?? ? ? ? ?H  (5.7)  
.X XC G?? ? ?? ? ??  (5.8) 
To derive the steady state optimum, we set 0x? ? ?? ? . Substituting (5.7) into (5.8) we have 
? ?( ) 2 .X X TACC G a bTAC C?? ? ? ?  The optimal steady state relationship between TAC and bio-
mass is thus as follows: 
? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
2
.
2 2
TAC
X
rX K r a C
TAC
b rX K r KC
?
?
? ? ?? ? ? ?   (5.9) 
As shown in (5.9), the optimal TAC depends on the cost function, and hence on the composition 
of the fleet – as not all vessel types are likely to be equally efficient in catching cod. While XC  
(the stock effect) is transmitted through all vessels that are in operation, TACC  (the cost of catch-
ing an additional amount of cod) is only transmitted through the marginal vessel type – the type 
that is the last to receive a quota if these quotas are handed out starting with the most preferred 
type (see also section 5.3.4). This difference is important if more than one vessel type is in use for 
catching cod. If only one boat type is operated in the cod fishery, deriving TACC  and XC  is 
straightforward. This may be the case because one vessel type outperforms all other types in a 
specific aspect – one type may be able to harvest at lower costs than the others, or one type may 
have smaller environmental impacts than any of the other types. If, however, more than one type 
is used in the fishery (because the government values a diverse fleet because of social or cultural 
considerations, or because it faces constraints regarding the number of vessels of the preferred 
type), the stock effect XC  shows the impact of having an extra unit of biomass on all vessels (of 
all types used) in the fishery, while TACC  only pertains to the marginal boat type as defined above. 
Furthermore, because the optimal TAC depends on the composition of the fishing fleet, so does 
the optimal steady state biomass, which can be determined by substituting (1 / )TAC rX X K? ?  
into (5.9) and solving. Having determined the optimal stock and harvesting levels, we can also 
calculate social welfare (as measured by producer surplus). 
 While steady state biomass and harvest levels are interesting in itself, they are often not 
very useful for management purposes, as in reality the stock will never be in steady state. There-
fore, we derive a harvest control rule (HCR) that informs the decision maker about the optimal 
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TAC for any given stock level. In the absence of discounting, a feedback HCR can be determined 
relatively easily following Sandal and Steinshamn (1997; 2001); see for applications Arnason et al. 
(2004) or Grafton et al. (2000). From (5.7) it follows that the co-state variable ?  can be rewritten 
as a function of the state and the control variable ( X  and TAC  respectively). If the discount rate 
is zero, the Hamiltonian is constant over time, and maximizing the current-value Hamiltonian 
boils down to maximizing the profit flow (as defined in (5.1)) that can be obtained in a steady 
state, also referred to as the sustainable economic rent * ( )X?  (Sandal and Steinshamn, 2001). 
We thus obtain the following analytical feedback rule: 
? ?
2
*2 1 2 1 4 1 ( )
;
2
TAC
X X XbrX brX b a C rX X
K K K
TAC
b
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ??  (5.10) 
see the Appendix for the exact derivation. 
 
5.3.2 Deriving the optimal quota allocation for each individual vessel type 
Suppose that currently there are Z  different types of vessels used in the industry, such as traw-
lers, factory trawlers, and longliners. Furthermore, in this subsection we also assume that boats 
can freely enter or leave the cod fishery – an assumption that will be relaxed in section 5.3.4. The 
total allowable catch of the vessels of type z , [1,.., ]z Z? , in year t  is denoted by ,ztTAC  and the 
sum of these type-specific allowable catches should add up to the TAC as determined by the 
government for that year (that is, 
1
).Zt ztzTAC TAC???  The production process of a vessel of type 
z  is described by a Cobb Douglas harvest function, where the amount of cod harvested in year t  
( zth ) is a function of both that vessel’s effective fishing effort ( zte , as measured in efficiency units 
– given by the number of days catching cod multiplied by the vessel’s Bruto Register Tonnage 
(BRT)), and of the total amount of cod biomass in the Northeast Arctic ( )tX : 
z z
zt z t zth q X e
? ?? ,  (5.11) 
where zq  is a catchability coefficient, z?  is the stock-output elasticity and z?  is the effort-output 
elasticity. All parameters are type-specific, and z?  and z?  reflect the percentage increase in har-
vests resulting from a one percent increase in the relevant input. In section 5.4 we show that for 
all boat types, 1 0.z z? ?? ? ?  
 Regarding the costs of catching cod, we distinguish between fixed adjustment costs and 
variable costs. Adjustment costs include changing the vessel’s gear to make it suitable for catch-
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ing cod, the fuel spent on sailing to the cod fishing grounds, etc., while the variable costs are the 
costs incurred on the days that the vessel is actually catching cod. We use zf  to denote the fixed 
adjustment cost components while the variable costs of effort are assumed to be constant and 
equal to zv . Hence, the annual costs incurred by a vessel of type z  spending zte  tonnage-days 
catching cod in a year are given by 
zt z z ztc f v e? ? . (5.12) 
Let us first determine, for each vessel type z , the optimal effort level per boat *ze , and also the 
optimal number of boats *zn , if the aggregate amount of cod to be caught by all boats of type z  is 
equal to zTAC  (that is, ).z zz z z zn q X e TAC
? ? ?  The Lagrangian of the cost minimization problem is 
as follows: 
? ? ? ? ,z zz z z z z z z z z zn v e f TAC n q X e? ??? ? ? ? ?  (5.13) 
where z?  is the shadow price of harvesting an extra unit of cod by increasing the fleet size or the 
size of the quota per boat. The first order conditions associated with (5.13) are 
0,z zz z z z z z z
z
v e f q X e
n
? ???? ? ? ? ??  (5.14a) 
1 0,z zz z z z z z z z
z
n v n q X e
e
? ?? ? ??? ? ? ??   (5.14b)
 0.
z zz
z z z z
z
TAC n q X e? ??
?? ? ? ??   (5.14c) 
For future reference, it is convenient to note that (5.14a) implies that the shadow price is equal to 
the vessel’s average costs of catching cod fish: 
.
z z
z z z
z
z z
v e f
q X e? ?
? ??  (5.15) 
Next, combining (5.14a) and (5.14b) we find that the optimal amount of effort per vessel per year 
is equal to 
? ?* .1z zz z z
fe
v
?
?? ?  (5.16) 
This efficient scale of operating a vessel of type z  is the result of two competing effects asso-
ciated with increasing the amount of cod harvested. If zh
 
is increased, the fixed costs of adjusting 
the gear to cod harvesting ( )zf
 
are spread over a larger harvest, but increasing zh
 
also requires a 
more than proportional increase in effort ( )ze
 
because of decreasing returns to scale; see (5.11). 
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Hence, the average costs of harvesting cod per vessel are a U-shaped function of effort, with its 
turning point at *ze . Also, note that the efficient scale of employing a boat of type z  is constant 
and independent of biomass. Let us now proceed by calculating the costs per vessel operating at 
*
ze  tonnage-days of catching cod. Using (5.12) and (5.16) we have 
? ? ? ?* * .1 1z z zz z z z z z z z z
f fc f v e f v
v
?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
 (5.17) 
Next, substituting (5.16) into (5.14c), we find that the optimal number of boats of type z  is equal 
to  
? ? ? ?* 1, .
z
z
z z z
z
z z z
v TACn TAC X
f q X
?
?
?
?
? ??? ? ?? ?? ?
 (5.18) 
The larger the amount of biomass, the more productive is a boat of type z , and hence the fewer 
boats are needed to harvest a specific TAC. So, combining (5.17) and (5.18) we identify that the 
harvesting costs of all boats of type z  operating at the efficient scale are equal to 
? ? * *, / ,zz z z z z zC TAC X n c TAC X ?? ? ?  (5.19) 
where 11( / ) ( / (1 )) .z zz z z z z zq v f
? ?? ? ??? ? ?  When operating at the optimal scale, the average costs 
of catching one tonne of cod fish are equal to 
* .
z
z
z zc X ?
? ?? ??  (5.20) 
 
5.3.3 Determining the optimal allocation of vessel quotas 
We analyze the case where the government (i) chooses to use a fleet that operates at lowest costs 
(potentially the result of a market mechanism like an ITQ system in which boats of all types are 
allowed to participate) or (ii) takes broader objectives into account and imposes fleet constraints.  
 First, we assume that the government aims to minimize the costs of catching a certain 
amount of cod, the TAC. From (5.19) it is clear that this would require allocating the entire TAC 
quota to the vessel type that, for the relevant level of biomass, has the lowest average harvesting 
costs, / ;zz zc X
?? ??  see (5.20). Let us use subscripts 1z LC?  to denote the vessel type with the 
lowest average costs, 2z LC?  to denote the vessel type with the one-but-lowest average costs, 
etc. More formally, 1z LC?  is defined as the type for which we have  
1
1 1 / /       {1,.., },LC zLC LC z zc X X c z Z
? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?  2z LC?  is defined as the type for which we 
have 2       {1,.., } \{ 1},LC zc c z Z LC? ? ?? ?  and so on.  
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 Second, we assume that governments may pursue objectives other than just pure financial 
profit maximization. While pure cost minimization may dictate 0zTAC ?  for all 1z LC? , consid-
erations other than the concern for financial cost minimization may result in 0z zTAC TAC?? ?  
for at least some 1z LC?  too. In our model the government chooses a specific vector of shares 
1
( 1)Z zz ?? ??  that matches the specific objectives and then determines the optimal TAC within 
these quotas constraints z zTAC TAC?? . This approach allows the government to calculate the 
welfare costs associated with imposing an allocation of quotas other than the allocation that mi-
nimizes harvesting costs. The difference in producer surplus (our measure of welfare) indicates 
the costs to society for not using the cost-minimizing vector of shares so that these costs can 
subsequently be compared, explicitly or implicitly, to the environmental or social benefits ob-
tained, to decide whether the benefits of these decisions exceed their costs. While allocation of 
quotas between several fleet types is not necessarily cost-minimizing (as it may be determined by 
other policy objectives than just maximizing financial welfare), the quota allocation within a fleet is 
still assumed to be optimal – and given by the number of tonnage-days boats spend chasing cod 
*( )ze . For any given vector of shares z?  and TAC, from (5.19) we have that the total harvesting 
costs are then equal to  
? ?* 1( , ) / .zZ z zzC TAC X TAC X ???? ??  (5.21) 
Note that (5.21) allows the government to calculate the (marginal) harvesting costs for all possi-
ble management objectives. In case it attempts to maximize fleet profits, the cost-minimizing al-
location can be recovered from (5.21) when setting 1 1LC? ?  and 0     {1,.., } \{ 1}.z z Z LC? ? ? ?  If 
environmental concerns play a role, (5.21) gives the associated cost function setting 1z? ?  for the 
boat type that is considered least harmful (and zero shares to all other vessel types). In short, the 
government can simply insert the vector of harvesting shares it deems optimal into (5.21) to ob-
tain the associated cost function. 
  
5.3.4 Optimal quota allocation in case of fleet lock-in  
In the previous sub-section, we have shown that it is cost-minimizing to use only the vessel type 
that has the lowest average costs. In practice, one is typically confronted with a situation where 
boats of a specific type cannot easily replace vessels of a different type. Instead, the fleet compo-
sition can only be changed in the short run at substantial costs – a situation which we will refer to 
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 In economics, the relationship between inputs and output (the production function) is 
often inferred by estimating a cost function ( , )zC X TAC  using a flexible form.  
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of the annual data used to estimate the cost and production function. The 
data covers the period from 1990-2000, and is obtained from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.  
Trawlers Days fishing cod  62°N Days fishing in total Days on sea Cod harv. 62°N in tonnes BRT Total costs in NOK Length in metres
 Mean 81.2 252.6 283.2 782 280.3 12 mln 41.8
 Median 79.0 260.0 294.5 768 298.0 12 mln 46.5
 Maximum 278.0 374.0 364.0 2882 499.0 32 mln 53.8
 Minimum 2.0 42.0 112.0 3 33.0 0.52 mln 17.6
 Std. Dev. 45.3 67.0 49.5 526 89.7 4.8 mln 8.3
Factory Trawlers
 Mean 50.5 181.5 181.5 1398 776.9 34 mln 60.3
 Median 47.0 182.0 182.0 1303 660.0 34 mln 56.9
 Maximum 122.0 299.0 299.0 4495 1428.0 57.7 mln 75.5
 Minimum 8.0 37.0 37.0 150 473.0 15 mln 48.7
 Std. Dev. 26.4 45.9 40.7 829 307.9 7 mln 6.5
Longliners
 Mean 46.5 218.0 310.7 306 216.2 12 mln 36.8
 Median 43.0 217.0 318.0 291 202.0 11 mln 36.7
 Maximum 134.0 342.0 356.0 874 688.0 28 mln 51.2
 Minimum 10.0 106.0 207.0 109 100.0 2.6 mln 28.0
 Std. Dev. 20.7 44.7 27.0 150 82.1 4.5 mln 4.3  
 
This approach is based on the assumption that whatever amount of fish a boat has caught, it has 
done so at minimum cost. In such a case duality applies (Varian, 1992, Chapter 6) and the pro-
duction function can be inferred from the prices of the inputs and outputs. The biggest advan-
tage of this approach is that one can estimate a cost function, even when one does not have data 
on fishing effort. Further advantages are that one does need to assume a certain technological 
structure a priori (as we did in (5.11)) and also that it is statistically more efficient because the 
cost function and the first-order condition for cost minimization can be estimated jointly. In fi-
sheries economics, this approach is less appealing because of several reasons. First of all, the 
standard cost function approach cannot be applied because one of the inputs in the production 
process, biomass, cannot be chosen freely by individual fishermen, and introducing quasi-fixed 
factors in the cost function typically complicates the estimation procedure considerably 
(Morrison, 1988; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996; van Soest et al., 2006). Second, while it is neces-
sary to make assumptions about the behavioral objectives of fishermen when designing a model, 
fishermen are unlikely to always operate at minimum costs at all times. Markets are usually in-
complete, fishermen face informational constraints, and payments of all inputs are not always 
determined by market prices directly because crew members may receive shares of the harvesting 
revenues rather than a fixed wage (McConnell and Price, 2006; Sandberg, 2006). Finally, it is not 
necessarily the case that all fishermen always try to maximize profits because other considerations 
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(including status seeking) may play a role too (Gezelius, 2007; Ginkel, 2009; Holland, 2008; Poos, 
2010; Salas and Gaertner, 2004). Because of these reasons it is preferred to estimate the technical 
relations (5.11) and (5.12) separately rather than using a cost function that assumes fishermen 
choices to be optimal (i.e. cost-minimizing). This is in line with Felthoven and Morrison Paul 
(2004 p.162), who argue that “fishing technology [should] be analyzed directly (through a “prim-
al” approach), by focusing on inputs and outputs, rather than by modeling choices based on 
costs, profit, or market prices.” Therefore, we estimate the production function (5.11) and the 
input cost function (5.12) separately.  
 
Estimating the production function of the three vessel types 
First, we estimate the production function for each fleet type z  given in (5.11). Table 5.1 shows 
that the ocean-going cod fleet consists of three types: trawlers (47.8% of the boats), factory traw-
lers (18.5%), and longliners (33.7%). We denote these three boats types by ,z T?  ,z FT? and 
z LL? , respectively. In our model, effort izte  is defined as the number of days a boat is fishing 
cod north of 62 degrees latitude, multiplied by its size (Bruto Register Tonnage). Including the 
size of the boat takes differences in operational intensity into account (Asche et al., 2009). We 
cannot rule out the presence of omitted variable bias – caused for example by differences in the 
skillfulness of individual skippers (Sandberg, 2006; Squires and Kirkley, 1999). This poses a par-
ticular problem if the “skipper effect” is positively correlated with the size of the boat, which may 
happen if the best skippers steer the largest boats. Therefore, we estimate the model by means of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with fixed effects on the cross-sections (that is, we use vessel-
specific fixed effects). As our number of cross-sections is much larger than the number of years, 
we use a robust variance-covariance matrix that produces panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE), as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). We estimate (5.11) for each boat type separately, 
thus allowing all parameters to be vessel type specific:  
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) ,izt z z t z izt iz izth q X e? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  (5.24) 
where izt?  is an error term, while iz?  is the estimate of the fixed effects. The latter sum up to zero 
when aggregating over all boats of type z , and hence iz?  can be interpreted as individual devia-
tions from the average catchability coefficient log( ).zq  The regression results are presented in 
Table 5.2. The stock-output elasticity z?  is estimated to be 0.58 for trawlers, 0.38 for factory 
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trawlers, and 0.22 for longliners. The effort-output elasticity z?  is estimated to be 0.85 for traw-
lers, 0.89 for factory trawlers, and 0.92 for longliners. These coefficients are similar to the ones 
found by Kronbak (2004).21 
 
Table 5.2. Regression output for the production functions of the three vessel types. The standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. 
Trawlers Factory Trawlers Longliners
?: stock-output-elasticity 0.58 (0.08) 0.38 (0.11) 0.22 (0.09)
?: effort-output elasticity 0.85 (0.05) 0.89 (0.06) 0.92 (0.08)
log(q) -7.39 (1.56) -3.29 (2.31) -0.54 (1.88)
Durbin Watson 1.72 1.55 1.52
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.76 0.93
Total observations 348 157 226
Number of boats 84 22 64  
 
 
Estimating the cost function of the three vessel types 
We estimate the fixed and variable costs of harvesting cod (as specified by (5.12)) as follows. The 
available cost data for each vessel contains expenses made for fuel, salt and packing, social costs, 
wages, vessel insurance, other insurance, vessel maintenance, gear and equipment maintenance, 
provisions, vessel depreciation, and a category “other costs”. In total, there are 11 cost compo-
nents, which are indexed 1...11.k ?  Total costs incurred by vessel i  of type z  in year t  are given 
by the vector of nominal cost components, izktC  which are subsequently corrected for inflation 
using the Producer Price Index tPPI . We calculate the part of the total costs incurred for catch-
ing cod by the share of days vessel i  spends on catching cod in the total number of days vessel i  
is fishing at sea. Using index j  to enumerate these nine fish species (with cod being 9j ? ) and 
using izjtD  to denote the number of days in year t  that vessel i  of type z  catches species j , the 
costs attributed to catching cod by a vessel i  of type z  in year t  are 
11
9 1
9
1
.iz t izktkizt
t izjtj
D c
c
PPI D
?
?
? ??  (5.25) 
                                                  
21 The only study we are aware of that finds an effort-output elasticity of larger than one is Eide et al. (2003). This is 
somewhat surprising, but may be explained by the fact that they use daily data, where effort is given by hours of 
trawling – economies of scale do not necessarily materialize at the very short term. 
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To estimate (5.12), we use (5.25) as the dependent variable and regress it on an intercept as well 
as on the number of tonnage-days vessel i  spent harvesting cod in year t . As before, we use 
fixed effects and panel corrected standard errors to estimate 
0 1 2 ,izt z z izt zi iztc a a e a ?? ? ? ?   (5.26) 
where the intercept 0 za  equals the fixed adjustment costs per boat operating in the cod fishery 
( )zf , while 1za  reflect variable costs per tonnage-day ( )zv . The coefficient for the fixed effects 
2 zia  can be interpreted as individual deviations from 0 .za  Table 5.3 shows the estimation results. 
Multiplying the variable costs per tonnage-day by the average size of a boat (in BRT) gives the 
variable costs for one day of fishing cod for each vessel type: these are 36,960 Norwegian Kroner 
(NOK) per trawler (of average size 280 BRT), 169,386 NOK per factory trawler (of size 777 
BRT), and 51,863 NOK per longliner (of size 216 BRT). The fixed costs per year are 1.55 million 
NOK per trawler, 2.89 million NOK per factory trawler, and 0.275 million NOK per longliner. 
We have performed two robustness checks to validate our results. First we have arbitrarily split 
the total costs into variable and fixed costs and compared them with our findings here. Second, 
we have estimated the cost and production function jointly, by combining equations (5.24) and 
(5.26). That model was judged to be inferior compared to the one estimated directly. The results 
of these robustness checks and more model validations are presented in the Appendix.  
 
Table 5.3. Regression output for the cost functions of the three vessel types. The standard errors are pre-
sented in parentheses. 
Trawlers Factory Trawlers Longliners
Fixed adjustment costs in million NOK 1.55 (0.21) 2.89 (0.74) 0.28 (0.15)
Variable costs  per tonnage-day in  NOK 131.66 (8.55) 218.49 (17.98) 239.38 (15.21)
Durbin Watson 1.36 1.25 2.24
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.78 0.77
Total observations 348 157 226
Number of boats 84 22 64  
 
 
5.4.2 The inverse price elasticity of Northeast Arctic cod 
Estimating the inverse demand function for cod (see (5.2)) is complicated, because the price and 
quantity data are equilibrium outcomes of market interactions, and hence are the result of both 
demand and supply. Of course, when the TAC is set by a manager, the supply is exogenous and 
OLS would give unbiased estimates of the demand function. However, there may still be supply 
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effects if (i) the manager decides on the TAC in an ad hoc manner and may set higher quotas 
when world prices are high, (ii) there is a tendency to harvest illegally when prices are high, or (iii) 
the quotas are not fully exercised when prices are really low. Because of these reasons we use 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), instrumenting for landings in the first stage of 2SLS using bio-
mass levels of the past two years as instruments. 
 We estimate the inverse elasticity of demand – the price flexibility – using export-prices. 
Ex-vessel prices and export prices are co-integrated (Asche et al., 2002), and therefore one can 
use the price flexibility to construct a demand function for the ex-vessel fish market. While in our 
theoretical model we assume the demand function for cod to be linear, econometrically it is pre-
ferred to estimate the demand function using a log-linear specification. Hence, our regression 
model is 
21 22 23 24log( ) log( ) log(Inc ) log(S ),t t t tP a a H a a? ? ? ?  (5.27) 
where tP  is the deflated price of cod (in NOK), tH  are the total landings, Inct  is disposable in-
come (given by real GDP in Europe), and St  is the price of a substitute product (saithe).
22
tP
 The 
time series for landings and biomass suffer from autocorrelation. We therefore, estimate (5.27) as 
an ARMA(1,1) process. Following Fair (1984), the lagged values of  and tH  will be used as 
instruments; see also Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991). We obtain the following estimates and stan-
dard errors: 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
log 21.87 0.50log 1.95log Inc 0.50log ,
s.e.            5.41   0.1               0.35               0.12
t t t t tP H S u? ? ? ? ? ?  
? ? ? ?
1 10.31 0.80 ,
s.e.   0.62      0.91    
t t t tu u ? ?? ?? ? ? ?  
with an adjusted R² of 0.97 and Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics of 1.27. We find that the inverse 
price elasticity is 0.5, i.e. if the supply of cod increases by 1%, the world price drops by 0.5%. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic is a bit small, indicating that we may not have fully succeeded in solving 
the issue of autocorrelation. As a further robustness check we have estimated the same model in 
different specifications (see Appendix). These additional estimations support an inverse price 
elasticity around 0.5.  
22 Due to constraints in the fishing process, it seems unlikely that fishermen can substitute saithe for cod – at least 
not in the same way consumers do. If they could, using saithe in the demand function would be problematic (as it 
may measure a supply effect). The size of the coefficient and robustness checks in the Appendix suggest that this is 
not a serious problem.  
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 From (5.2), the inverse price elasticity is given by ( / )( / ) / ,t tH P dP dH bH P? ?  which 
should equal 0.5. Using the inflation-corrected average price per kilogram of cod between 1997 
and 2007 of 12.59 NOK, and the annual average landing of cod of 527,815 tonnes, we find 
81.19 10 .b ?? ?  Substituting this value of b , together with the price and quantity data, into (5.2), 
we find 18.88.a ? 23
818.88 1.19 10 .t tP H
?? ? ?
 Hence, the price of a kilogram of cod is given in our model as:  
 (5.28) 
 
5.4.3 The biological model 
Because our biological data is given in years, while our biological model (5.4) and (5.5) is conti-
nuous, we use the following model to approximate the growth function of cod: 
2
1 0 1 0 0 1 ,t t t t t tX X H a X a b X ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  (5.29) 
where the error term t?  is expected to follow an autoregressive process. Here, 0a  yields the point 
estimate for r, and 0b  is our point estimate for 1/ .K The results are presented in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4. Regression output for the biological model. The standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
The data covers the period 1946-2007.  
r 0.54 (0.06) 0.55 (0.09) 0.56 (0.08)
K -1 (in 10-7 tonnes) 1.78 (0.2) 1.85 (0.34) 1.87 (0.31)
AR(1) 0.25 (0.15) 0.31 (0.14)
AR(2) -0.18 (0.14)
Durbin Watson 1.50 1.89 2.02
Adjusted R^2 0.01 0.03 0.05
AIC 28.39 28.37 28.38
Total observations 61 60 59  
 
 
The model with the lowest AIC gives a carrying capacity ( )K  of 5.41 million tonnes and an in-
trinsic growth rate ( )r  of 0.55. These estimates are similar to the results obtained by Kugarajh et 
al. (2006). Hence, equation (5.5) reads as ( ) 0.55 1 .
5.41
XG X X ? ?? ?? ?? ?  
The biomass that supports a 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) thus equals 5.41 / 2 2.7?  million tonnes of cod, and the asso-
ciated MSY is equal to 743,000 tonnes. 
23 Using not average prices and landings, but the price in a specific year gives slightly different values for a  and b  
around our estimate. If one is particularly interested in a specific year, it would obviously better to use these year-
specific estimates. 
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5.5 Using the empirical results for an optimal policy 
We can now use the estimates obtained in section 5.4 to derive the optimal quota sizes per vessel 
of each type, the optimal amount of biomass, and the associated producer surpluses as indicated 
in section 5.3. We start by calculating the optimal scale of operation (as measured in tonnage-
days) for each of the three vessel types (see equation (5.16)), and also the optimal number of fish-
ing days (by dividing (5.16) by the average BRT of the boat type). We find that the optimal num-
ber of days fishing cod for the three boat types varies between 62 for longliners and 238 for traw-
lers; see Table 5.5. This is more than the time the boats spend currently catching cod (see Table 
5.1) and consistent with intuition because the current situation is most likely characterized by 
overcapacity.  
 We now turn to the question how to set an optimal total allowable catch. First, we 
present results for the situation where the fleet composition is flexible, and there is no upper limit 
on the number of boats that can be used (as derived in section 5.3.2). We start by calculating the 
average costs of harvesting one kilogram of cod for each of the three vessel types, as given by 
(5.20). At a given level of remaining biomass equal to X , the costs equal 0.581,327,706 /TC X?  in 
case of trawlers, 0.22955 /LLC X?  in case of longliners, and 0.3823,557 /FTC X?  in case of factory 
trawlers. Multiplying these numbers by zTAC  gives the total costs of all boats belonging to one 
fleet type; see (5.19).  
 
Table 5.5. Optimal number of days fishing cod for different boat types, as measured by days and tonnage-
days.  
Trawlers Longliners Factory Trawlers
Optimal tonnage days 667122 134514 1070196
Optimal days 238 62 138  
 
 
Furthermore, we find that trawlers have always lower average harvesting costs than factory traw-
lers (when both are operating at their efficient scales), for all levels of biomass between 0 and K.24
24 In our analysis we ignore the fact that factory trawlers create added value by processing the fish on board. That 
means that our regression results underestimate the benefits (or overestimate the costs) from using factory trawlers 
that produce frozen fish fillet rather than raw fish. Therefore, it seems unfair to compare them with the other boats. 
Hence, factory trawlers will be omitted from the rest of the analysis, except in the scenario where a diverse fleet is 
preferred by society.  
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Similarly, trawlers have lower average harvesting costs than longliners, as long as biomass is 
530,000 tonnes or higher. In the analysis that follows, it is shown that if biomass is below this 
level, it will be desirable to stop fishing altogether. Therefore, we can conclude that – if fishing 
takes place – trawlers are always the cost-minimizing option; 1 .LC T?  
 Next, we use our model to determine the optimal long run equilibrium values for bio-
mass, TAC, and fleet profits for the various management objectives; see Table 5.6. Three scena-
rios will be compared. First, the government minimizes fleet costs and allocates all quotas to 
trawlers (potentially through an ITQ mechanism). Second, the government not only cares about 
financial welfare but pursues environmental objectives too, and hence allocates all quotas to lon-
gliners as they are more environmentally-friendly than trawlers. Third, we also solve for the case 
where the government has other objectives too (like cultural and social considerations), embodied 
by assuming that society prefers a diverse fleet as it operates currently.25
 We obtain the following results. First, we find that discounting has a negligible impact on 
optimal long run policies – Table 5.6 shows that the optimal biomass levels for a discount rate of 
zero percent are less than two percent smaller than for a discount rate of ten percent. Second, 
independent of the fleet composition, we find that the optimal biomass is always larger than the 
maximum sustainable yield stock of 2.7 million tones of cod (see section 5.4.3).  
  
 
Table 5.6. Optimal steady state biomass and harvest levels for several harvesting scenarios for maximizing 
rents (using only trawlers), environmental concerns (using only longliners), and cultural diversity (using 
trawlers, factory trawlers, and longliners)  
Management objective Discount rate Biomass Harvests Profits
(mln tonnes) (mln tonnes) (bln NOK)
Maximizing rents 0% 3.94 0.59 4.86
Environmental concerns 0% 4.35 0.47 2.84
Fleet diversity 0% 4.12 0.54 3.97
Maximizing rents 10% 3.89 0.60 4.86
Environmental concerns 10% 4.34 0.47 2.84
Fleet diversity 10% 4.09 0.55 3.96  
 
 
25Since our dataset comprises almost all boats that are engaged in the cod fishery, we derive the parameters from our 
dataset. That is 0.478,   0.185,  0.337.T FT LL? ? ?? ? ?  
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That means that search costs and a lower price that can be obtained for higher catches are more 
important than discounting (even when using a discount rate of 10%), as the optimum is always 
on the right hand side of the logistic growth function. Third, we find that the optimal biomass is 
smallest in the case fleet profits are maximized and the cheapest boats – trawlers – are used (and 
hence the amount of cod caught is largest). The remaining biomass is largest in case of environ-
mental concerns, when the government only allows cod harvesting to take place by longliners.26
 So we find that the optimal biomass levels are much higher than the biomass levels that 
we are currently experiencing; see Figure 5.1. This raises the question how the transition path 
looks like – as given by the HCR (10); see Figure 5.2.  
 
Our results are similar to results obtained by Armstrong (1999), who found a TAC of 650,000 
tonnes to be optimal and Armstrong and Sumaila (2000) who found an optimal TAC of 450,000 
tonnes for NEA cod. 
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Figure 5.2. The optimal harvest control rule for using only trawlers, longliners, or a mixed fleet.  
26 Recall that we assume the government to maximize producer surplus (with or without constraints on the type of 
boats used). If the government not only cares about producer surplus but also about consumer surplus (and hence 
aims to maximize social welfare as the sum of consumer and producer surplus), the optimal steady state biomass is 
3.14 mln tonnes with an associated TAC of 0.72 mln tonnes (trawlers), 3.33 mln and 0.70 mln tonnes (longliners), 
and 3.20 and 0.72 mln tonnes (mixed fleet).  
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First, we find that the optimal HCR is concave: a one percent decrease in the remaining biomass 
calls for a more than proportional decrease in the quantity harvested. Second, we find that the 
minimum biomass level, below which all fishing activities should be ceased, is higher for trawlers 
than for longliners – as trawlers are getting relative inefficient at low biomass levels (see the 
stock-output elasticity in Table 5.2). Third, we find that at higher biomass levels, it would be op-
timal to harvest more with a fleet of trawlers compared to longliners.27
 If the situation is characterized by fleet lock-in, it is not necessarily possible to follow the 
cost-minimizing policy identified in Table 5.6. If the optimal TAC of 590,000 tonnes needs to be 
harvested using trawlers operating at their efficient scale, 206 vessels are needed. Let us analyze 
the case where only 90 trawlers are available.
 The minimum biomass 
levels we find are similar to the ones found by Arnason et al. (2004), who start fishing at 1.3 mil-
lion tonnes of biomass, and Kugarajh et al. (2006) who found it optimal to start fishing at around 
one million tonnes of biomass. In these studies, harvesting was never higher than around 500,000 
tonnes (Arnason et al., 2004) and 750,000 tonnes (Kugarajh et al., 2006). 
28
Table 5.7. Optimal steady state biomass and harvest levels for the case of cost-minimization harvesting if 
the fleet is characterized by a lock-in.  
 Plugging in all estimated parameters into (5.20) we 
find that it is cheapest to let trawlers operate 365 days a year, before using longliners if biomass 
levels are above 600,000 tonnes (cf. (5.23)); see table 5.7.  
Discount rate Biomass Harvests Profits # Trawlers # Longliners
(mln tonnes) (mln tonnes) (bln NOK) (number of vessels) (number of vessels)
0% 4.42 0.44 4.34 90 97
10% 4.40 0.44 4.34 90 119  
 
Therefore, if the manager aims to maximize the rents from cod harvesting, it should force all 90 
trawlers to operate the whole year. In addition, it is then optimal to also have 97 longliners active 
in the cod fishing industry, each of which operates at its efficient scale (see the third line in equa-
tion (5.23) and Table 5.7). Surprisingly, the optimal amount of biomass is then larger than when 
27 For the HCR, we find that maximizing producer surplus leads to somewhat smoother harvesting activity than 
maximizing the sum of profits and consumer surplus (as harvesting is continued at lower biomass levels, but not as 
aggressive at higher biomass levels). Then, the minimum biomass levels would be around 1.5 million tonnes. 
28 We do not know the exact number of available vessels. As a benchmark, the number of trawlers holding a license 
for catching cod has decreased from 102 in 2000 to 41 in 2009. However, in reality the TAC is also harvested by 
Russian vessels and smaller coastal vessels. Therefore the current situation can still be characterized by overcapacity 
– in spite of a substantial reduction of the Norwegian fleet over the past 10 years.  
132
using just trawlers or longliners (and hence the TAC is smaller, given that the optimal biomass 
lies on the right hand side of the logistic growth curve); compare Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The explana-
tion for this counter-intuitive finding is that using additional longliners will negatively affect the 
efficiency of trawlers through the stock effect. At lower biomass levels, trawlers are getting less 
efficient than longliners (see the estimates of the stock-output elasticities ( )z?  presented in Table 
5.2, and equation (5.9)). This indirect cost explains why it is optimal to use less longliners – given 
that the trawler fleet is already operating at maximum capacity.  
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter we developed a management plan to determine the optimal steady state biomass, 
total allowable catch, and the associated welfare for three different management objectives for 
the Norwegian Northeast Arctic cod fishery. Our model allows the decision maker to determine 
the optimal allocation of a total allowable catch over the various types of vessels currently used in 
the fishery (trawlers, longliners and factory trawlers). Having derived the associated cost func-
tions of catching cod, the information can subsequently be used to determine the optimal steady 
state level of biomass, as well as the harvesting trajectory towards it (the so-called harvest control 
rule). All equations of the model have been estimated using detailed data of the NEA cod fishery, 
while addressing the many statistical difficulties associated with them. 
 Our analysis shows that fleet structure is important for optimal policy as it determines not 
only how many boats optimally harvest a given TAC, but also the size of the overall TAC and the 
associated optimal biomass levels. Taking the cost structure of the industry into account affects 
the optimal biomass levels substantially, as the steady state stock is 3.94 million tonnes in the case 
the government aims to maximize long-run financial welfare (implying that the fishing fleet 
should consist of trawlers only, because they are most efficient in harvesting) while it is 4.35 mil-
lion tonnes if the government aims to maximize long-run welfare while limiting the fleet structure 
to consist of longliners only – as they are indicated to impose least damages to the marine ecosys-
tem. These results can be used by the decision maker to decide how to set an optimal TAC, to 
choose which vessels are allowed to participate in the fishery, and assess the costs of deviating 
from the least-cost approach. If there is a maximum number of vessels available in the cod fi-
shery (as analyzed in section 5.3.4), cost-minimization may require using longliners in addition to 
trawlers. Interestingly, in such a case optimal total biomass is even higher than when only trawlers 
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or longliners are used. This happens because harvesting of one vessel affects the productivity of 
all other vessels through the stock-effect.   
 Some model assumptions deserve special attention, as they may have potential policy im-
plications. First, we assume cod growth to be represented by a simple logistic growth model. 
Adding more biological realism may alter our results; see Eikeset et al. (2010c) and chapter 6 for a 
study that uses a more complex biological model to determine an optimal HCR. While the way in 
which the cost structure of different vessel types affect the management plan would carry over to 
a model allowing for more biological complexity, the specific optima – such as the size of  optim-
al biomass or the TAC – will probably be different. Second, we focus our analysis on cod har-
vesting ignoring all economic and ecological interactions with other fish species (Nøstbakken, 
2006; Salvanes and Squires, 1995; Squires et al., 1998). An interesting further avenue would be to 
investigate how the economies of scale that we identified in this paper relate to economics of 
scope (i.e. the possibility to catch other fish species). Third, we assume that each fleet can be 
represented by a typical boat. In reality, a fleet comprises many boats that differ in age, size, 
productivity, and costs. This is not accounted for in our model, giving rise to potential inefficien-
cies when quotas are distributed over boats. These inefficiencies could be eliminated by an ITQ 
mechanism (within the fleet constraints that we have outlined), even though the costs and disad-
vantages of such a mechanism can easily outweigh the potential benefits (Sumaila, 2010); see also 
chapter 7. Fourth, while our results give optimal quotas in tonnage-days, in practice it would be 
desirable to hand out the actual quotas – transferable or not – as catch shares to remove the in-
centive to substitute controlled for uncontrolled capital.  
 The study presented here is novel, as it provides an optimal management plan that is flex-
ible and can be adapted to various policy objectives concerning the utilization of the fleet going 
beyond cost-minimization. However, it can only be considered a first step towards optimal man-
agement of natural resources that recognizes the full array of preferences society holds regarding 
how these resources should be exploited.  
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Appendix 5.A: Deriving an analytical harvest control rule 
Deriving an HCR is fairly straightforward if the discount rate is assumed to be equal to 0 ? ?0 ;? ?  
see Sandal and Steinshamn (1997; 2001). The current-value Hamiltonian of the optimal control 
problem in section 5.3.1 can be written in general terms as follows: 
? ? ? ?, ( ) ,X TAC G X TAC?? ? ? ?H  (5.A1) 
and the associated first-order conditions are 
0         ( , ),TAC TAC X TAC?? ? ??H  (5.A2)
 ? ? ? ?? ?, ,X X XX TAC G X? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?H  (5.A3) 
.X ??? H  (5.A4) 
We aim to derive the optimal harvest control rule which is, by definition, a function of the stock 
of biomass, ( )TAC X . Substituting this generic expression of the HCR into (5.A1) and taking the 
first derivative with respect to time, we have  
dTAC X X
X TAC dX ?
? ??? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
? ? ??H HH H  (5.A5) 
where the latter equality holds because of (5.A2) and (5.A3); see also Sandal and Steinsham 
(2001). That means that the Hamiltonian is constant over time if 0.? ?  In that case, maximizing 
the Hamiltonian then boils down to just choosing X  to maximize the instantaneous profit flow 
in steady state (Sandal and Steinshamn, 2001):  
*
( )
max ( )
TAC G XX
X?? ? ? ?H  (5.A6) 
Substituting (5.A6) and (5.A2) into (5.A1), we obtain the following equality: 
? ?* ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) .TACX X TAC X TAC G X TAC? ?? ?? ?  (5.A7) 
Using the instantaneous profit function (5.1), the growth function (5.5) and (5.A7), we find the 
optimal harvest control rule as presented in (5.10). 
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Appendix 5.B: Model validations  
Model validation of the production and cost functions 
As a robustness check, we have split total costs into variable and fixed costs, by assuming that 
variable costs contain expenses made for fuel, salt and packing, social costs, provisions, wages, 
and a category “other costs”. We found that the average cost per trawler fishing cod is 36,823 
NOK, per factory trawler 158,452 NOK, and per longliner 47,285 NOK. The fixed costs that are 
assumed to comprise vessel insurance, other insurance, vessel maintenance, gear and equipment 
maintenance, and vessel depreciation are 1.6 million NOK for trawlers, 3.57 million NOK per 
factory trawler, and 0.75 million NOK per longliner. These guesstimates are comparable to what 
has been estimated in our regression analysis, even though the fixed costs in the regression analy-
sis are somewhat lower, especially for longliners. This may be due to the fact that some costs that 
were assumed to be fixed here (e.g. maintenance) are in reality partially dependent on effort. 
Since our regression analysis is able to capture this effect, while the ad hoc composition here is 
not, we are confident that our regression results are the more accurate ones. 
 As a further robustness check we have estimated the relationship of costs and harvests joint-
ly without using effort as a variable, by combining equation (5.24) and (5.26). The equation 
? ? 0 1 2log log( ) log( ) log( )it t it iz itTC a a X a h ? ?? ? ? ? ?  (5.A8) 
is again estimated with fixed effects. The results are presented in Table 5.A1. We find a stock-
output elasticity smaller than one and an effort-output elasticity smaller than zero, which is con-
sistent with our earlier findings. In order to judge the quality of each model, we will assess their 
forecasting ability. Table 5.A2 shows the forecasting ability of the production functions (5.24) 
and cost functions that are estimate directly (5.26) compared with the model (5.A8). All models 
have been estimated in the period 1990-1995, while the period 1996-2000 has been forecasted. 
The bias proportion indicates how the mean of the predicted time series differs from the original 
one, while the variance proportion tells us how the variance of the two series differs. We find 
that the models (5.24), and (5.26) perform better than model (5.A8), indicated by the lower bias 
and variance proportion and consequently the higher covariance proportion. 
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Table 5.A1. The coefficients of model (5.A8), estimating the relationship between costs, total biomass and 
harvests.  
Trawlers Factory Trawlers Longliners
a 0 13.67 (1.04) 12.75 (1.83) 8.92 (1.37)
a 1 -0.44 (0.06) -0.39 (0.08) -0.21 (0.06)
a 2 0.81 (0.03) 0.82 (0.05) 0.81 (0.05)
Durbin Watson stat. 2.26 1.64 2.64
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.83 0.79
Total observations 437 169 309
Number of boats 107 25 85
 
 
 
Table 5.A2. The forecast ability of models (5.24) and (5.26) estimated directly and model (5.A8) estimated 
indirectly.  
Model Production Cost Jointly Production Cost Jointly Production Cost Jointly
Equation (5.24) (5.26) (5.A8) (5.24) (5.26) (5.A8) (5.24) (5.26) (5.A8)
Bias proportion 0.344 0.258 0.078 0.36 0.089 0.52 0.455 0.248 0.476
Variance proportion 0.013 0.019 0.32 0.12 0.026 0.059 0.012 0.006 0.02
Covariance Proportion 0.643 0.723 0.602 0.52 0.885 0.421 0.533 0.746 0.504
Trawlers Longliners Factory Trawlers
 
 
 
Model validations of demand function 
We have estimated the inverse price elasticity under various different specifications to evaluate 
the robustness of our results. First, we have estimated (5.27) as an ARIMA(0,1,0) process. This 
delivers a slightly lower inverse price elasticity of -0.40 as given by  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?1 2
0.0 0.40 log 1.72 log 0.62 log
0.06 2.34 0.15 ,
log log , log .
log Inc
s.e.           0.14                                 
with an adj. R²=0.36 and DW=1.92. Instruments for  are 
t t t t t
t t t
P H S
H B B
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
 
Furthermore, the same model has been estimated without income as a variable, giving an elastici-
ty of -0.42 and the following results: 
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?1 2
0.03 0.42 log 0.59 log
0.03 0.15 ,
log log , log .
log
s.e.            0.13                
with an adj. R²=0.36 and DW=1.89. Instruments for  are 
t t t t
t t t
P H S
H B B
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
 
Omitting the price of saithe gives the same results: 
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? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?1 2
0.08 0.42 log
0.03 ,
log log , log .
log
s.e.            0.17  
with an adj. R²=-0.02 and DW=1.62. Instruments for  are 
t t t
t t t
P H
H B B
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
 
Alternatively, we have re-estimated model (5.27) without landing as independent variable, but 
with export quantity directly. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
log 19.33 0.61log 1.76log Inc 0.73log S
s.e.            3.29   0.07           0.22                0.09 ,  
t t t t tP Q u? ? ? ? ? ?  
? ? ? ?
1 10.16 0.09
s.e.   1.53      1.50    
t t t tu u ? ?? ?? ? ? ?   
with an adjusted R²=0.98, DW= 1.90. Instruments for ? ?log tQ are ? ? ? ?1 2log ,log .t tB B? ?  
The estimated elasticity is a bit higher now (0.61), which is not unexpected, because exports 
quantities have a much more direct impact on prices than landings. All in all, we can conclude 
that the estimated inverse price elasticity of -0.50 seems reasonable. 
 
Data sources 
Equations 5.24-5.26: Data for harvests, costs and effort has been obtained by the Directories of 
Fisheries, Bergen, while biomass comes from ICES (2009a). The cost data has been deflated with 
the Producer Price index for Norway taking from the OECD, (2008) using the year 2000 as a 
benchmark. The OECD data has been accessed via 
www.SourceOECD.org/database/OECDStat. 
  
Equation 5.28: Landings and biomass are taken from ICES (2009a). Export prices for cod and 
saithe are inferred from export values and export quantities; see Timmer and Richter (2009) for 
more information on the method. For each export commodity i  (“Atlantic cod, fresh or chilled”, 
“Atlantic cod, frozen”, “Atlantic cod, salted, or in brine”, “Cod, dried, unsalted”, “Cod, salted, 
and dried” a price is calculated by dividing the total value in a given year by the total quantity: 
/ .it it itP V Q?  A weighted export price is obtained by multiplying each price by its value and divid-
ing it by the value of all exports given by 
5
1
5
1
.it itit
iti
P V
P
V
?
?
? ??  The data for saithe is given by “Saithe, 
dried, salted or in brine”. This data was accessed with Fish Stat Plus (FAO, data from “FAO 
Yearbook of Fishery Statistics – Commodities”; the data was collected originally by Statistics 
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Norway). This is annual data for the period 1976-2006. European income is proxied by real Eu-
ropean GDP (Maddison, 2010). The data has been corrected for inflation, and has been con-
verted from US Dollar into Norwegian Kroner using exchange rates from the OECD (2010). 
  
Equation 5.28: The KG price for cod is given by the off-boat sales prices (“Førstehåndspris”) as 
given by the Directories of Fisheries, Bergen (Fiskedirektoratet, 2007). To make the price data 
comparable with the costs data we have used, again, the producer price index from the OECD. 
The baseline year was 2000 (as before). The average KG price is the average price between 1997 
and 2007. 
Equation 5.29: Landings and biomass are taken from ICES (2009a). 
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6 
The economic repercussions of fisheries- 
induced evolution
6  
Abstract
Human-induced changes in life-history traits have been observed for many harvested popula-
tions, with a component of those changes being attributed to an evolutionary (i.e., genetic) re-
sponse. Most notably, fish stocks that experience high fishing mortality show a tendency to ma-
ture earlier and at a smaller size. Some have suggested that fisheries-induced evolution could af-
fect the fishery’s yield and therefore have economic repercussions for society. Yet, this has not 
been formally investigated. We use data from 1932 to 2005 to develop a bio-economic model 
specifically for Northeast Arctic cod that allows us to compare the economic yield in scenarios 
with and without evolution of key life-history traits. We also compare a “business as usual” sce-
nario where fishing continues at its current pace, with a scenario in which harvest is controlled 
through an optimal control rule. Our model predicts that fisheries-induced evolution decreases 
economic yield if fishing mortality rates continue at their current high levels. We also find that 
maximum economic yield is achieved at a considerably lower fishing mortality than what the 
stock has historically experienced. At this lower mortality, fisheries-induced evolution is less pro-
nounced and actually increases the spawning stock biomass and economic yield. Overall, we find 
that evolutionary and non-evolutionary models recommend similar harvesting rates and the over-
riding message is that higher economic yield can be obtained by lower harvest rates irrespective 
of whether evolution occurs or not.  
 
This chapter is a modified version of: Eikeset, A.M., A.P. Richter, E.S. Dunlop, E. Nævdal, U. Dieck-
mann, and N.C. Stenseth, 2010. The economic repercussions of fisheries-induced evolution. Manu-
script. Valuable comments and advice on earlier drafts of this manuscript were provided by P. Sand-
berg, J. A. Hutchings and C. T. Marshall, K. Enberg, C. Jørgensen, L. Nøstbakken, T. Schweder, A. 
Skonhoft, C. Armstrong, C. Brinch S. I. Steinshamn, J. Grasman and D. P. van Soest.
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6.1 Introduction 
Today, management decisions in fisheries throughout the world are based on the assumption that 
evolutionary changes caused by harvesting do not occur (Jørgensen et al., 2007). However, expe-
rimental studies have demonstrated that the pace of evolution can be rapid, occurring in only a 
few generations (Conover and Munch, 2002; Reznick and Ghalambor, 2005). Additional evidence 
from field-based studies strongly suggests that fisheries-induced evolution has occurred in several 
commercially important stocks (Barot et al., 2004; Darimont et al., 2009; Grift et al., 2007; Grift 
et al., 2003; Olsen et al., 2005; Olsen et al., 2004; Sharpe and Hendry, 2009), although there is de-
bate as to the relative contribution of environmental factors in driving the observed changes 
(Andersen and Brander, 2009b; Koons, 2009; Marshall and McAdam, 2007). However, the bulk 
of life-history theory, experiments, and field-based studies would at least strongly suggest that 
fishing is capable of inducing genetic adaptations, especially when it preferentially removes indi-
viduals with certain characteristics such as large body size (Carlson et al., 2007; Dunlop et al., 
2009b; Hutchings, 2009; Hutchings and Fraser, 2008; Jørgensen et al., 2007). Even if fishing is 
not size-selective, high fishing mortality may be sufficient to induce genetic change (Roff, 1992; 
Sharpe and Hendry, 2009). The resultant selection pressure imposed by most fisheries favors in-
dividuals that mature at younger ages and invest more in reproduction because individuals with 
those genotypes are more likely to survive and reproduce (Andersen and Brander, 2009a; Dunlop 
et al., 2009c; Eikeset et al., 2010a; Enberg et al., 2009). The direction of fisheries-induced evolu-
tion of growth depends on the size-selectivity of the fishing pressure: if both immature and ma-
ture fish are exposed to fishing mortality, growth rates may increase (Dunlop et al., 2009c; 
Eikeset et al., 2010a). In contrast, size-selective harvesting of large, mature individuals leads to a 
decreased growth rate (Andersen and Brander, 2009a; Conover and Munch, 2002; Dunlop et al., 
2009c).  
 Genetic adaptations to fishing may, in principle, be beneficial for the state of the stock 
because individuals invest more in reproduction and growth (Andersen and Brander, 2009a; 
Dunlop et al., 2009c; Eikeset et al., 2010a; Enberg et al., 2010). However, adapting to the fishing 
pressure may also bear a cost of evolution through increased natural mortality (Jørgensen and 
Fiksen, 2010). An additional cost of evolution may occur if genetic changes are difficult to re-
verse (Conover et al., 2009; Dunlop et al., 2009c; Enberg et al., 2009; Stenseth and Dunlop, 
2009). This is sometimes referred to as Darwinian debt that must be paid back by future genera-
tions (Dieckmann et al., 2009). Studies have suggested that fisheries-induced evolution might re-
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duce yield (Hard et al., 2008; Hutchings, 2009; Jørgensen et al., 2007; Stenseth and Dunlop, 2009; 
Sutherland, 1990). However, to our knowledge, no study has explicitly investigated the economic 
implications of evolutionary change in wild populations.  
 It is difficult to predict how genetic changes at the individual-level affect population-level 
properties such as the spawning stock biomass (SSB). For example, an individual’s increased re-
productive investment leads to larger gonads, but at the expense of slower post-maturation 
growth. Maturing earlier may also reduce fecundity because individuals are smaller when they re-
produce (Marshall et al., 2004). Furthermore, the adaptive response of a population to fishing 
could actually allow it to withstand higher mortality rates than if it otherwise did not adapt 
(Eikeset et al., 2010a), perhaps also permitting higher yields. Therefore, evolution has the poten-
tial to have both positive and negative effects on stock properties such as total biomass and yield, 
making the total economic effect ambiguous. Furthermore, other so-called ecological effects such 
as the release of density-dependence when population biomass is fished down could be more im-
portant drivers of phenotypic change, and could effectively swamp out any underlying effects 
evolution has on yield. 
 The Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod is currently the world’s largest stock of Atlantic cod 
(Gadus morhua). The stock’s fishery is an important economic resource for Norway, Russia, and 
the European Union with an annual catch by Norway of about 3.5 billion NOK in 2008 – see 
also chapter 5.  Traditionally, the fishery harvested primarily adult cod at the spawning grounds 
along the Norwegian coast (Godø, 2003). From the 1930s onwards, the stock experienced a shift 
in fishing pressure when industrial trawlers were introduced in the stock’s feeding grounds in the 
Barents Sea (Garrod, 1967). When the trawling fishery began, fishing pressure substantially in-
creased for both adult and juvenile populations, the latter being previously little affected by har-
vesting as the traditional fishery had mostly been in the spawning grounds (Godø, 2003). Evolu-
tionary changes in this stock have been predicted to be a factor in explaining observed decline in 
age and length at maturation (Eikeset et al., 2010a; Heino et al., 2002b), although the extent of 
evolutionary change predicted has varied among studies (Eikeset et al., 2010a; Heino et al., 
2002b; Jørgensen et al., 2009).  
 After the 1930s when fishing mortality was intensified, there has been a steady decline in 
age and length at maturation, with the age at maturation declining from age 9 to 6 years and the 
length at maturation declining from about 80cm to 60cm (Eikeset et al., 2010a). Our biological 
model was specifically developed to investigate the ecological and evolutionary effects of exploi-
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tation on these changes in maturation. There are mainly two hypotheses on the importance of 
ecological versus evolutionary effects in explaining this phenomenon. The first hypothesis claims 
that these changes have a genetic component where evolution favors those individuals that ma-
ture early. The intuitive explanation is that traits can only be passed on if a fish reproduces before 
getting caught. Therefore, fisheries-induced evolution will occur and it is caused by genetic adap-
tations to fishing mortality. The second hypothesis states that these changes can be explained by 
phenotypic plasticity. This occurs as high fishing mortality results in less competition over re-
sources. As a result, fish can grow faster and reach maturation earlier.  
 Our biological model allows for both hypotheses to occur. Changes in life-history traits 
may be driven by both ecological processes, like phenotypic plasticity and density-dependence, 
and through genetic processes. Eikeset et al. (2010a) suggest that fisheries-induced evolution has 
occurred in NEA cod, but the genetic changes are smaller than what has been suggested in pre-
vious studies on Atlantic cod (Edeline et al., 2007; Heino et al., 2002b; Olsen et al., 2004).  
 Here, we develop a bio-economic model to investigate the economic repercussions of 
fisheries-induced evolution, specifically testing how genetic change affects economic gain in fleet 
profits and total welfare (the latter being the sum of fleet profits and consumer surplus). Our 
model incorporates feedbacks between the state of the resource (i.e. SSB), the economic gains, 
and management of the fishery (i.e., fishing mortality, Fig. 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1. The individual-based eco-genetic model and the coupled dynamics between ecology, evolution 
and economics. a, The model framework for the biological component, describing an individual’s life 
cycle. b, Ecological dynamics and economic objectives mutually influence each other. Additionally, fishing 
mortality may induce evolutionary changes. These changes affect the eco-evolutionary dynamics and have 
economic repercussions. c, The shape of an HCR depending on two parameters: Above a certain level of 
spawning stock biomass, Bmax a maximum fishing mortality Fmax is allowed. Between Bmax and  a biomass 
level of zero, fishing mortality linearly decreases from Fmax to zero. These parameters can take the shape of 
the HCR that was implemented for the NEA cod fishery in 2004. 
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The biological component of our bio-economic model is specifically developed for NEA cod to 
capture trends in the age and length at maturation from 1932 until 2005; see panel a in Fig. 6.1 
and Eikeset et al. (2010a). The biological model is built upon the individual-based eco-genetic 
model described by Dunlop et al. (2009c) to study fisheries-induced evolution. It describes four 
evolving life-history traits capturing key components of growth, maturation, and reproduction 
(Dunlop et al., 2009c): two traits for maturation tendency given by a linear probabilistic matura-
tion reaction norm (Dieckmann and Heino, 2007; Heino et al., 2002b), one trait describing the 
intrinsic somatic growth capacity, and one trait as a measure of reproductive investment, the go-
nado-somatic index. The assumptions of our model arise from basic quantitative genetics theory 
and commonly observed empirical relationships for fish stocks (Dunlop et al., 2009c; Eikeset et 
al., 2010a). Resource limitation and competition with conspecifics are accounted for through 
density-dependent growth and newborn mortality (Eikeset et al., 2010a). The model structure 
accounts for both the demographic and evolutionary effects of fishing on growth, maturation, 
and reproduction, and allows us to distinguish genetic change from phenotypic plasticity in the 
modeled populations (Dunlop et al., 2009c; Eikeset et al., 2010a). For more details about the bio-
economic model structure, parameter values and data sources, see Appendix. Model limitations 
and simplifying assumptions are discussed further in Eikeset et al. (2010a) and Dunlop et al. 
(2009c). 
 To evaluate whether fisheries-induced evolution requires a unique management plan, we 
created a non-evolutionary version of the biological model where the genetic traits could not 
evolve; for more information see Eikeset et al. (2010a) and Appendix. This framework allows us 
to mimic stock properties to investigate the relative importance of evolutionary change. Hence, 
we compare a non-evolutionary model, in which changes in populations are driven only by phe-
notypic plasticity, with an evolutionary model that allows, in addition, for genetic adaptations. 
Comparisons between non-evolutionary versus evolutionary eco-genetic models have been done 
previously to study historical trends in NEA cod (Eikeset et al., 2010a) and recovery potential in 
Atlantic cod (Enberg et al., 2009). 
6.2 The bioeconomic model and results 
Our economic model has been developed in chapter 5 of this thesis and consists of a Cobb-
Douglas production and cost function estimated specifically for the Norwegian cod trawler fleet. 
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We used these estimations to derive a mechanism that mimics the use of individual quotas in the 
most efficient way. Additionally, we incorporated a demand function, also estimated from data to 
account for total catch affecting the landings price. For more information see Appendix and 
chapter 5. Using our bio-economic model, we compare the characteristics from (i) a scenario of 
high fishing mortality that mimics the historic level of harvesting with (ii) optimal harvest scena-
rios. We investigate how the emerging harvest properties differ between the evolutionary and the 
non-evolutionary model. Furthermore, we ask whether any substantial losses arise from over-
looking fisheries-induced evolutionary changes. For each of the fishing scenarios, we compare 
the trajectory of key life-history traits and economic yield (Fig. 6.1b). 
 In the first fishing scenario, we analyze stock development according to the observed 
fishing mortality between 1932 and 2005. Then, from 2006 onwards we continue with “business 
as usual” with a mean fishing mortality of 0.68 yr-1 (Fig. 6.2a). Our optimal management plan is 
built on the harvest control rule (HCR) implemented for the NEA cod fishery in 2004 (ICES, 
2008b, 2009b); see Fig. 6.1c. This HCR allows a specific fishing mortality for a given SSB. The 
maximum fishing mortality Fmax is allowed above a certain SSB level, given by the parameter Bmax. 
Below Bmax fishing mortality decreases linearly to the origin. We ran model simulations, searching 
over a large grid size for the combination of these two parameters (Fmax and Bmax
 When fishing mortality is high (Fig. 6.2a), the evolutionary model predicts cod maturing 
about half a year earlier than in the non-evolutionary model (Fig. 6.2b) due to the underlying ge-
netic adaptations in the evolving population. Also, the predicted total welfare is lower in the 
model where fisheries-induced evolution occurs, although not by a large amount (Fig. 6.2c). This 
higher cost of evolution occurs because the total biomass and catch are slightly lower in the evo-
lutionary model than in the non-evolutionary model (See Appendix, Table 6.A2 and Fig. 6.A2). 
) that delivered 
the best results for our economic objectives (to either maximize profits or total welfare). In the 
main results discounting is neglected because it does not change the overall results, and we only 
discuss results for the objective total welfare, noting that maximizing profits recommends a very 
similar management plan compared to maximizing total welfare; but see the supplementary re-
sults in the Appendix. 
 Given that fisheries-induced evolution has already occurred in the past, what would be 
the best way to avoid undesired effects in the future? Furthermore, can genetic changes – if un-
desired – be reversed? To address these questions, we have approximated an optimal manage-
ment plan for the period 2006-2100 (Fig. 6.2d-f). We find that the optimal fishing mortality in 
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both the evolutionary and non-evolutionary model is substantially lower than it has been histori-
cally (indicated by a black arrow in Fig. 6.2d). For both models the predicted age at maturation 
does not decline as much when lower fishing mortality is implemented from 2006.  
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Figure 6.2. The grey shaded area has occurred in the past with observed fishing mortality from 1932-
2005. From 2006 on, we have analyzed two different scenarios: one continues with the average fishing 
mortality that has been observed between 1946-2005, called “business as usual”. The other scenario has 
implemented an optimal HCR from 2006 by maximizing welfare. For each scenario, the emerging proper-
ties from an evolutionary model (grey) are compared with a non-evolutionary model (black). The grey line 
at the bottom in a and d shows fishing mortality at the spawning grounds which are beyond the control of 
the manager (not included in deriving the HCR). In a, fishing mortality stays as high as it was in the past. 
In b, the predicted age at maturation is lower in the evolutionary model than in the non-evolutionary 
model. Both models predict age at maturation to fall between age 6 and 7 in 2005 (dashed line), which is 
what has been observed from data. c, The evolutionary model delivers slightly lower welfare than the non-
evolutionary model (Table 6.A2). d, If each population is managed optimally from 2006, this would de-
mand a much lower fishing mortality (illustrated by a black arrow) in both the evolutionary and non-
evolutionary model. e, In the evolutionary model the age at maturation is lower, and continues to decrease, 
while the non-evolutionary model has stabilized around the age of 7 (dashed line). f, Although age at matu-
ration is lower in the evolutionary model, total welfare is slightly higher and shows an increasing trend in 
the evolutionary model. The higher level of welfare in both models is caused by higher spawning stock 
biomass and catch (see Table 6.A2). Note that the evolutionary and non-evolutionary models are not di-
rectly comparable in this figure because they do not have the same starting point in 2006 in respect to 
stock characteristics. For a direct comparison, see Fig. 6.3, where both models start from 1932. Emerging 
properties are shown from an average of 15 independent model runs. 
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Interestingly, the evolutionary model still predicts a lower age at maturation (Fig. 6.2e) but due to 
a higher SSB, the evolutionary model performs slightly better in terms of welfare (Fig 6.2f and 
Table 6.A2). Therefore, if fishing pressure is sufficiently low, evolutionary change can increase 
the SSB, total biomass, catch, and welfare, but if fishing pressure remains at historically high le-
vels, evolution may lead to undesired economic repercussions (Fig. 6.2c and Table 6.A2).  
 In most stocks, the degree of evolutionary change and its impact are not known, which 
makes it difficult to manage them from an evolutionary perspective. If evolutionary effects are 
present, but ignored by managers, how costly will it be to overlook fisheries-induced evolution? 
The encouraging answer is that a derived optimal HCR in an evolutionary model is not very dif-
ferent than what a non-evolutionary model recommends. For both the evolving and the non-
evolving model optimal fishing mortality is equally low (Fig. 3a see also Appendix). 
 Low fishing mortality avoids the large decline in age at maturation (Fig. 6.3b) that is ob-
served for high fishing mortality (Fig. 6.2b). For both an evolutionary and non-evolutionary 
model, the same low fishing mortality is required for ecological and economic sustainability. 
Comparing the overall performance, an optimal HCR in an evolutionary model predicts higher 
total biomass, higher SSB, and higher catch (Table 6.A3, Fig. 6.A3). As a result, fisheries-induced 
evolution leads to higher total welfare (Fig. 6.3c).  
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Figure 6.3. The hypothetical case that optimal HCRs had been in use since 1932 in an evolutionary model 
(grey line) and a non-evolutionary model (black line). The fishing mortality at the spawning grounds (grey) 
is beyond the control of the manager. A, The same low fishing mortality is both optimal in an evolutionary 
(grey) and non-evolutionary (black) model. b, The evolutionary model predicts lower age at maturation 
than the non-evolutionary model. c, Total welfare is higher in the evolving population, caused by higher 
spawning stock biomass and catch (Table 6.A3). Emerging properties are shown from an average of 15 in-
dependent model runs. 
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Therefore, if the fishing mortality is set correctly according to what would be optimal in a non-
evolutionary model, biomass, catch, and welfare are even higher in a model that allows for genet-
ic adaptations. Hence, in this case, ignoring evolutionary effects would not undermine manage-
ment objectives. If a population in an evolutionary model is managed according to what would 
be optimal in a non-evolutionary model, total welfare is almost as high, as if fisheries-induced 
evolution was taken into account when deriving the optimal HCR (Table 6.A3). Hence, using an 
optimal management plan derived from a non-evolutionary model in an evolutionary model does 
not result in substantially reduced economic yield and SSB. 
 This does not necessarily imply that evolution can be ignored. Beneath the surface – and 
likely to go unnoticed – the qualities and properties of the stock are changing as a result of evolu-
tion. Although the age at maturation declines in the non-evolutionary model (solely a product of 
phenotypic plasticity), the decline is even more severe when evolution takes place. In the evolving 
population, not only is age at maturation lower but there is also a lower length at maturation, 
higher intrinsic growth capacity, higher reproductive investment and higher gonad weight caused 
by the increased reproductive investment (Fig. 6.4a-c and Eikeset et al. (2010a)). These changes 
have various implications. First, age-truncated populations, consisting of younger and smaller 
spawners, may lead to a destabilized population growth rate (Anderson et al., 2008). Second, such 
juvenation may also reduce resilience to climate (Ottersen, 2008; Ottersen et al., 2006). Third, the 
type of evolutionary changes predicted here may be difficult to reverse in some cases (Dunlop et 
al., 2009c; Enberg et al., 2009). Fourth, evolutionary changes could alter the stock’s migration 
patterns (Dunlop et al., 2009a; Jørgensen et al., 2008; Theriault et al., 2008) and, fifth, may have 
wider ecosystem effects that have yet to be fully explored (Jørgensen et al., 2007).  
 Another result of evolution is a higher ratio between SSB and total biomass from age 3 
(Fig. 6.4d). In fisheries management it is very common to use SSB as an indicator for stock viabil-
ity. We should be aware that with changing maturation schedules, assuming stability in the SSB 
may mask a decreasing total biomass. Fisheries-induced evolution may have effects on recruit-
ment and the accuracy of recruitment predictions (Enberg et al., 2010). This may increase the risk 
of stock collapse if biomass levels approach the limit reference points. It has been suggested that 
using SSB as a measure for stock reproductive potential may lead to overly optimistic assess-
ments of stock status (Marshall et al., 2006). Thus, biological reference points should be set in the 
light of eco-evolutionary dynamics (Hutchings, 2009).  
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 The biological component of our bio-economic model has several limitations and simpli-
fications (Dunlop et al., 2009a; Dunlop et al., 2009c; Eikeset et al., 2010a; Enberg et al., 2009). A 
few assumptions merit special attention here. First, we assume an initial 1:1 sex ratio although it 
has been shown that the sex ratio in this stock has fluctuated over time (Marshall et al., 2006). 
Second, we assume no sexual selection, though it is possible that sexual selection may influence 
the evolutionary changes in life-history traits (Hutchings and Rowe, 2008a, 2008b; Urbach and 
Cotton, 2008).  
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Figure 6.4. Life-history trait changes shown by predicted a, mean age and b, mean length at maturation, 
c, mean gonad weight and d, annual ratio of SSB and total biomass from age 3 for an evolutionary model 
(grey) and a non-evolutionary model (black). Age at maturation for these scenarios is also shown in Fig. 
6.2b and 6.3b. The scenario of high fishing mortality (business as usual) is shown by thin lines, while the 
optimal scenarios are shown by the thick lines corresponding to Fig. 6.2 and 6.3. High fishing mortality 
leads to lower a, age at maturation and b, length at maturation. These effects are stronger for the evolu-
tionary model (grey) compared to the non-evolutionary model (black). c, As the other properties, the pre-
dicted average gonad weight is higher for low fishing mortality, but the evolutionary model has higher go-
nad weight than a non-evolutionary model. d, Due to age-truncation, the SSB to biomass ratio is lower for 
both the evolutionary and non-evolutionary model when fishing is high (thin lines). For both fishing mor-
talities, the evolutionary model (grey), predicts a higher SSB and biomass ratio than the non-evolutionary 
model (black). Emerging properties are shown from an average of 15 independent model runs. 
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Third, we do not include genetic correlations between the life-history traits describing maturation 
tendency, growth capacity and reproductive investment (Eikeset et al., 2010a). Fourth, we limit 
our analysis to the feeding grounds, while considering the fishing pressure in the spawning 
ground fishery to be beyond the control of a resource manager. It is an evident extension to al-
low for optimization of both the Barents Sea and Lofoten islands fisheries at the same time. 
However, in reality, it is often the case that managers’ jurisdiction contains only a certain part of 
an ecosystem, and analyzing such a case may be even more relevant for policy makers. 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
Summing up, our results quantify the costs and benefits of fisheries-induced evolution. Depend-
ing on harvesting pressure, it can reduce or increase the economic revenue generated by a fishery. 
In any case, low fishing mortality is the key for successful management. However, fish stocks are 
typically far from being managed ecologically optimally. Furthermore, there may very well be cas-
es where the biological circumstances are such that a population requires a different management 
plan than what a non-evolutionary model would suggest. We also find evidence that fisheries-
induced evolution could alter management reference points through its effects on life-history 
traits and population properties such as SSB. Changes in the stock-recruitment relationship and 
SSB are crucial for stock assessment models and management decisions. If such changes go un-
detected, this can result in persistent harvesting above sustainable biomass levels, or harvesting at 
levels below the economic optimum, which are both undesirable for different reasons. The inter-
play between ecology, evolution and economics underscores that a Darwinian approach to fishe-
ries science is necessary to enhance the long-term sustainability and profitability of valuable fishe-
ries.
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Appendix 6.A:  Model description 
Our bio-economic model consists of two sub-models: “the biological model” which is a descrip-
tion of the life-cycle of NEA cod, and “the economic model” describing details such as cost and 
demand for the NEA cod fishery. These two components are linked together through an annual 
feedback of spawning stock biomass (SSB). This is fed into the economic model where ultimately 
the total allowable catch is determined by an optimal harvest control rule (HCR). The derived 
total allowable catch (TAC) feeds back into the biological model and affects the stock size. Each 
of the sub-models have been specifically estimated and calibrated for the NEA cod fishery using 
data from the time period 1932-2005 (Table 6.A1). In this chapter we focus on the fishery in the 
cod’s feeding grounds, hence, we keep harvest rates in the spawning grounds at the historical le-
vels between 1932 until 2005, and at a constant rate after 2006. Hence, we consider the spawning 
ground fishery to be beyond the control of the manager, and consequently, the HCR (Fig. 6.1). 
 
Biological model 
The biological model is an individual-based, eco-genetic model similar to the one developed by 
Dunlop et al. (2009c). It describes an individual’s life cycle through annual processes for matura-
tion, somatic growth, reproduction and mortality, and has been calibrated specifically for the 
NEA cod (Eikeset et al., 2010a). Our main focus is to analyze how changes that occur at the in-
dividual level lead to emerging properties at the population level, as for example, changes in SSB 
and catch. Our individual-based model follows the fate of about 50,000 super-individuals (Huse 
et al., 2004; Scheffer et al., 1995). All model results, such as SSB and catch, are given for a popu-
lation that has been scaled up by a factor of 100,000.  
 
Genetic structure 
In the initial population, each genetic trait had initial values based on empirical data (Table 6.A1). 
The genetic traits are assumed to be normally distributed with variances based on the coefficient 
of genetic variation which has been determined in Eikeset et al. (2010a). Based on quantitative 
genetics (Mousseau and Roff, 1987), each trait has a heritability that is the ratio between their ad-
ditive genetic variance (VG ) and phenotypic variance (VP ). The heritability is assumed to be 0.2 
for all genetic traits in the initial population (Mousseau and Roff, 1987). Phenotypic variance is 
the sum of genetic and environmental variance components ( )V V V? ?P G E , and we used this to 
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calculate the environmental variance for each trait in the initial population. This environmental 
variance was then subsequently kept constant. The phenotypic expression of each individual life-
history trait was then determined by drawing randomly from a normal distribution with means 
equal to the respective genetic trait with the corresponding environmental variances. In our mod-
el, we studied the changes in four life-history traits: maturation tendency by probabilistic matura-
tion reaction norm (PMRN) (i) slope sP  and (ii) intercept iP ; (iii) growth capacity gP  and (iv) re-
productive investment (gonado-somatic index GSIP ). The genetic traits were passed on to 
offspring by drawing random values from a normal distribution with means equal to the midpa-
rental value and variances equal to half of the variance for a given genetic trait in the initial popu-
lation (Roughgarden, 1979). After the initial year, genetic means, heritabilities and the trait distri-
butions could change freely as determined by the processes of maturation, somatic growth, re-
production, natural mortality and harvesting mortality. These processes were applied sequentially 
in each year to all individuals. 
 We made two versions of our model, an evolutionary and a non-evolutionary, each mod-
eling their respective population of individuals: we did this in order to compare a population that 
has the propensity to evolve, with a population that does not evolve. In the evolving population, 
the coefficient of genetic variance has been determined by matching trends in age and length at 
maturation. For the non-evolving population, which is only driven by ecological processes, the 
coefficient of genetic variance is equal to zero (Eikeset et al., 2010a).  
 
Maturation, growth, reproduction and natural mortality 
Each year, the probability that an immature individual will mature depends on the individual’s 
probabilistic maturation reaction norm (Dieckmann and Heino, 2007; Heino et al., 2002b), 
1
50( , ) [1 exp( ( ( )) / )] .p a l l l a l
?? ? ? ? ?m P The length at age 50 ( )l aP  is where the maturation probabil-
ity ( , )p a lm  is 50% with a phenotypic intercept iP  and slope sP , 50 ( )l a i s a? ?P P P . The width of 
the maturation envelope wP  covers the lower envelope bound (25%) to the upper bound (75%) 
from where the probability to mature at a given age, is determined by the change length, or 
growth, defined by l?  (Dunlop et al., 2009c; Eikeset et al., 2010a). 
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Table 6.A1. Parameter values and data sources for the bio-economic model. 
Parameters Value Source
Biological model
Initial mean PMRN† sGslope, 0.15 cm yr 1 
–1
Initial mean PMRN† iGintercept, 77.4 cm 1 
Initial mean PMRN† wGwidth, 12.88 cm 1 
Initial mean reproductive investment, GSIG 0.15 2 
Reproductive investment conversion factor, ? 0.60241 3 
Allometric proportionality constant, k 3.2 10–6 kg cm 4 –j
Allometric exponent, j 3.24 4 
Weight-specific oocyte density, D 4.45 106 kg 5 –1
Initial mean growth capacity, gG 11.08 cm 6 
Coefficient of genetic variation in PMRN slope, CVs 10 % 7 
Coefficient of genetic variation in PMRN intercept, CVi 2 % 7 
Coeff. of genetic variation in reproductive investment, CVGSI 12 % 7 
Coefficient of genetic variation in genetic growth, CVg 4 % 7 
Immature fishing probability in spawning-ground pre-1932 0.38 8 
Immature fishing probability in feeding-ground pre-1932 0.09 8 
Minimum-size limit on feeding grounds 45 cm 9 
Economic model
Intercept of the demand function, a 18.88 NOK KG 10-1
Slope of the demand function, b 1.19257 10–8 NOK KG 10-2
Stock-output elasticity ? 0.58 10
Effort-output elasticity ? 0.85 10
Catchability coefficient q exp(-7.39) tonnagedays 10-1
Fixed costs per boat fc 1.55 106 10NOK
Variable costs per boat vc 131.6NOK tonnagedays 10
-1
Sources: 1 = Heino et al. (2002b) and M. Heino (unpublished); 2 =Kjesbu et al. (1998); 3 = Gunderson et 
al. (1988) and Lester et al. (2004); 4 = survey data from 1999–2007 (IMR, O. R. Kjesbu, pers. comm); 5 = 
Thorsen and Kjesbu (2001); 6 = survey data from 1932–2005 (M. Heino, unpublished); 7 = model calibra-
tion Eikeset et al. (2010a); 8 = Godø (2003) and M. Heino (unpublished); 9 =Bjordal et al. (2004); 10 = 
Richter et al. (2010); see chapter 5.  
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 For the immature individuals, the body length in a given year depends on the length in the pre-
vious year and the growth increment in that year, 1 , , 1t t tl l g? ?? ? P D . To reflect density-dependence 
in growth brought about by changes in abundance, and consequently competition and resource 
availability, we used an estimated relationship of phenotypic growth , , 3 ,exp( )t t tg g bB ??P D, P  de-
pending on total stock biomass 3 ,tB ?  from age 3 and older in year t .This density-dependent 
growth model was estimated using data from 1978-2009 on annual growth increments and bio-
mass from survey and stock assessment (Eikeset et al., 2010a; ICES, 2008a). 
Mature individuals do not only allocate resources growth, but also to reproduction, de-
pending on the reproductive investment. This is given by the phenotypic gonado-somatic index 
GSIP  and  a conversion factor, ? , needed to account for the higher energy content of gonadic 
tissue relative to somatic tissue (Gunderson and Dygert, 1988; Lester et al., 2004). Consequently, 
the length of a mature individual is given by 1 , 1 , 13( ) / (3 ).t t t tl l g GSI?? ? ?? ? ?P D, P  An individual’s 
fecundity f  is determined by its length l  and gonado-somatic index phenotype GSIP  and given 
by ,
jf kl GSI D? P  where D  is the weight-specific packing density of oocytes (Thorsen and 
Kjesbu, 2001), and k  and j  are allometric constants relating body length to body mass. In our 
model, sex was assigned randomly at birth at a 1:1 primary sex ratio. Atlantic cod are batch 
spawners and so may mate with several different partners (Kjesbu et al., 1998; McEvoy and 
McEvoy, 1992). We therefore assumed mating to be random with replacement. The density-
dependent newborn mortality was modeled by using an estimated Beverton-Holt stock-
recruitment relationship for 3-year olds (Eikeset et al., 2010a). The estimated stock-recruitment 
relationship depended on the SSB and sea surface temperature to reflect climate impact. The sea 
surface temperature stretches from the Kola meridian transect (33°50’ E, 70°50’ N to 72°50’ N) 
and has been shown to be a good indicator for recruitment (Bochkov, 1982; Hjermann et al., 
2007; Ottersen et al., 2006; Tereshchenko, 1996). Annual temperature data from 1932-2005 was 
fed into the modeled stock-recruitment relationship. Prior to 1932 we used the average from 
1932-1950 and after 2006-2100 we used the average from 1995-2005. Our model does not in-
clude cannibalism despite it has been shown to be important for the natural mortality in the 
young age-classes (Hjermann et al., 2007; Yaragina et al., 2009). By back-calculating we then 
found the number of 1-year olds as in a VPA-analysis by assuming an annual total natural mortal-
ity rate equal to 0.2 (ICES, 2009a). The individuals can die from natural or fishing mortality. The 
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natural mortality has been summed up by two sources: background natural mortality and mortali-
ty from a growth-survival trade-off (Eikeset et al., 2010a). The growth-survival trade-off accounts 
for the mortality increase when growth increases, as a result of, for example, risky foraging beha-
vior (Biro and Post, 2008). Due to annual spawning migration out of the feeding ground at about 
¼ of the year, the harvest probability of mature fish on the feeding grounds was 3/401 (1 )p? ? , 
where p0  is the harvest probability for the immature fish. 
 
Economic model 
To calculate the welfare effects of harvesting, we rely on the analysis developed in the previous 
chapter.  We consider the situation where harvesting takes place at minimal costs and only traw-
lers are used. Therefore, the number of trawlers are given in 5.18, the number of tonnage-days 
per trawler are given in 5.16. Furthermore the demand function is given t tP a bH? ? , where tP  is 
the price, tH  is the total allowable catch, and a  and b  are parameters as estimated in 5.28.  
The objective function 
Each year, the NEA cod fishery generates economic profits. An economic objective that is often 
followed in bioeconomic models is to maximize these aggregated profits over T  years. The max-
imum economic yield requires us to maximize ? ?0 1 / (1 )T ttt ?? ? ?? , where ?  is the discount rate. 
From society’s point of view, it is desirable to take into account that consumers and fish proces-
sors benefit from buying cheap fish. Therefore, one may also take the consumer surplus into ac-
count. Consumer surplus is given by ? ?0.5t t tCS a P H? ? . Total welfare is given by the sum of 
profits and consumer surplus. Maximizing total welfare requires us to maxim-
ize ? ?? ?0 1 / (1 ) .T tt tt CS ?? ? ? ??  
 
The harvest control rules 
The harvest control rule (HCR) implemented for the NEA cod fishery in 2004 translates precau-
tionary reference points into a management plan (ICES, 2008b, 2009a). Below these reference 
points the stock is at risk of being harvested unsustainably. The implemented HCR for the NEA 
cod in 2004 consists of two parameters (Bogstad et al., 2005; Kovalev and Bogstad, 2005): a max-
imum fishing mortality Fpa is followed if the biomass level is above the precautionary biomass 
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level Bpa
 Here we generalize a HCR with two parameters (Fig. 6.1c) to compare with the imple-
mented management plan. If SSB is between zero and B
; below this biomass level the fishing mortality decreases linearly to the origin, i.e. fishing 
mortality is zero at a biomass level of zero.  
max
max max/SSBF B
, the instantaneous fishing mortality 
for the given year is . If SSB is larger than Bmax, the fishing mortality is equal to the 
Fmax. The current HCR is therefore recovered as a special case when Bmax=Bpa and Fmax=Fpa. In 
our model, we vary the parameters in the HCR over a wide range of values, not constraining 
them to existing precautionary reference points. Due to the complexity of our biological model, 
we cannot deliver an exact optimum. Instead, we search for the combination of parameter values 
Bmax and Fmax to approximate the maximum of our objective functions (maximize profit and max-
imize welfare). The grid size for the parameters gave a grid of 4141 different HCRs. Bmax from 0-
800 thousand tonnes in steps of 20, and instantaneous fishing mortality Fmax from 0.2-1.2 yr-1 in 
steps of 0.01 yr-1
 
. Our model is individual-based, and for some of these HCRs, fishing could 
make the abundance very low. To avoid stochastic effects at low abundances, we therefore set a 
threshold below which the population was classified as extinct (at 20 modeled mature “super-
individuals”) (Eikeset et al., 2010a; Scheffer et al., 1995). In total the computation time was 2 days 
for 7 independent model runs at a cluster with 5776 CPUs at the Research Computing Services at 
the University of Oslo. 
Historic fishing pressure 
The harvest pressure in the feeding ground increased steadily from the 1930s to the middle of the 
1960s and remained high until mid- 2000. In one of the fishing scenarios, we assume a fixed fish-
ing mortality in the feeding ground (0.68 year-1) being maintained into the future. This is an aver-
age of historic fishing mortality between 1946-2005 and is higher than what is suggested to be 
precautionary for the NEA cod (0.4 year-1
 
) (ICES, 2009a); we coin this scenario “business as 
usual”. 
Appendix 6.B: Objective functions and discount rates 
Maximizing welfare 
In the main results we focus on the objective maximizing welfare (Fig. 6.2-6.4). The fishing sce-
narios are i) observed fishing mortality between 1932-2006, then from 2006 onwards “business as 
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usual” with annual fishing mortality set to 0.68 (Fig. 6.2a-c), ii) observed fishing mortality be-
tween 1932 and 2006 followed by optimal fishing mortality from 2006 (Fig. 6.2d-f), and iii) op-
timal fishing mortality from 1932-2100 (Fig. 6.3). 
 For each scenario, we compare the results from the evolutionary and non-evolutionary 
model. Table 6.A2 and 6.A3 report the parameters Bmax, and Fmax for the optimal HCR. In the 
“business as usual” case, these parameters are omitted because fishing mortality is not derived 
from an HCR. Furthermore, we analyze the emerging harvesting properties, given in averages 
over the course of fishing (Table 6.A2-6.A7). 
Table 6.A2. Mean values corresponding to Fig. 6.2. Observed fishing mortality from 1932-2005, followed 
by a constant rate from 2006-2100. In the optimal harvest control rule (HCR), total welfare has been max-
imized from 2006-2100: for this case, values shown are averages for 2006-2100. Averages of fishing mor-
tality (F), catch (TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), profit, and welfare are shown with standard devia-
tion in parentheses. 
Model F Bmax Fmax TAC SSB Profit Welfare
Historic
Evolutionary - - 0.68 360 (95) 267 (365) 1755 (519) 2705 (874)
Non-evolutionary - - 0.68 370 (93) 260 (356) 1821 (505) 2808 (836)
Optimal HCR
Evolutionary 0.31 440 0.3 474 (76) 938 (155) 3149 (441) 4837 (767)
Non-evolutionary 0.32 580 0.31 446 (71) 798 (113) 3099 (446) 4565 (716)
Units: Fmax (inst. rate); Bmax, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); Profit and total welfare (million NOK).
Business as usual and optimal management from 2006  
Table 6.A2 shows harvesting properties for a scenario of historic fishing mortality, followed by 
“business as usual”, and an optimal HCR from 2006 on. In the evolutionary model, lower spawn-
ing stock biomass (SSB), total allowable catch (TAC) and economic yield can be observed, 
though these differences are insignificant. If management is optimal, fishing mortality is much 
lower than what has been done historically (average fishing mortality from 2006-2100 is 0.31 year-
1 in the non-evolutionary model and 0.30 year-1 in the evolutionary model). The evolutionary 
model delivers slightly higher SSB, TAC and welfare. Figure 6.A2 shows that in the “business as 
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usual” case, total biomass and TAC tend to be slightly lower in the evolutionary model, though 
not significantly so. When the optimal HCR is used, total biomass and TAC are somewhat higher 
in the evolutionary model. 
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Figure 6.A2. Supplementary information for Fig. 6.2. Emerging total biomass from age of 3 and older 
(thick line) and total allowable catch (TAC, thin line), compared for the evolutionary model (grey) and the 
non-evolutionary model (black). a, Historic fishing mortality from 1932-2005 (grey area), continued by a 
high constant harvest rate from 2006-2100 (white area). Total biomass and TAC tend to be slightly lower 
in the evolutionary model b, When the optimal HCR is used, total biomass and TAC is higher in the evo-
lutionary model. Predictions are averages over 15 independent model runs. 
 
Optimal management from 1932 
For the optimal HCR derived over the time-period 1932-2100, the evolutionary and non-
evolutionary models have the same starting point in 1932. Hence, we can compare these two 
models and ask how optimal management differs in an evolutionary model compared to a non-
evolutionary one. Therefore, we derive an “ecologically optimal HCR” from a non-evolutionary 
model and an “evolutionarily optimal HCR” from an evolutionary model. We find that the max-
imum fishing mortality Fmax is marginally higher in the evolutionary model compared to the non-
evolutionary models (0.33 vs. 0.32 year-1, Table 6.A3). The parameter Bmax differs, but note that 
the SSB almost never drops below this precautionary buffer (not shown). Therefore, the mean 
emerging fishing mortality from 1932-2100 is 0.32 year-1 for both the non-evolutionary and the 
evolutionary model. Note that the evolutionary model allows for a slightly higher TAC, while 
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maintaining higher SSB. As a result, total welfare is higher for the evolutionary model. Profits, 
however, are not significantly higher in the evolutionary model. This happens because higher 
catches depress the price (see section below). Fig. 6.A3 shows that total biomass from age 3 and 
older with corresponding catch are slightly higher in the evolutionary model compared to the 
non-evolutionary one.  
Table 6.A3. Mean values corresponding to Fig. 6.3. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for maximizing 
welfare from 1932-2100. Averages of fishing mortality (F), catch (TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), 
profit, and welfare are shown with standard deviation in parentheses. 
Model F Bmax Fmax TAC SSB Profit Welfare
Evolutionary 0.33 380 0.32 465 (72) 826 (138) 2970 (487) 4631 (755)
Non-evolutionary 0.32 120 0.32 439 (48) 702 (123) 2927 (427) 4372 (551)
Evolutionary ¥ 0.33 468 (60) 804 (169) 2977 (453) 4635 (678)
Units: Fmax (inst. rate); Bmax, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); Profit and total welfare (million NOK).
¥ Evolutionary model with HCR derived from a non-evolutionary model; using an “ecologically optimal 
HCR”.
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Figure 6.A3. Supplementary information for Fig. 6.3. Emerging mean total biomass from age 3 and older 
(thick line) and total allowable catch (TAC, thin line). Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for maximizing 
welfare from 1932-2100. Total biomass and catch are higher in the evolutionary model (grey), compared to 
the non-evolutionary model (black). Note that the decline in total biomass prior to 2006 is also driven by 
the historic and variable spawning ground fishing mortality. Predictions are averages over 15 independent 
model runs. 
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In the evolutionary model, total biomass tends to increase over time (though not significantly), 
which could be a symptom of changing stock-properties due to genetic change. Furthermore, we 
investigate how costly it is to overlook evolutionary effects. If a manager is unaware that genetic 
change occurs, how large will the welfare losses be? To answer this question we use an “ecologi-
cally optimal HCR” derived in a non-evolutionary model in an evolutionary model. Given that 
the non-evolutionary and evolutionary models recommended very similar HCRs, the welfare 
losses are negligible. An evolutionary model that is managed with an “ecologically optimal HCR” 
still outperforms the non-evolutionary model. Using an “evolutionary optimal HCR” in the evo-
lutionary model does not increase any of the emerging harvesting properties significantly (Table 
6.A3).  
 
Changing the objectives to maximizing profit 
We investigated the characteristics from alternative HCRs for different objectives and discount 
rates. The objective maximizing profit from 2006-2100 leads to slightly lower mean fishing mor-
tality for the evolutionary and the non-evolutionary model (0.29 year-1) than maximizing welfare 
(0.32 year-1). Overall, changing objectives did not alter our results concerning the ranking of the 
evolutionary and the non-evolutionary model: the evolutionary model allows for a slightly higher 
TAC, while it tends to maintain higher SSB. Therefore, profits and total welfare are still higher 
for the evolutionary model, though not very significantly (Table 6.A4 and 6.A5). 
Table 6.A4. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for maximizing profits from 2006-2100. Values shown 
are averages for 2006-2100 for fishing mortality (F), catch (TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), profit, 
and welfare with standard deviation in parentheses. 
Model F Bmax Fmax TAC SSB Profit Welfare
Evolutionary 0.29 140 0.29 465 (67) 1002 (197) 3149 (384) 4795 (717)
Non-evolutionary 0.29 280 0.29 438 (62) 872 (140) 3112 (398) 4549 (655)
Units: Fmax (inst. rate); Bmax, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); Profit and total welfare (million NOK).
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Table 6.A5. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for maximizing profits from 1932-2100. Values shown 
are averages for 1932-2100 for fishing mortality (F), catch (TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), profit, 
and welfare with standard deviation in parentheses. 
Model F Bmax Fmax TAC SSB Profit Welfare
Evolutionary 0.31 60 0.31 463 (60) 872 (182) 2983 (455) 4637 (685)
Non-evolutionary 0.29 200 0.29 427 (46) 826 (141) 2940 (438) 4359 (561)
Evolutionary ¥ 455 (59) 944 (199) 2982 (463) 4616 (695)
Units: Fmax (inst. rate); Bmax
¥  Evolutionary model with HCR derived from a non-evolutionary model; using “ecologically optimal 
HCR”.
, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); Profit and total welfare (million NOK).
 
Changing discount rates for maximizing welfare 
As expected, higher discount rates (2 and 4%) lead to slightly higher fishing mortality. Discount-
ing does, however, not influence optimal policy substantially. This is in line with earlier findings 
from chapter 5 and Sandal and Steinshamn (1997). Discounting did also not change the relative 
difference between results obtained from the evolutionary model compared to the non-
evolutionary model; see tables 6.A6 and 6.A7.  
Table 6.A6. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for maximizing welfare from 2006-2100 with different 
discount rates (dr), 0, 2 and 4%. Values shown are averages for 2006-2100 for fishing mortality (F), catch 
(TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), profit, and welfare with standard deviation in parentheses. 
Model dr (%) F Bmax Fmax TAC SSB Profit Welfare
Evolutionary 0 0.31 440 0.3 474 (76) 938 (155) 3149 (441) 4837 (767)
2 0.41 760 0.32 479 (81) 852 (126) 3128 (464) 4822 (796)
4 0.35 440 0.34 483 (75) 790 (121) 3121 (427) 4811 (744)
Non-evolutionary 0 0.32 580 0.31 446 (71) 798 (113) 3099 (446) 4565 (716)
2 0.33 460 0.32 450 (67) 743 (104) 3092 (418) 4560 (678)
4 0.33 460 0.32 450 (67) 743 (104) 3092 (418) 4560 (678)
Units: Fmax (inst. rate); Bmax, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); Profit and total welfare (million NOK).
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Table 6.A7. Optimal harvest control rule (HCR) for maximizing welfare from 1932-2100 for different 
discount rates (dr), 0, 2 and 4%. Values shown are averages for 1932-2100 for fishing mortality (F), catch 
(TAC), spawning stock biomass (SSB), profit, and welfare with standard deviation in parentheses. 
Model dr (%) F Bmax F max TAC SSB Profit Welfare
Evolutionary 0 0.33 380 0.32 465 (72) 826 (138) 2970 (487) 4631 (755)
2 0.33 20 0.33 468 (60) 802 (170) 2977 (455) 4634 (682)
4 0.35 120 0.35 470 (60) 733 (155) 2959 (450) 4604 (668)
Non-evolutionary 0 0.32 120 0.32 439 (48) 702 (123) 2927 (427) 4372 (551)
2 0.34 120 0.34 442 (48) 670 (121) 2916 (424) 4363 (549)
4 0.36 180 0.36 445 (51) 621 (114) 2896 (425) 4348 (554)
Units: Fmax (inst. rate); Bmax, TAC, SSB (1000 tonnes); Profit and total welfare (million NOK)
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7 
Unintended consequences sneak in through 
the back door: making wise use of regulations 
in fisheries 
 
 
 
Abstract
 
In this chapter we discuss the potential failure of simple management models. Analyzing compo-
nents of a complex adaptive system in isolation is often misleading. The fundamental complexity 
of the social and natural environment has to be fully accounted for if unpleasant surprises are to 
be avoided. We examine a list of general management tools used in real world fisheries, arguing 
that the success of a given instrument depends not only on its inherent properties but also on the 
way these instruments are administered. Similarly, we address how uncertainty and the biological 
complexity of the resource system may result in unintended consequences, including unantici-
pated costs. This demonstrates that for each resource system, the informational constraints have 
to be considered. Hence, interdisciplinary research is mandatory in order to reach adequate man-
agement decisions for social-ecological systems. 
 
7  
 
This chapter is a slightly modified version of: Eikeset, A.M., A.P. Richter, F.K. Diekert, D.J. Dankel, 
and N.C. Stenseth (2011), Unintended Consequences Sneak in the Back Door: Making wise use of 
Regulations in Fisheries Management. In Ecosystem Based Management for Marine Fisheries: An 
Evolving Perspective. A. Belgrano & C.W. Fowler (eds.), Cambridge University Press, in press. We 
are grateful to Svein Jentoft, Kristina Raab, Alessandro Tavoni, Johan Grasman and Daan van Soest 
for valuable comments and advice on earlier versions of the manuscript.
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7.1 Introduction  
Marine fish stocks are renewable natural resources. They have the potential to provide food, in-
come, and other services to mankind on a sustainable basis (Smith et al., 2010). Yet in reality, 
overfishing – the wasteful exploitation of marine resources – is a widespread observable fact 
(Hilborn et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2001; Myers and Worm, 2003; Worm and Myers, 2004). On 
the one hand, there is no doubt that globally fisheries are in crisis (Clark, 2006). On the other 
hand, how we can manage to rebuild global fisheries is still under debate (Worm et al., 2009). 
There are few cases of environmental policy wherein the gap between actual and potential per-
formance is as large as in fisheries (Heal, 2007). The underlying cause of overfishing is most often 
thought to be the open access nature of many fisheries: each individual fisherman takes fish out 
of the ocean until the cost of catching one more fish exceeds the return of doing so. The fisher-
man has no incentive to leave fish as an investment for future harvesting; if the fisherman does 
not take the fish when they can be taken, another fisherman will. This problem is often described 
with the metaphor of the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). Like most metaphors, it 
simplifies the true complexity of the problem. In this case it masks the two facets of overfishing 
that Munro and Scott (1985) defined as a “Class I problem” and a “Class II problem”. 
 First, the Class I problem relates to excess fishing mortality; too many fish are harvested. 
Turned the other way around, too few fish are left in the oceans to reproduce. That is, future so-
cial and natural losses result from overstraining the replenishing potential of the resource. It re-
sembles a “temporal trap” (Messick and McClelland, 1983) as the concentration on today’s gains 
squanders obtainable gains in the future.  
 Second, even when the government is aware of this problem and sets a Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC), too many boats will “race” to catch as much as possible until the TAC is reached. 
This is the Class II problem, where social and natural waste is the result of a perverse incentive 
structure brought about by the fact that fish can be appropriated only by the first fishermen to 
catch them, resembling a “social trap” (Messick and McClelland, 1983). A symptom of this “rule 
of capture” (Boyce, 1992) is the widespread overcapacity of fishing fleets. 
 Decision-makers today meet challenges not previously experienced in the era of unregu-
lated open access fisheries (Homans and Wilen, 1997). On the one hand, today’s decision-makers 
have more possibilities due to the increased level of knowledge. On the other hand, today’s man-
agers are expected to uphold both biological and economic sustainability in an increasingly com-
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plex world (Clark 2006). Not all management instruments work in the same way: while some 
solve the Class I problem, others overcome the Class II problem. Therefore, any management 
advice should specify whether it aims at solving a Class I problem, a Class II problem, or both.  
 An excellent framework for analyzing such complex social-ecological systems for sustain-
able management is given by Ostrom et al. (2007) and Ostrom (2009). A social-ecological system 
consists of four subsystems: (i) the resource system (e.g. a coastal fishery), (ii) the resource units 
(e.g. fish stock), (iii) the users (e.g. fishermen), and (iv) the governance system (e.g. the specific 
laws and social norms in place); see Figure 7.1. Within each subsystem, relevant variables can be 
identified to help map policy recommendations to specific system characteristics.  
 Panaceas for resource management typically fail (Ostrom et al. 2007). This can happen as 
a result of a variety of factors, often in combination. Frequently, this occurs because of over-
weighing, or, alternatively, simply ignoring the importance of one of the subsystems. For exam-
ple, a solution that focuses on the protection of resource units (RU), like biomass of a certain 
species, may fail because it does not take into account how it is affected by the response of users 
(U) to these regulations (see Figure 7.1). It is crucial to recognize the occurrence of feedbacks 
and, to the extent possible, to identify particular feedback structures within and between the spe-
cific systems (Berkes et al., 2003; Berkes et al., 1998). If management strategies are based on re-
sults derived from analyzing one of the subsystems in isolation, the outcome may be very differ-
ent from what the manager had in mind. These unintended consequences occur because over-
looked or underemphasized issues will always find a way to sneak in through the backdoor. By 
this, we mean that models that focus only at parts of the system lack important components that 
are present in reality. As a result, these models are inaccurate at best, but, often, they will also 
provide completely flawed results. It is conventional wisdom that every complex problem has an 
answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. We are obviously not the first ones who claim that this 
holds for fisheries as well. Wilson (1982), for instance, points out that objectives and forms of 
regulation would be very different from those proposed by the traditional economic view, when 
“complicating factors” were taken into account. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows: First, in sections 7.2 and 7.3, we highlight the funda-
mental complexity of the social and natural environment relevant for fisheries management. In 
section 7.4, we discuss a list of management tools with regards to their ability to alleviate Class I 
and Class II problems. We argue that this depends not only on the inherent properties of a given 
instrument but also on the way an instrument is administered. Finally, in section 7.5, we summar-
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ize and broadly categorize different sets of social and natural complexity. By constructing four 
stylized examples, we highlight that the adequacy of a given instrument in a given case is contin-
gent on the specific structure of the costs of implementation and the difficulty of obtaining all 
relevant information. 
 
Figure 7.1. An adaptation of Ostrom’s (2009) framework of core subsystems for analyzing social-
ecological systems in our marine fisheries context. Here, we emphasize the feedback loop between the re-
source system and resource units in their interactions with the users (black arrows) in the form of objec-
tives, and the resulting management tools applied to the resource system and/or units (grey arrows). 
 
7.2 Stakeholder participation and the social environment 
A stakeholder can be defined as any member of society who has direct (primary stakeholders) or 
indirect (secondary stakeholders) interests, or stakes, in a fishery (Gray and Hatchard, 2008). It is 
important to keep in mind that, in practice, managers and scientists often have hidden agendas 
themselves, in spite of their alleged neutrality (Jentoft and McCay, 1995). 
 Stakeholder participation can be an effective way to reconcile conflicting objectives 
(Dankel, 2009). Through an active and assisted dialogue process, objectives can be cognitively 
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broken down and made more compatible (Follett, 1955). For example, the broad objective “eco-
system preservation” could be a symbol for a more specific objective like “a 50% decrease in the 
amount of trawling that has contact with bottom habitat.” Additionally, participation may en-
hance the chances of reaching consensus and lead to better decisions due to the integration of the 
specific expertise these stakeholders have (Jentoft et al., 1998). Ideally, the outcome of such par-
ticipation coincides with what would be best from society’s point of view, especially regarding 
long-term sustainability. Unfortunately this is not necessarily the case. Far too often, the voice 
that shouts loudest is heard best (Hatchard, 2005), especially when some stakeholders have much 
more resources – financial funds as well as knowledge – than others (Esteban and Ray, 2006; 
Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2008). In many cases it is impossible to distinguish an active debate among 
stakeholders from lobbyism. Often stakeholders are willing to spend a substantial amount of 
money and time on influencing political decisions. This form of “rent seeking” activity (Bergland 
et al., 2002; Johnson and Libecap, 1982; Krueger, 1974) is highly undesirable from the society’s 
point of view, but is often a well established part of the political culture and therefore hard to 
eradicate. In spite of this, it would be naïve to conclude that all lobbying would cease if stake-
holders were excluded from the decision-making process. This is especially true because the deci-
sion on whom to include and exclude is itself a political choice, making the process even less 
transparent (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2008). If primary stakeholders are involved in the decision-
making process, they should therefore be made responsible and accountable (Berghöfer et al., 
2008; Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2008). 
 Fisheries managers, on their side, should also be accountable and bear the full responsi-
bility of their decisions (Jentoft and McCay 1995). In part, this is because sustainable long-term 
management use of marine resources requires planning over a time horizon that is longer than 
the duration of political offices. Such challenges are made even more difficult by the fact that, 
often, policy makers use fisheries management as a vehicle to solve other political issues (and if 
these involve other environmental issues, it introduces artificial connections and relationships 
among the various elements of ecological systems). Prominent examples are regional develop-
ment, employment or simply redistribution of income. These are all legitimate political choices, 
but they do not necessarily fulfill the explicit management goals of a fishery. 
 When management objectives have been identified and prioritized, scientists may present 
management trade-offs based on current knowledge of the fish stocks. But scientists are often 
confronted with large amounts of uncertainty (especially in regard to tradeoffs and consequences 
168
involving other components of an ecosystem) that, especially when not successfully communi-
cated, can disillusion stakeholders (Rosenberg, 2007) and breed distrust towards scientists and 
their methods. Therefore, an open dialogue process (Follett 1955) is a pertinent first step where 
different stakeholders and scientists can meet to gain more knowledge of inherent trade-offs of 
the resource, data and modeling involved to support management transparency and trust-
building.  
 In most cases, fisheries management is a top-down bureaucratic exercise with centralized 
control (Gray and Hatchard, 2008; Hatchard, 2005; Prince, 2003); there is a tendency to discon-
nect the human system from the ecological system by not explicitly including the human compo-
nent of ecosystems with all of its user groups. Since there are important feedbacks from the go-
vernance system to the users, including or excluding stakeholders will lead to institutional reper-
cussions. Central intervention from authorities very often directly undermines existing norms of 
cooperation, lowers the willingness to obey these rules and weakens stewardship motives. The 
literature has identified many cases where external interventions, intended to stimulate certain 
behavior, in fact eroded any motivation to voluntarily behave as intended (Bowles, 2008; Deci et 
al., 1999, 2001; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Stutzer, 2006; Gintis et al., 2005; 
Vollan, 2008), see also chapter 2 of this thesis. This phenomenon, often referred to as “crowding 
out”, holds especially for external incentives in the form of direct payments, but also for external 
control that signals distrust to the individual. This happens because individuals base their decision 
not only on financial considerations, but are also often intrinsically motivated to be a good mem-
ber of society. A fisherman may, for instance, feel responsible or morally obliged to use nets that 
minimize bycatch (unintended mortality of non-targeted organisms caught in fishing gear). He 
may also want to signal to others that he is a trustworthy person, who has high moral standards. 
Standard economic models typically ignore how moral motivation is affected by financial incen-
tives. Instead, it is assumed that financial incentives come on top of moral motivation and, when 
the two are consistent, one would expect that it can only strengthen the overall incentive. The 
literature on crowding-out (where one motivation replaces another), however, has established 
that this assumption is often invalid because moral incentives and financial incentives are inter-
linked and therefore non-separable (Bowles 2008): a financial incentive directly affects, and often 
crowds-out (i.e. replaces) the incentive coming from moral motivation. If a fisherman suddenly 
receives money for using bycatch-minimizing nets, this external reward may supplant his moral 
motivation to use them voluntarily. As a result, he may still use more of such nets (if the financial 
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incentive is large enough), but, in principle, it is possible that he will use less of them if the incen-
tive is perceived to be too small.  
 In principle, it is also possible for government policy to crowd-in (i.e. stimulate) good be-
havior. If banning nets that produce a lot of bycatch helps stigmatizing the use of them, a fisher-
man who is personally indifferent about the problem of bycatch may not be indifferent towards 
social pressure and may try to comply with the social norm. Therefore, governmental policy can 
also help by supporting and evoking social values and public-spirited motives (Bowles 2008). 
 Financial incentives are not alone in replacing voluntary actions; external control can do 
the same. In many cases, an individual obeys a certain social norm or law because he considers 
himself to be a good citizen, and not so much because he fears to be fined. Once the authorities 
start monitoring an individual frequently he may respond to this signal of distrust by non-
compliance when he is not monitored. This can happen because he infers that he is simply not 
expected to comply by default, or he reciprocates this sign of mistrust by breaking the rules. In 
both cases, the individual sees the authorities as an opponent, rather than as a partner. This find-
ing has been corroborated in economic experiments and distrust has aptly been called “the hid-
den cost of control” (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). 
 Policy makers should take into account that any external intervention may have feedbacks 
not predicted by simple standard economic models. Some fairly simple rules can be used to try to 
minimize the negative consequences – see chapter 2 of this thesis. First, policies that are designed 
in a way that reveals distrust towards users will most likely destroy any voluntary compliance that 
may have been present before (Anderson and Lee, 1986; Bowles, 2008; Hatcher et al., 2000; 
Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999) and certainly inhibit additional voluntary compliance. Second, a law 
that is not perceived to be legitimate and fair, is less likely to be obeyed (Frey 1997, Ch.6). A 
good example comes from Denmark, where “fishers feel they are taken hostage by an illegitimate 
management system, and thus feel it is morally correct not to comply” (Raakjær Nielsen and 
Mathiesen, 2003). In South Africa the government tried to reduce illegal fish landings by estab-
lishing formal rights for the local fishermen. But some fishermen had the feeling that the process 
was not fair and expressed their discontent by “protest fishing” (Hauck, 2008). Similarly, eco-
nomic experiments in the laboratory have shown that individuals indeed feel less obliged to 
comply with regulation by an institution that is perceived to be unfair (Kosfeld et al., 2009; van 
Soest and Vyrastekova, 2008) 
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 Stakeholder participation can be an important way to achieve legitimacy (Jentoft et al. 
1998, Hatcher et al. 2000, Dankel 2009). Such a participatory approach may build trust among 
users themselves, but it also contributes to trust between users and central authorities. Economic 
experiments have indeed shown that involving individuals in the process of institutional design 
leads to more efficient outcomes (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992; Vyrastekova and van 
Soest, 2003). However, if individuals fail to reach consensus, stakeholder involvement can be 
counterproductive; the outcome can be less cooperative than if the individuals had never been 
involved in designing the institution (Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2004; Tyran and Feld, 2006). 
These findings from controlled experiments indicate that stakeholder participation can replace 
opposition with motivated stewardship, and increased compliance. But this will only be the case 
if an actual consensus is reached and the institution is designed in a fair way. 
 
7.3 Uncertainty and the biological environment  
Worldwide marine fish stocks are declining (FAO, 2008; Worm et al., 2006; Worm et al., 2009; 
Worm and Myers, 2004) leading to changes in ecosystem structure and functioning. After over-
exploitation of large predatory species, fishermen may switch to target smaller prey species, mak-
ing “fishing down the food web” a predominant threat to overexploited marine systems (Pauly et 
al., 1998; Pauly et al., 2002; Pauly and Palomares, 2005). Habitat loss from trawl (the fishing net 
usually towed behind a fishing vessel) activity and bycatch threatens populations of non-targeted 
species. This may be manifested as a reduction in species richness and ecosystem diversity 
(Armstrong and Falk-Petersen, 2008). 
 Fishing may also be effectively size-selective where larger fish are more likely to get 
caught, leading to age-truncation where younger age classes dominate the population and spawn-
ing stock biomass (Marshall et al., 2006; Ottersen, 2008). Such juvenation and loss of age diversi-
ty may negatively affect recruitment and make stocks less robust or resilient to climate change 
and variability (Hsieh et al., 2006; Marshall et al., 2006; Ottersen et al., 2006). Pertinent questions 
arise. How does fishing and changes in the environment, like climate change, affect inter- and 
intra-species interactions? In turn, how do these impact food-web dynamics and ecosystems? For 
example, how do fisheries change stock vulnerability and resilience? Are there tipping points 
where, beyond a certain threshold, stock collapse is inevitable? And, if the stock collapses, what is 
the potential for recovery? 
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 Fishing can change the basic dynamics of exploited populations. Exploitation, for exam-
ple, can result in larger variability in fish abundance, which may potentially pave the way to sys-
tematic declines in stock levels (Anderson et al., 2008; Stenseth and Rouyer, 2008). A recent study 
that summarized the magnitudes of phenotypic change in fish, ungulates, invertebrates, and 
plants found that harvesting may produce rates of evolution up to 300% larger than what occurs 
naturally (Darimont et al., 2009). In commercial fish populations, changes in life-history traits, 
exemplified by maturation at earlier ages and smaller size, is higher when exposed to strong fish-
ing pressure (Sharpe and Hendry, 2009). Such phenotypic changes may have a genetic compo-
nent driven by the selection pressure caused by intense harvesting (Dieckmann and Heino, 2007; 
Dunlop et al., 2009c; Heino, 1998; Heino et al., 2002a, 2002b; Marshall and McAdam, 2007; 
Olsen et al., 2004; Stenseth and Dunlop, 2009), see also chapter 6 of this thesis. Potential effects 
of such genetic changes include the erosion of genetic and phenotypic diversity (Jørgensen et al., 
2007). Therefore, fisheries-induced evolution is of special concern because genetic changes may 
be difficult to reverse (Conover et al., 2009; Enberg et al., 2009; Law and Grey, 1989). The extent 
to which fisheries-induced evolution occurs and how important it is compared to other factors is 
being debated (Andersen and Brander, 2009a; Browman et al., 2008; Conover and Munch, 2007; 
Hilborn, 2006; Jørgensen et al., 2007). However, addressing the genetic impact in such phenotyp-
ic changes is important if management is to be precautionary. Otherwise negative socio-economic 
and biological consequences from unnoticed fisheries-induced evolution (including coevolutio-
nary effects on other species) could sneak in through the backdoor. 
 The identification and, where possible, the quantification of uncertainty in all the steps 
from data collection to model implementation is crucial to derive reliable projections for deci-
sion-making. In fisheries, the first level where uncertainty enters is in survey data and catch statis-
tics, with cascading effects into models and model choice. Therefore, stock assessment (quantifi-
cation of the number of fish in the sea) is a challenging, but crucial field of research. Models are 
continuously being improved or replaced. For example, survey estimates used in population 
models are not always consistent, and are difficult to reconcile with commercial catch statistics. 
To meet these challenges, as they involve uncertainty in marine science, state-space modeling, a 
statistical modeling framework, has become popular to analyze data for many fish stocks (Ånes et 
al., 2007; Bogaards et al., 2009; Eikeset et al., 2010b; Lindegren et al., 2009; Millar, 2002; Millar 
and Methot, 2002; Swain et al., 2009). 
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 Choosing the level of model complexity is another challenging task: management has of-
ten focused on single-species populations, especially historically. However, it is progressively be-
ing recognized that single-species applications are inadequate for management decision-making 
when they exclude important multi-species feedbacks like predator-prey relationships within an 
ecosystem (Hjermann et al., 2007; Lindegren et al., 2009; Morissette et al., 2009).  
 All of these factors contribute to the overarching principle of biological complexity of 
ecosystems. This principle contributes to the understanding of how fishing can create substantial 
changes in ecosystems, such as an altered structure or function (e.g., lower biodiversity). Some of 
the changes may result in lower yield from the targeted fish; some changes may be hard or im-
possible to reverse even if fishing ceases (Casini et al., 2009; Enberg et al., 2009; Lindegren et al., 
2009). To meet the goals of adaptive management, models need to integrate the natural and so-
cial system as early as possible in order to provide knowledge and develop specific operational 
objectives for the resource.  
 
7.4 Fisheries management 
Many different tools for fisheries management are available and have been applied and analyzed 
over the past decades. It is clear that what works well in one setting may lead to management 
failure in a different context (Brock and Carpenter, 2007; Ostrom et al., 2007). Therefore, a key 
message is that a single best management instrument does not exist (Caddy and Seijo, 2005; 
Dankel et al., 2008; Degnbol et al., 2006; Grafton et al., 2000; Jentoft, 2006; Ostrom, 2008). Suc-
cessful policy is not so much a question of inventing a new and magic strategy, but of adequately 
applying existing instruments to the specific situation at hand. However, this has proven to be 
difficult in the past.  
 
7.4.1 Management responsibility  
An often overlooked question is not only what to manage, but how to manage. For example, a 
regulation on the total allowable catch for a fishery may have very different effects, depending on 
whether it is agreed upon communally or administrated by a central government. A key ingre-
dient of any successful management strategy is to provide the users with the right incentives. We 
will therefore take the question of how management is brought about as our principal characteri-
zation when portraying the management tools below. Afterwards, we will discuss specific man-
agement tools in more detail. 
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7.4.1.1 Centralized management 
The vast majority of industrialized fisheries are managed by a central authority (government) 
which stipulates laws and regulations that are legally binding. If users are caught violating these 
regulations, they face a penalty. This seems to be a straightforward bureaucratic approach, as the 
government by its very nature is equipped with the power to set up, monitor, and enforce a given 
set of rules. The costs of doing so can, however, be extremely high, and there is a real danger that 
users will be alienated. As a result, informal arrangements between the users may be crowded-out 
(i.e., replaced), and so may any willingness to comply with these laws. The “hidden cost of con-
trol” (Falk and Kosfeld 2006) in the form of distrust can be substantial. As a general rule, suc-
cessful central management requires strong enforcement and monitoring. Therefore, even if a 
certain law or regulation can be easily formulated, it can be extremely difficult to implement and 
enforce it in practice. 
 There is also the danger that unintended consequences of economic incentives will sneak 
in through the backdoor. If it is forbidden to land a species that is threatened and the fines for 
doing so are high, the users may throw it overboard when it comes on deck as bycatch. This may 
mask the overall effects on fishing on this particular species as conventional catch data used for 
stock assessments will not reflect bycatch discards.  
7.4.1.2 Co-management 
In contrast to centralized management, co-management relies on a broader sharing of manage-
ment responsibilities between governing systems (i.e., the State), research institutions and stake-
holder groups. In fisheries discourse, co-management is presented as an alternative model which 
is reliant on stakeholder dialogue and participation for cooperative management decisions be-
tween the State and other co-managers. A good review of the various forms of co-management is 
provided in Carlsson and Berkes (2005) and a review of implementation of fisheries co-
management in developing countries is found in Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2007). In the context 
of fisheries, most research regarding co-management identifies legitimacy and stakeholder empo-
werment as important success factors of such a governance regime (Armitage et al., 2009; 
Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2007; Jentoft, 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Jentoft, 2006; Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee, 2009; Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2004; Pinkerton and John, 2008). 
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7.4.1.3 Community-based management 
Community-based management takes co-management model a bit further from the top-down 
model and closer to a bottom-up management paradigm. The idea of community-based man-
agement is that the fishing community itself, separate from the State, decides on a harvesting 
strategy that is sustainable and profitable. This implies that the government deliberately steps 
down and relies on the community to develop management decisions. Actions may be legally 
non-binding, but still not purely voluntary, as they are based on social norms that may be en-
forced by fellow community members (Ostrom et al., 1992). Therefore, rule-compliance may be 
mandatory for members of the community and heavily sanctioned according to rules developed 
locally or at higher levels. This form of community-based management can be powerful, especial-
ly when users have close social ties and share the same norms and values. The government may, 
however, take a supportive role in giving scientific advice, by facilitating community meetings, or 
by encouraging desired behavior, such as promoting the use of nets that minimize bycatch. Many 
examples show that local users are able to agree on management decisions if certain conditions 
are met (Baland and Platteau, 1996; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 
2002). Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis develop theoretical models that shed light on the mechan-
isms that may facilitate – but also threaten – successful community-based management. While 
community-based management aims at upholding a harvesting strategy by social norms of coop-
eration, the actual harvesting strategy may take the form of a regulation of the mesh size (gear 
regulation), the number of days at sea (effort regulation), or of any other variable that defines the 
fishing process. Hence, the way a harvesting strategy is put into practice is not necessarily specific 
to the community-based approach. However, what is specific to community-based management 
is the explicit involvement of users in the process of deriving and implementing rules (Jentoft, 
2000a), for example via structured group consultations. 
 It is worth pointing out that social norms often solve the “social trap” (Class II problem), 
but not necessarily the “temporal trap” (Class I problem). Fishermen may, for instance, take 
turns in getting the best fishing spots (rather than competing for them), but may strongly resist 
joining a cooperative to achieve long-term sustainability (Taylor, 1987). Norms of cooperation 
may even aggravate the Class I problem of overexploitation. This may happen, for example, 
when norms are not aimed at sustainable management, but, instead, at lowering costs of exploita-
tion, e.g. through sharing information about the location of the fishing grounds; see Holm et al. 
(2000). 
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 In spite of this, community governance can be very effective and efficient, in particular 
when the users are able to pool their risks or when cooperative management helps to lower  har-
vesting costs (Swallow, 1997). The literature on this topic includes several key variables that can 
be linked to the self-organizing capacity of a community and the sustainability of common-
property regimes. A good synthesis is given by Ostrom (2009), who identifies a common-
property regime to be successful when: (i) the size of the resource system is moderate, (ii) the re-
source is neither too abundant, nor already exhausted, (iii) the resource system dynamics are pre-
dictable, (iv) the resource unit mobility is low, (v) the number of users is small, (vi) some users act 
as leaders, (vii) users hold common social norms and values, (viii) users have common knowledge 
about the system, (ix) the resource is very important to the users (in terms of livelihood or cultur-
al value), and (x) the users have full autonomy for crafting collective-choice rules. By these stan-
dards, the chances for success of self-organized management for marine ecosystems are mixed 
(McClanahan et al., 2009). Some coastal (typically bay) fisheries can be successfully managed by a 
small community (Agrawal, 2001; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 2002; 
Ostrom et al., 2007; Schlager et al., 1994; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, 1999), but when fish spe-
cies are highly migratory and foreign fishermen are difficult to exclude, the prospects for com-
munity governance are rather bleak. 
 
7.4.2 Management tools 
Fisheries management can rely on a variety of tools (see Figure 7.2 for a graphical and tabular 
exposition of the tools we discuss). Good overviews can be found in Rettig (1995), Kahn (2005, 
Ch.10), and van Kooten and Bulte (2000. pp. 94). We will distinguish between tools that are 
based on a command and control approach, such as fines for catching fish below a certain size 
limit, and tools that are based on financial incentives, such as imposing a tax on landings. Finally, 
we attempt to give an overview of the ongoing debate on tradable permits. These are a special 
class of tools based on financial incentives in that they aim to exploit the efficiency of decentra-
lized competition by creating a market for harvesting rights. 
 Management tools can be described and analyzed along several dimensions: one may ask 
whether a given class of policies aims to avoid the social or natural waste brought about by exces-
sive harvesting (Class I problem), or changes the prevailing “rule of capture” (solve the Class II 
problem, see panel A in Figure 7.2). Alternatively one may ask whether a given instrument is ro-
bust to social and biological complexities, i.e., is it likely that it leads to unintended behavior from 
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the fishermen, or is it likely that this instrument will lead to unintended changes in the resource 
or consequences for the ecosystem (panel B in Figure 7.2)? A management tool that targets the 
Class I problem should limit what is taken out of the water to ensure a sustainable stock for the 
future. This can be done by setting, for example, a total allowable catch (TAC). A different angle 
is taken through input-centered instruments, which essentially control the way fish are taken from 
the ocean. An example would be to manage fishing capacity through controlling days at sea. 
Whether input or output controls perform better depends on many factors (Yamazaki et al., 
2009), not all input controls are equally able to solve Class I or II problems and some of them are 
more likely to lead to unintended consequences than others. We will address this issue in the next 
sections. 
7.4.2.1 Command and control approach 
Let us first take a closer look at the tools that are used to control what is taken out of the water 
(output controls), before turning to controls that regulate the way of harvesting (input controls). 
The prime example and most ubiquitous output-centered instrument is a cap on the total allow-
able catch (TAC). That is, all harvesting of a given fish species is prohibited once the total al-
lowable volume has been landed. While this may effectively protect the resource stock and, in 
principle, solve the Class I problem of overfishing, a TAC does not necessarily lead to an effi-
cient use of the resource (Class II problem). Quite to the contrary, each fisherman has an incen-
tive to catch as much as possible before the TAC is filled and the fishery is closed for the rest of 
the season, leading to the infamous “race to fish” (Grafton et al., 2006). In the extreme case, this 
kind of derby fishery can lead to the complete dissipation of profits as price and quality of the 
landed fish deteriorate while harvesting costs are increasing (Homans and Wilen, 1997). Moreo-
ver, a significantly shortened season often places serious strain on fishermen, gear, and environ-
ment. One of the most infamous examples is probably the North Pacific halibut fishery, in the 
1980’s, when the year’s catch was taken in three to five days after opening of the season, regard-
less of weather conditions (Homans and Wilen, 2005). 
An additional problem with how TACs have been used is that they target individual species with-
out consistent consideration of other species. Once the quota for one species is fulfilled, fisher-
men may shift to another one. The extreme case occurs when fishermen are “fishing down the 
marine food-web” (Pauly et al. 1998, Pauly et al. 2002, Pauly and Palomares 2005). 
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Figure 7.2. A classification of management tools and their characteristics. Panel A: Management tools and 
their capacity to solve Class I (excess fishing mortality) and Class II (overcapacity) problems. Panel B: 
Management tools and their general advantages, disadvantages, and challenges regarding biological and so-
cial complexity. 
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It is not desirable to set the TAC every year on an ad hoc basis, because this leads to substantial 
economic uncertainty for the fishermen. It also requires time-consuming negotiations between 
countries (for shared stocks), or within any individual State’s governing system, which can be an 
obstacle when the stock has declined and a collapse needs to be prevented by prompt emergency 
actions. Therefore it is helpful for managers to have an adaptive management plan for how 
stocks should be exploited. One increasingly popular management tool with the mission of a sus-
tainable exploitation pattern is the implementation of harvest control rules (HCRs). In this ap-
proach, the TAC is established through specific input variables, especially the size of the spawn-
ing stock biomass. An HCR is a feedback control rule that links a harvest scenario and a stock 
size (Arnason et al., 2004; Sandal and Steinshamn, 1997), see also chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
An HCR framework can be built on the precautionary principle by including reference points 
that are quantified and set to prevent overexploitation and secure future stock recruitment by en-
suring spawning stock biomass, or other selected indicators, to be above a defined precautionary 
limit (Beddington et al., 2007). However, most HCRs in practice today retain the inadequacies of 
single-species approaches, with little, if any consideration of unintended consequences to other 
species and the ecosystem. 
 Although often overlooked in the literature, it is important to acknowledge that the "race 
to fish" is also an influential factor in determining a fished stock’s age composition (Turvey, 
1964; Wilson, 1982). Given that a fisherman deems that his own action has little influence on the 
overall outcome, he will have no incentive to avoid targeting young fish; he cannot be assured 
that he will have the benefit of gains from the investment of leaving a fish in the ocean so that it 
can grow, reproduce and be harvested at a later time. Many fisheries are indeed managed with 
minimum size limits that prohibit harvesting fish that are too young or too small. However, 
these size limits are almost always administered on an ad hoc basis and rarely take biological or 
economic criteria into account (Froese et al., 2008). Simulations from the Barents Sea cod fishery 
indicate that in the long run profits could be more than doubled, simply by changing the mesh 
size (Diekert et al., 2010a). 
 Another output-centered management approach that has sparked considerable interest is 
the use of marine reserves. The aim is to provide a spatial or temporal refuge to particularly 
vulnerable or valuable life stages of a population. Examples could be a no-take zone around a 
highly productive and diverse coral reef, or a seasonal closure of the fishery during spawning. 
Sumaila et al. (2007) found that closing 20% of the high seas to fishing may have a relatively small 
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decrease in the global reported marine fisheries catch (1.8%), while the gain from reserves would 
be maintenance of marine diversity and benefits for current and future generations. In principle, 
marine reserves can be very effective in preserving biodiversity (Lubchenco et al., 2003; Sumaila 
and Alder, 2001), particularly in warm water ecosystems (shallow water coral reefs) compared to 
temperate and cold open water systems (Kaiser, 2005). In spite of this, they can be quite ineffi-
cient, because adaptive behavior of fishermen harvesting outside the reserve may over-ride the 
gains from protection (Hannesson, 1998; Sanchirico and Wilen, 1999). Alternatively, fish may 
migrate from densely populated, protected areas to less densely populated areas where they are 
harvested inefficiently. A large literature on marine reserves exists with considerable disagreement 
on the effectiveness of these instruments; for overviews of this approach see Sanchirico et al. 
(2006) and Kaiser (2005). 
 One has to take into account that users may have the incentive to undermine the estab-
lishment of a marine reserve that has the purpose of protecting an endangered species. Marine 
reserves therefore perform particularly poorly if they are not effectively controlled and clash with 
existing community customs. While it is important to analyze the ideal design of marine reserves, 
it is even more important to build community support for them (Kareiva, 2006). Hence, one may 
conclude that marine reserves work best embedded in successful community based management 
or co-management. It is pertinent to note that identifying and quantifying long-term conse-
quences of an extinction of a species to an ecosystem and its related economic consequences is 
extremely difficult (Van Kooten and Bulte 2000, Ch.8 and 9). 
 In general, the informational needs of output-centered instruments are demanding. The 
sustainability of a stock can only be ensured when its current size is accurately known, the total 
harvest can only be limited when the landings can be controlled, the fishing mortality can only be 
limited when it is known which fish are targeted by the fishing gear, and special components of 
the stock can only be protected when their attributes are known. The advantage of output-
centered management tools is of course that they directly target the defining characteristics of the 
system (i.e. how many and which fish to harvest, how many and which fish to leave in the ocean). 
 In contrast, input-centered instruments essentially control what is used to take fish out of 
the ocean. Typical aspects of fishing that are managed by this class of instruments are days-at-
sea, vessel length/width/tonnage, and gear restrictions. Although the number of active 
boats is just another dimension of inputs from the perspective of fish, it has the implication of 
turning regulated open access into regulated limited entry. “Closing the commons” (Hersoug, 
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2005) may have considerable social side effects on employment, settlement and the cultural land-
scape in general. Input regulations almost invariably lead to “effort creep” where fishermen subs-
titute uncontrolled for controlled input. In the words of Wilen (1979, p. 855–56) “…we cannot 
necessarily simply limit ‘‘effort’’ (a multidimensional notion) by, say, limiting tonnage or vessel 
numbers, or numbers of fishermen. With flexibility fishermen have the option to, and may, in 
fact, simply readjust other factors in their control to expand effort and subvert any imposed re-
strictions.” This is also referred to as “capital stuffing” (Clark 2006), which is indeed a widespread 
empirical observation. On the other hand, as Crutchfield (1979, p. 746) notes: “The vessel is, af-
ter all, only a platform that carries harvesting equipment. There are obvious limitations on the 
extent to which additional capital investment … can increase catching power if key proxies for 
increased fishing power such as tonnage and length are constrained.” In spite of these limitations 
and drawbacks, input controls are often the easiest way to set an upper bound on what actually 
can be harvested. The informational needs for input-centered management are only moderate 
and this class of regulations provides flexible tools that can be adjusted to local circumstances. 
This makes them often the most practical management tools, especially in complex multi-species 
fisheries where the necessary information on biology and fleet structure is difficult to obtain. For 
example, the optimal harvest levels in a tropical multi-species fishery are often immensely hard to 
define and even harder to monitor (due to bounds on biological knowledge, technical ability, and 
institutional capacity). In contrast, a fisherman’s mesh size and length of his boat is fairly easy to 
observe. At the same time, however, these instruments have only an indirect impact on the actual 
resource stock. They are therefore not able to directly protect the resource stock (Class I prob-
lem), and they (by themselves) also do not change the perverse incentive structure (Class II prob-
lem).  
  
7.4.2.2 Tools based on financial incentives 
Taxes increase the cost of catching a fish and essentially affect the point where taking out anoth-
er fish from the sea is no longer worthwhile. Managing a fishery via taxes works therefore only 
indirectly, as it requires extensive information about the economic components of the system. 
These extensive informational requirements are definitely a disadvantage (Arnason, 1990). Yet if 
there is sparse information about the biological components of the system, Weitzman (2002) has 
argued that managing by prices (i.e., taxes) may actually be preferable to managing by quantities 
(i.e. quotas). It seems counterintuitive to use a tax instead of, for example, a TAC if the state of 
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the stock is unknown. However, this result is based on the assumption that taxes can dampen 
harvesting activity effectively by making it more expensive. Albeit, there is – to the best of our 
knowledge – not one fishery which is managed by taxes as a specific instrument to solve Class I 
and Class II problems. The reason seems that taxes are often deemed to be politically infeasible 
(Brown, 2000; Johnson and Libecap, 1982; Scott, 1979). In the words of Munro and Scott (1985, 
p.662): “Fishermen are not noted for their reticence in using any and all political power at their 
command”. 
 Another class of tools that draw on financial incentives are buy-back programs. Calls 
for measures to reduce overcapacity are often heard in relation to the observation that harvesting 
capacity in global industrial fisheries grew at a rate eight times greater than the rate of growth of 
landings over the two decades 1970-1990 (Greboval and Munro, 1999). Buy-back programs en-
sure that boat owners are paid to take their boat permanently out of the fishery. Although these 
programs may be favored by the industry, their potential to perform in practice is limited, to say 
the least (Holland et al., 1999). First of all, it will most likely be the oldest and least efficient ves-
sels that will be decommissioned initially. Therefore, efficiency is likely to be enhanced (Class II), 
but effects on overexploitation will only be marginal (Class I). Second, owners will not withdraw 
unless sufficiently compensated, and in a limited entry fishery this implies granting boat-owners 
payments far above original vessel costs (Clark 2006). Both these arguments hint that an effective 
reduction of fishing capacity via buy-back is likely to be very expensive. But to make matters 
worse, such a program could actually lead to extremes in capacity build-up if it is anticipated by 
the fishermen (Clark et al., 2005). And finally, buy-back programs may be next to useless in a 
global perspective if vessels that are taken out of one fishery are simply sold to be used in another 
fishery, touching on the “flags of convenience” phenomenon that is known to support illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing. 
 Finally, a fairly recent market-based approach is eco-labeling. Based on the widely suc-
cessful introduction of “dolphin free” labels that signaled the use of tuna catching gear that 
avoided mammal bycatch (Teisl et al., 2002), the goal is to improve the harvesting pattern by 
changing the structure of the demand side. Non-governmental organizations such as the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) award their labels to fisheries that fulfill an in-depth set of criteria for 
sustainable fishing. However, to be successful, this approach necessitates a substantive product 
demand (Gardiner and Viswanathan, 2004); when only 1-2% of the consumers are receptive to 
such a label, its impact will most likely remain negligible. Moreover, it is prone to the prolifera-
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tion of self-serving labels that are issued by the industry itself after adhering to significantly lower 
standards (Jacquet and Pauly, 2007). Finally, if the label is not tied to the specific use of harvest-
ing techniques, the label might be perceived by fishermen as a price premium, which could lead 
to increased effort (Gudmundsson and Wessells, 2000). Hence, eco-labels will not be very effec-
tive if not embedded in a broader management plan. Nevertheless, they may have a complemen-
tary character, not the least of which would be raising awareness about the issue of sustainable 
fisheries. 
7.4.2.3 Tradable permits 
Tradable permits are a special case of market instruments. Individuals are endowed with harvest-
ing rights, such as a catch quota, which they own as property. These permits can be sold or 
bought from other holders. The existence of a market for harvesting rights is appealing for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, most people are very sensitive to financial incentives, making market 
instruments very effective. Secondly, in the absence of market failures, any market will allocate 
resources most efficiently without any central intervention and informational requirements. The 
central idea is that the externality at the root of the “Tragedy of the Commons” should be over-
come by giving clear and well defined property rights to those that harvest (Grafton et al., 2006; 
Hannesson, 2004). Establishing a market for these rights would then effectively separate the indi-
vidual harvesting decision from the development of the fish stock (Arnason 1990). However, 
whether tradable permits can in fact achieve their promise is actively debated. In the remaining 
part of the section we will give an overview of the main arguments assessing whether individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) will eradicate overcapacity and the low profits obtained in the fishing 
sector (Class II problem), and at the same time, decrease the pressure on overexploited fish stock 
(Class I problem). 
 While the notion of “clear” or “well defined” property rights sounds good in theory, the 
practice is often much messier, making careful analysis necessary (Grafton, 2000; Wilson, 1982). 
In fact, property rights have several relevant dimensions, as pointed out by Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992). First, one may have the rights to enter a certain physical space, and extract resources. 
Second, one may hold the right to make management decisions, such as deciding to catch only 
fish above a certain size. Third, one may be able to exercise the right to enforce property rights 
by excluding others. Fourth, one may be able to transfer these property rights to a third party. 
Traditionally, economists favor an approach that ensures all of these rights, because this will max-
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imize economic rents. The first three points make sure that the holder of the rights maximizes 
long-term benefits, while the last point ensures that the most efficient user will end up holding 
the rights. It is actually very difficult to come up with a policy tool that fulfils these criteria, since 
a necessary condition is that users take all consequences of harvesting into account so that the 
price for which one permit is traded in the market reflects the full value of the resource. 
 To this end, it has been proposed that fishermen be provided with a right to manage their 
own part of the stock, bearing the full consequences of their own exploitation decision. This idea 
– under the names "population stewardship right" (Gavaris, 1996), "transferable dynamic 
stock rights" (Townsend, 1995), or "virtual population units" (Lee and Gates, 2007) – is in-
deed very appealing. However, as each fisherman would have to keep track of his own virtual 
stock, and the impact of his harvesting would have to attribute to the real overall stock develop-
ment and recruitment, such a management tool is only feasible when there is full knowledge of 
the social and biological complexities. It is therefore unlikely this idea will become an available 
workhorse for managers reasonably soon. 
 A much simpler and already widely used management tool is the use of individual trans-
ferable quotas (ITQs) or catch shares. These quotas give the exclusive right to harvest a certain 
amount of fish, but there is a wide variation in the actual implementation of this idea. In some 
fisheries, quotas are allocated to individuals by means of an annual auction. In others, the quota is 
tied to the fishing vessel, but the vessel may be bought or sold. Sometimes these quotas are is-
sued in absolute values, but in most cases they are issued as a fraction of the total allowable catch. 
 Empirically, the track record of overcoming the race to fish by ITQs is indeed impressive 
(Grafton et al., 2006). For example, after ITQs were introduced in the North Pacific halibut fi-
shery, the short season was lengthened to the whole year, with the effect that fresh fish was avail-
able for longer periods which resulted in considerable beneficial side effects (including much sa-
fer working conditions for the fishermen) in addition to more cost-effective harvesting (Homans 
and Wilen 2005). Pinkerton and Edwards (2009), however, questioned the persistence of efficien-
cy gains, mostly due to asymmetric information, imperfect capital markets and other market dis-
tortions. 
 Sometimes the fear is expressed that transferable quotas will end up in the hands of a few 
highly industrialized fishers and small, traditional boats will be driven out of the market. This is 
indeed likely to happen and it is important to understand that this is not a negative side-effect of 
an ITQ, but the whole point of a transferable quota. Economic theory predicts that ITQs will 
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end up in the hands of the most efficient users and overcapacity will be reduced. In general, effi-
ciency gains from ITQs will be higher compared to non-transferable quotas if there is more hete-
rogeneity among fishing techniques and boats. But this can cause unintended consequences since 
the most economically efficient user may be the one whose harvesting efforts are most detrimen-
tal to the environment; see chapter 5. 
 Moreover, the reallocation of fishing activity may create devastating effects on fishing 
communities and considerable political tensions (Helgason and Pálsson, 1998; Pinkerton, 2009). 
If society attaches cultural value to community life and small-scale family owned fishing boats, 
the welfare losses could, in principle, be higher than any gains in efficiency. Another source of 
political tension relates to the duration of the quota. If the right to harvest is perpetual, the ques-
tion of who exactly is the beneficiary becomes very important (Jentoft, 2006). Selling quotas 
through auctions seems efficient and fair, but resistance from established fishermen can be ex-
pected to be very high. ITQs that are given for free to incumbent, i.e. established fisherman will 
most likely be welcomed by the recipients. But it seems unfair to transfer perpetually to a small 
number of people, wealth that, in principle, belongs to the whole society (Bromley, 2009). Divid-
ing the pie today can also be unfair to future generations. Giving the quotas away for free may 
create additional perverse incentives, especially if it is based on current capacity, an often heard 
suggestion. In anticipation of an ITQ system, fishermen may be willing to incur losses to increase 
their capacity now, given that they may be rewarded with a valuable quota. In Iceland, anticipated 
free ITQs based on catch history may have led to increased fishing in the period before the quo-
tas were actually distributed (Haraldsson, 2008). This undermines not only progress toward solv-
ing the Class II problem but also aggravates the Class I problem. 
 How do ITQs, in general, fare with respect to solving the Class I problem? Evidence 
seems to indicate that establishing ITQs indeed positively affects the long-term status of a stock 
(Grafton et al., 2006). Statistical analyses of 11000 fisheries have indicated that the establishment 
of catch shares has reduced the probability of stock collapse (Costello et al., 2008; Heal and 
Schlenker, 2008). It is, however, notoriously difficult to disentangle institutional and economic 
reactions and performance. It is not unlikely that a general awareness among stakeholders has led 
to a management change (establishing ITQs) and the reduced stock collapse is the direct result of 
the same awareness rather than the management change. 
 Also, the overall effect of ITQs on marine ecosystems is not unequivocal (Branch, 2009). 
This may be due to a number of caveats: first, catch shares will not achieve efficiency when there 
Unintended consequences sneak in through the backdoor ? 7 
185
are externalities (e.g.. congestion of fishing spots) in the production process (Boyce 1992) or if 
the resource is of heterogonous quality (Costello and Deacon, 2007). Second, an incomplete cov-
erage in terms of the principal target species may lead to a substitution of uncontrolled species 
for controlled ones (Grafton and McIlgorm 2009). Also, the related bycatch and discarding prob-
lem (Herrera, 2005) may be substantial. 
 On a more profound level, the allocation of catch shares alone could, of course, only 
overcome the problem of overfishing if, and only if, the TAC is set correctly. Someone who 
holds the right to harvest a fixed amount of fish, or a fixed fraction of a TAC simply has no in-
centive to withdraw from that right. Sometimes the hope is expressed that ITQs will induce an 
expanded sense of stewardship on the part of the users (Grafton et al. 2006, Costello et al. 2008). 
The argument here is that an ITQ is a secure asset (like a share of a company) and if the fishery 
collapses, the quota would be worthless. Therefore, ITQ owners will start caring about the state 
of the stock (their asset) and jointly agree on a lower quota. This view is probably overoptimistic, 
because the failure to reach consensus on what would be best for everyone (and especially, if the 
well-being of the ecosystem is a consideration) is exactly why most fisheries pose a social dilem-
ma and are, hence, in crisis. 
 From a theoretical perspective, the fact that ITQs may reduce the number of users, be-
cause less efficient users leave the industry, may help crowding-in stewardship motives. It is likely 
that a smaller number of users will find it easier to reach consensus on reducing exploitation. But, 
as established in the previous section and chapter 2, material incentives often crowd-out voluntary 
stewardship motives. Thus, it is essentially an empirical question of whether or not the lower 
number of users outweighs this crowding-out effect. ITQs may be especially detrimental because 
they give fishermen an unambiguous enforceable right to harvest a certain amount of fish. One 
may even argue that buying “rights to destroy nature” are akin to medieval indulgences (Robert, 
1994) and therefore quite the opposite of progress toward stewardship based on social motiva-
tion. 
 Summing up, it is clear that catch shares form an interesting group of management tools: 
they require regulatory activity in setting the overall harvesting limit. Organizing and distributing 
the individual rights occurs at a central level, while the trading and changing of incentive structure 
happens at the individual level. However, the natural conditions that allow for ITQ management 
(high level of predictability) seem to be fulfilled only in a narrow set of circumstances in marine 
fisheries. Given that evidence to support the contention that ITQs do indeed induce stewardship 
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motives is sparse, it seems wise to not take any irreversible steps. This links particularly back to 
the question of “how” a specific fishery is managed; even if the natural pre-conditions for suc-
cessful ITQ management are present, it is important not to destroy effective informal arrange-
ments. In general, establishing ITQs will not be cheap, as any catch share management implies 
considerable management costs. At times these may be prohibitively high (Grafton and McIl-
gorm 2009). Moreover, as an efficient catch share system is expected to generate considerable 
profits, the distribution of catch shares may cause considerable political tensions (Hannesson 
2004, Clark 2006). Last, but not least, it is clear that catch shares will be no global solution: 
roughly 50% of the world’s value from fisheries is taken from waters where either no single 
country has sufficient control to exclude other countries or where the country in question does 
not have the ability to institutionalize such a management scheme (Diekert et al., 2010b). 
 
7.5 Policy recommendations for four stylized examples 
Overfishing cannot be stopped with simple technical fixes (Degnbol et al. 2006). Neither Class I 
problems (the social and natural waste stemming from overstraining the replenishing potential of 
the resource), nor Class II problems (the social and natural waste which is the result of a perverse 
incentive structure brought about by the fact that fish can be turned into money only by the first 
person who catches it) will be solved by one instrument (see Figure 7.2). Solving both simulta-
neously is even more complicated, if possible at all with current options. Remedies for overex-
ploitation require first, and foremost, agreement on what a given ecosystem is capable of deliver-
ing, thus the need for an explicit management objective (Dankel et al. 2008). This objective and 
the tools intended for its attainment will only be perceived as legitimate and fair when all stake-
holders have the possibility to influence the decision process. In particular, external “incentives 
that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act 
altruistically or in other public-spirited ways” (Bowles 2008). However, not only the social subsys-
tem, but also the resource subsystem is of fundamental complexity. To achieve true ecosystem-
based management the larger context within which these subsystems occur must be taken into 
account. Not only direct human-induced changes from resource use, but also natural changes to 
the resource’s environment and its qualitative properties will have a profound impact on the re-
source dynamics and its variability. 
 The actual success of a given set of policies is thoroughly contingent on the specific cir-
cumstances (Sen, 2009). Nevertheless, it is possible to broadly categorize different classes of bio-
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logical and social settings that result in particular combinations of informational needs and trans-
action costs, and ultimately lead to different sets of policies that are recommendable. 
 The first example is a hypothetical small-scale coastal fishery where fishermen know each 
other and have social ties on several levels outside of their professional activity (e.g. religious or 
community organizations, etc.). Fishing is a way of life and is done mostly by traditional means. 
The fishery mainly targets an autonomous stock which is not systematically affected by factors 
outside the fishery. Such a fishery would lend itself to informal management as many communal 
ties already are firmly established and little formal interaction would be needed to secure sustain-
able fishing. Indeed, outside intervention in a top-down manner (e.g. in form of official govern-
ment controls) could be viewed as an illegitimate intervention and could lead to a crowding-out 
of stewardship incentives. However, applied measures that are easily observed and enforced by 
the community itself, such as gear restrictions or minimum market sizes, could signal best prac-
tice and help to maintain a cooperative equilibrium. 
 The second hypothetical example is a coastal fishery where fishermen may know each 
other but closer ties are confined to the professional level. Fishing is a way to make money and is 
pursued in a technologically advanced and industrial manner. The fishery is largely an autonom-
ous stock which is not systematically affected by factors outside the fishery. Here, community 
management would be less effective, and such an industrialized fishery would lend itself better to 
market-based approaches such as ITQs. In fact, the technical efficacy of the fleet might make it 
necessary to externally control the amount of harvest in order to curb the Class I problem. None-
theless it would still be instrumental to include fishermen and other stakeholders in management 
decision, as this would significantly enhance the legitimacy of the overall TAC and other regula-
tions. The latter would complement the ITQ system in order to minimize negative externalities. 
 The third example would also be a coastal fishery where fishermen may know each other 
and ties are again confined to the professional level. As in the previous example, fishing is a way 
to make money and is pursued in a technologically advanced and industrial manner. However, 
the fishery consists of many different fish species that can replace each other in the market but 
that are complementary in the water, constituting a complex ecosystem. In contrast to the second 
example, ITQs will be very costly in such a setting as they would have to involve most or all tar-
get species (to avoid substitution to uncontrolled species). To cope with the Class I problem, 
some form of limits on the volume of landing or on the amount of employed effort would still be 
needed. In addition, a temporal or spatial restriction on harvesting would be needed to protect 
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the most vulnerable or productive parts of the system. Given the complexity of the resource(s), 
there would be a strong need for in-depth biological research. Again, stakeholder involvement in 
all stages of management and research would be crucial in order to enhance understanding and a 
sense of “ownership”, thereby stimulating joint responsibility for the fishery. 
 The fourth example is a high-seas fishery, where individual fishermen do not know each 
other and fishing is highly industrialized and pursued internationally at a corporate level. The fi-
shery consists of mainly one species, which is, however, highly migratory. Direct stakeholder par-
ticipation will be very difficult in such a setting due to the distance separating them. At the same 
time, top-down management will be nearly impossible as there is no single central enforcing 
agency for the high-seas. On the other hand, international agreements on the most proximate and 
easily observable measures (such as gear restrictions) might be possible and protect the sustaina-
bility of the fishery (albeit at an inefficient level). Additionally, pressure from consumers (e.g. me-
diated via eco-labeling) might provide further incentives to fishermen to harvest in a sound man-
ner. 
 In conclusion, sustainable fisheries management necessitates carefully identifying and dis-
entangling all levels of biological and social complexity (Ostrom 2009). Management should be 
designed to avoid hidden assumptions and overlooked issues that result in unintended ramifica-
tions that sneak in through the backdoor. Moreover, it is crucial that the specific tools that are 
applied remain flexible and adaptable. It is, therefore, also very important to consider not only 
what is managed, but also how it is managed. It is mandatory that we account of how regulation 
is perceived and how it affects existing behavior based on incentives, social norms or customs. 
The ideal would be a governance system where the objectives and tools are the result of a demo-
cratic involvement of all stakeholders. Yet, the fundamental challenge would be first, to set up 
the institutions necessary to keep such a system in place, and second, to make such a system ro-
bust to slow or sudden changes in the socio-economic (e.g. dominance by one interest group) or 
natural environment (e.g. climatic change). 
 It remains paramount to recognize that we cannot wait for all uncertainties to resolve be-
fore action is taken. Rather, we need to apply the appropriate available measures, by taking the 
salient biological features into account, bringing stakeholders on board, and then adapt manage-
ment as the future unfolds. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This research was motivated by three observations. First, worldwide several renewable natural 
resources, as for example fish stocks, grazing lands or forests are severely depleted, while some 
are in relatively good shape. Second, some of these resources are conserved because of active gov-
ernment intervention, some are conserved in absence of any government intervention, while other 
resources are depleted in spite of active government intervention. Third, sometimes government-
intervention can be counter-effective and speeding-up, rather than slowing down resource degra-
dation (Cárdenas et al., 2000; Frey et al., 1996; Gintis et al., 2005; Vollan, 2008). The explanation 
for this ambiguity is that most decisions by resource users do not only depend on formal institu-
tions (such as governmental law and the corresponding fines), but also on informal institutions 
(such as social norms or moral preferences). The main message of this thesis is that acknowledg-
ing complexity in resource management is important. This holds for social complexity (chapters 
2-5), but also biological complexity (chapter 6), or both (chapter 7). Yet, most economic models 
rely on simple assumptions. For example, most economic models describe human behavior with 
the stylized avatar of the homo economicus. These models assume that each individual has all 
available information that is necessary to make an optimal decision and consequently maximizes 
her expected utility. Furthermore, it is assumed that the collective action of many individuals will 
lead to a stable situation – a steady state – that can be identified. Additionally, it is usually as-
sumed that individuals are solely motivated by financial motives. Empirical evidence regularly 
shows that these assumptions are not met in practice; see for instance Henrich et al. (2001).  
This discussion analyzes how problematic these shortcomings are and how they can be 
remedied. Moreover, these insights will be linked to the models used in this thesis. First, it will be 
discussed whether human behavior can be accurately described by optimization models. Second, 
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it is addressed whether the objective function of homo economicus is defined too narrowly – as 
it includes only self-regarding motives.29
 
 In the third sub-section, several modeling choices that 
were made in this thesis are critically reflected. Furthermore, it is discussed why fisheries eco-
nomics had so little impact on actual management practices in the real world. The discussion 
ends with some concluding remarks. 
8.2 Model techniques and the problems with utility maximization  
The critic that utility maximization is not always well suited to describe human behavior goes 
back at least to Herbert Simon (1956).30
 Often overlooked is the fact that even if humans were able to maximize utility, this would 
not necessarily converge to a unique equilibrium at the group level (Elster, 2009; Green and 
Shapiro, 1996).
 It is well known that individuals often do not have the 
capacities to make optimal choices, for example because of cognitive, informational, or time con-
straints. If one wants to take these ideas into consideration, it is appropriate to use a model that 
takes learning processes into account. Evolutionary game theory is a framework that can be used 
to model a learning process. The replicator equation (presented in chapter 1) assumes that the 
more successful strategy grows over time and can therefore represent a process of learning, imita-
tion, trial-and error, but also just a mental evaluation of different strategies of agents unaware of 
each other. Not used in this thesis is the framework of Bayesian updating, which is commonly 
used for modeling learning processes, see for example Charness and Levin (2005) and Brekke et 
al. (2009). 
31
 Finally, rational actor models always maximize utility in a static environment. In reality, 
the environment is not constant but changes in response to actions by all individuals. Ecosystem 
changes and government regulations have both in common that they typically i) respond slowly 
(or delayed) and ii) respond to the actions of all agents, while individual actions have a negligible 
impact. In these cases, rational actor models are not very useful, as they cannot capture frequen-
cy-dependence, where the payoff of one individual depends on the actions of all other agents – 
 This is a valid concern, but it can be remedied fairly easily. After all, the notion 
of equilibrium implies that there must be a dynamic process, which can in principle be analyzed 
and understood.  
29 Sometimes the additional assumption is imposed that individuals are only motivated by financial incentives.
30 An example in this thesis with utility maximization  is equation 3.7. 
31 This was for example assumed in equations 3.11 and 4.32. 
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and both the payoff and frequency of strategies endogenously coevolve. In such a case it is more 
appropriate to use a modeling framework that can analyze feedbacks between individual behavior 
and the environment affecting all individuals as a coevolutionary process. Adaptive dynamics  
used in chapter 4 of this thesis is such a framework. In adaptive dynamics, decisions are optimal, 
but the environment is not static, but changing in response to individual actions. This implies that 
individuals exhibit optimizing behavior, but due to repercussions from the environment, optimal 
actions are not constant but change endogenously.  
 The evolutionary models described above are all analytically tractable. In addition, agent-
based models (ABMs)32
 A second example where analytical work and individual-based simulations complement 
each other is given in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. While chapter 5 determines an analytical 
harvest control rule that provides valuable insights about the relative importance of the demand 
effect and the fleet structure, the biological model in that chapter is very simple. With these in-
sights from chapter 5, we have developed a highly complex bio-economic model in chapter 6 that 
relied on an individual-based biological model and lacked analytical rigor to focus on very com-
plex biological questions.  
 are welcome alternatives because they allow for almost endless complexi-
ty and robustness checks. Since ABMs are not based on equations, but on rules, they are not ana-
lytically tractable. The research pursued in this thesis suggests that ABMs and equation-based 
models are highly complementary. Analytical work gives valuable insights to understand the basic 
properties of a system, while sensitivity, stability, robustness, and realistic extensions can be bet-
ter analyzed with an ABM. It is therefore the combination of the two that is especially appealing, 
as used in chapter 4. The analytical work in this chapter raised some typical questions: how im-
portant are the functional forms that were used? What happens if individuals cannot monitor 
each other perfectly? How sensitive are the results if individuals make mistakes? All of these 
questions could be answered by pointing at the agent-based simulations. Likewise, skepticism to-
wards the results coming out of the ABM due to its “black box” character and its complexity va-
nished, since the analytical work told us what drives the results.  
 Therefore, the combination of equation-based models and individual-based models 
serves a dual purpose. First, the agent-based models validate the robustness and stability of the 
analytical work. Second, the analytical work helps explaining what drives the results obtained 
from an ABM. Therefore, equation-based models with their analytical rigor, and ABMs with their 
32 also referred to as individual-based models (IBMs) 
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bells and whistles cover each other’s back and help analyzing complex problems that have high 
real-world relevance.  
 
8.3 (Lacking) moral motivation in economic models  
Most economic models assume that humans only care about themselves – referred to as homo 
economicus. This thesis has argued several times that this is not a very good description of hu-
man behavior, because the objectives of most individuals are much broader. These other objec-
tives, such as pro-social considerations are not just random deviations from homo economicus, 
but they tend to be very consistent over time and consistent between other individuals – even 
though they may differ between individuals from a different cultural background (Boyd and 
Richerson, 2005; Gintis et al., 2005; Henrich and Henrich, 2007). One could modify the objective 
function to facilitate a closer match with behavior of socially responsible citizens, which Nyborg 
(2000) aptly called homo politicus. In a similar vein, one could include pro-social considerations, 
such as equity preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). These suggestions do not question the 
rational actor model as such, but only their restrictive objective function – which could be 
changed easily. For example, in chapter 4, our model included a utility component that was af-
fected by approval or disapproval of other agents. It is of course surprising that empirical evi-
dence strongly suggests that humans are often motivated by non-financial incentives and financial 
incentives can even undermine motivation – as discussed extensively in chapter 2 – while most 
economic models assume that individuals are only motivated by financial incentives. For non-
economists it is often hard to grasp that empirical evidence is not necessary to justify using mod-
els of homo economicus – while empirical evidence is sometimes considered to be insufficient to 
justify a deviation from homo economicus. Therefore, it is sometimes argued that these modeling 
choices are made for ideological reasons, and economists have a hidden agenda of promoting the 
role model of self-interested behavior (Foley, 2004). Be that as it may, two reasons are usually 
mentioned why we should continue using models of homo economicus. First, even if it is true 
that humans have other-regarding and non-financial preferences, we know very little about how 
these preferences are shaped. Since we know so little about them, preferences become a tautolo-
gy: agents act in a certain way because they prefer to do so. Second, the average person is proba-
bly equipped with a moral compass, but the models we are using are not meant to describe aver-
age behavior. Instead, we are using them for advising policy makers. These policies should be 
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designed for people who are self-interested, even if they do not represent the majority of our 
population. Otherwise these individuals would take advantage of the others.  
 The first point has been addressed by Stigler and Becker (1977), according to whom 
economists should just assume preferences to be stable, rather than spending effort on analyzing 
preferences with their “endless degrees of freedom. Further, Stigler and Becker (1977, p.89) argue 
that  
This argument may be criticized for the following reason. If a process is perfectly understood, 
using a model is not necessary. But if a process is not fully understood, and we only have a vague 
idea – or several hypotheses – that can explain the process, then models are really useful. There-
fore, suggesting to model something that we know (how do changes in prices affect behavior), 
rather than attempt to model what we do not know (how do preferences affect behavior), is the 
exact opposite of what scientific work requires. However, in moving forward one must also be 
careful and compare, test, and validate different models and their assumptions. This is not always 
easy or possible, especially if the models are very theoretical, such as in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis. In that case, it is desirable to build models that are very flexible and allow for example for 
pro-social and anti-social punishment (as in chapter 4). Even if Stigler and Becker do not have a 
convincing argument, the idea that preferences are stable over time is worth thinking about. Ad-
mittedly, empirical evidence points into a different direction. Voors et al. (2010), for example, 
have shown that individuals that have been exposed to conflicts, exhibit more altruistic, but also 
more risky behavior. This does not necessarily imply a preference change, as decisions may be 
context-dependent. This point has been discussed in chapter 2; see for the situation where it is 
not clear whether a preference or the perceived context has changed Figure 2.2. In biology, or-
ganisms frequently make phenotypic expressions, such as growth, dependent on cues from the 
environment. Intuitively, it seems that humans with more cognitive capacities make their beha-
vior even more contingent on the environmental context. To my knowledge, no study has so far 
disentangled preference changes from context-dependency.  
[w]e have partly translated ‘unstable tastes’ into variables in the household production functions for commodi-
ties. The great advantage, however, of relying only on changes in the arguments entering household production 
functions is that all changes in behavior are explained by changes in prices and incomes, precisely the variables 
that organize and give power to economic analysis.  
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 The second point, stating that models of homo economicus are useful because we need 
to design policies for selfish individuals rather than for committed citizens (homo politicus) 
seems to be a valid justification. Since we cannot rely on moral virtues and social norms only, of-
ten laws are required to prevent selfish individuals to take advantage of other members of society. 
Designing policies in a way to constrain homo economicus in her activities is crucial and should 
always be an essential part of economic policy analysis. Having said that, the costs of doing so 
may be very high. The nature of this dilemma is reflected in Horace’s question “quid leges sine 
moribus vanae proficiunt?” – what good are laws when there are no morals? Crafting laws that 
are tailor-made for homo economicus, while the far majority of the population consists of home 
politicus can be problematic, or at least inconsistent. Again this insight is far from new and a par-
ticularly nice illustration has been given by David Hume (1826):  
Even if designing public policy for homo economicus is a perfectly legitimate political choice, it is 
important to understand that it comes at a cost. Chapters 2 and 7 of this thesis have shown that 
there are many cases where laws that are tailor-made for homo economicus cause a collateral 
damage on homo politicus by undermining existing moral values and social citizenship. Conse-
quently, this collateral damage leads to an outcome that it suboptimal – an efficiency loss, which 
can be prohibitively high. Note that economic models that rely only on homo economicus are 
not able to assess this efficiency loss – in spite of the fact that efficiency is usually highly empha-
sized in assessing these models. Typically, the attractiveness of several policy tools is only eva-
luated in terms of economic efficiency (in a world of homo economicus), while the efficiency ef-
fects in reality may be fundamentally different. Efficiency calculations that rely only on homo 
economicus may still serve as important baseline cases, but we should be aware that any policy 
recommendations coming from them may be inaccurate, or even harmful.  
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the 
several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other 
end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make 
him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, cooperate to public good […]. It is, therefore, a just 
political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat 
strange, that a maxim should be true in politics which is false in fact. 
 To sum up, the main challenge for policy makers is to design policies that are fair and 
successfully restrict homo economicus in her incredibly high plasticity, while keeping the efficien-
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cy loss coming from alienating homo politicus limited. The challenge for the economic science is 
to build flexible models that can provide valuable advice to achieve this.  
8.4 Modeling assumptions and roads not taken 
The previous sub-section has dealt with the necessity to build models that go beyond the as-
sumption that individuals are only self-regarding and motivated by financial motives. In this sub-
section, I will briefly reflect on several modeling choices that have been made in this thesis, and 
point out several alternatives.  
 In chapter 3 good spirits were assumed to be contagious. This implies that individuals can 
be convinced at no cost to become cooperators. In theoretical models of cooperation (and Hol-
lywood movies), the good guys always need some form of obstacle to make the story interesting. 
In chapter 3, a strong temptation to defect formed that counter-force. In chapter 4, it was as-
sumed that social sanctions are costly. Again, this assumption was made to make the scientific 
problem more interesting, not so much because of empirical considerations. The cost of sanc-
tions is one of the ingredients in models of cooperation where the bridge to the real-world is not 
very clear. While severe penalties or excluding individuals may bear some costs, simply disap-
proving of someone’s behavior seems to be very cheap and effective (Masclet et al., 2003). Some 
studies even show that sanctioning someone is making us feel good (de Quervain et al., 2004). 
This seems to be even more the case if social sanctions are based on “sweet revenge” (Knutson, 
2004), or if someone, who sanctions a bad guy is rewarded, esteemed, or cherished by other indi-
viduals (Kendal et al., 2006). On the other hand, anecdotal evidence abounds where sanctioning 
is rather stressful, and hence costly, especially if the other person retaliates. 
 From a theoretical perspective, costly punishment is a puzzle in itself, as it classifies as a 
(second-order) public good. Cooperative individuals who do not discipline their peers are better 
off than individuals who cooperate and sanction defectors. Additionally, Dreber et al. (2008) have 
pointed out that punishment may escalate conflicts, rather than moderate them. As a result, the 
possibility to punish may actually lower average payoff. Chapter 4 touches upon this issue, by 
finding that a sanctioning mechanism evolves towards the social optimum if time lags are such 
that individuals adjust their behavior quickly. This mechanism therefore can solve the second-
order free rider problem, and shows that sanctioning can be socially optimal after all.  
 In the models used in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis, spatial aspects are neglected. Agents 
interact with each other at random, which is most likely not met in practice. Allowing for a spatial 
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dimension usually favors cooperation, because cooperative clusters can emerge (Noailly et al., 
2007; Nowak, 2006, Ch. 9). Therefore, making models spatially explicit typically helps coopera-
tion a hand. It would be very interesting to investigate how spatial aspects influence norms of 
cooperation. Chapter 4 has shown that it is important for the community to be able to monitor 
each other. An interesting question would be to investigate how social control is affected by spa-
tial considerations. Are social norms of cooperation likely to evolve if everyone knows more or 
less what all other community members are doing? Or is it better if each individual knows exactly 
what the neighbors are doing, while having no idea what individuals living three streets away do? 
These spatial considerations are very exciting, but unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In the last sub-section it was explained why it is important not to restrict models to the 
stereotype of homo economicus. In chapter 4 an enforcement mechanism evolves through a 
sanctioning preference. Several scholars have suggested that it may be better to model moral con-
sideration not as moral preferences, but as moral constraints; see for example Baland and Plat-
teau (1996). While preferences and constraints are of course different sides of the same coin, the 
implications could be very different. Thinking about moral values as constraints is intriguing, as it 
may explain why some individuals are unwilling to update – and hence tighten – their moral con-
straint by ignoring, rejecting or denying information about, for example, climate change. A formal 
model along these lines has been developed by Rabin (1995). An interesting avenue would be  to 
see how these findings correspond to approaches that rely on preferences, such as chapter 4 or 
Bowles and Hwang (2008). This may have implications when it comes to, for example, crowding-
out – as discussed in chapter 2.   
 
8.5 Fisheries  
Chapter 7 has sketched a gloomy picture of the global fisheries, characterized by declining fish 
stocks, overcapacity of fishing fleets, and consequently low profits. These depressing results have 
laid bare the failure and limits of current management practices – and questions also the underly-
ing scientific work. Fisheries economics absorbs a large part of the intellectual effort in the field 
of resource economics, while the practical relevance of this work is negligible (Wilen, 2000). In 
the previous chapter several ways have been addressed to make management more successful. 
Here, I will reflect on why fisheries management is yet so difficult. Often it is argued that political 
roadblocks are the main reason why current fisheries management is not successful; see for in-
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stance Heal (2007). Indeed, political objectives and constraints are much higher in fisheries than 
in other parts of environmental policy. This is especially problematic if these objectives are not 
clearly defined. But according to James Wilen (2006), political limitations are not the only reason 
why fisheries management failed. Wilen (2006) argues that scientific advice often overlooks that 
excessive fishing mortality is as symptom, rather than the root of a problem and the key message 
should therefore be to get the institutions right, rather than fighting the symptom of overfishing. 
This point is well made, even though it often makes a lot of sense to fight symptoms if the un-
derlying problem cannot be solved immediately. According to Wilen the solution is the creation 
of property rights and, more specific, the establishment of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). 
In a different paper, Wilen (2000) concludes the resource economists’ “most important policy 
achievement must surely be its influence on ITQs on the agenda as a viable policy instrument. “ 
This thesis has shown many examples, where resource management is very successful without 
relying on private property rights. Additionally, any policy intervention, especially when it relies 
on market mechanism poses a danger of crowding-out stewardships motives. Therefore, Wilen’s 
reasoning that good institutions imply private property rights, which implies individual transferable 
quotas, seems a bit hasty. An ITQ is a powerful tool that may work extremely well in many fishe-
ries, but it has failed and will fail in other cases as well – see chapter 7 of this thesis. The overrid-
ing message coming from that chapter is that magic bullets and panaceas do not exist. Using the 
words of Amaryta Sen (2009)  
[
Admittedly, we all have a fascination for magic bullets and panaceas. Who does not find Weitz-
man’s (2002) conclusion  that “pure ecological uncertainty unambiguously favors fees over quo-
tas.”  much more appealing than Richter’s (2011), who finds that  “policy descriptions that work 
well in one setting may lead to management failure in a different context.“? Nonetheless, it is our 
responsibilities to present solutions that work in practice and not only in stylized economic mod-
els. Models should have the aim to represent empirical phenomena and be useful – not serve aes-
thetical appeal. 
t]here are, however, good evidential reasons to think that none of these grand institutional formulae typically 
deliver what their visionary advocates hope, and that their actual success in generating good social realizations 
is thoroughly contingent on varying social, economic political, and cultural circumstances. 
 David Bromley (2009) goes even further and sketches fisheries economists as a science 
that can be characterized by “chronic conceptual confusion” using incoherent models. Essential-
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ly, Bromley’s point of view is orthogonal to the one taken by Wilen, as Bromley says that fisheries 
economists have not understood the problem and the establishments of an individual fishing qu-
ota (IFQ) should be answered by “comprehensive incredulity”. Bromley further argues – again in 
contrast to Wilen – that a low fishing mortality (through a strict TAC) is the key, while there is no 
necessity to think about ways to maximize economic rents in models of fisheries management. 
The main difference in opinion  between Wilen and Bromley boils down to the question whether 
we should focus on the class I or the class II problem of fisheries – as analyzed in chapter 7. Re-
member that the class I problem refers to an excessive fishing mortality (which could be solved 
by a strict TAC – as suggested by Bromley), while the class II problem refers to wasteful compe-
tition among fishermen (which can be solved with an ITQ – as suggested by Wilen).  While an 
ITQ will improve the efficiency of exploitation, it will not necessarily protect the stock. A strict 
TAC, however,  will preserve the stock, but a situation in which all fishermen make zero profit 
can neither be the aim of fisheries management, nor is it a viable strategy – simply because we 
can do better than that. Economic and biological sustainability must go hand in hand.  
 Furthermore,  fisheries management is more difficult than other parts of public policy 
because of inherent conflicts over objectives (Hilborn, 2007). Even if objectives are clearly de-
fined, they do often not find their way into economic models. One of the key objectives of many 
policy makers is secure and stable employment in the fisheries sector; see for instance Nakken et 
al. (1996). The idea of having employment as an explicit objective – an argument in a social wel-
fare function – must sound very odd to most economists. However, this does not imply that em-
ployment effects of different policies cannot be addressed and assessed. Chapter 5 provided op-
timal policy for a flexible set of political choices, concerning the utilization of the fleet. So there is 
also a responsibility on the scientific side to pay closer attention to the questions policy makers 
have, rather than telling them what we find interesting. There are different opinions on this issue, 
such as the one from Robert Hahn (2000), according to whom 
While I do understand the frustration of many scientists whose well-intended advice is not fol-
lowed on political grounds, this is inherent part of democracy. Elected politicians have the re-
sponsibility and the legitimacy to make policy, while we scientists do not. It is the responsibility 
economists need to get more comfortable with the idea of being lobbyists for efficiency or advocates for policies 
in which they believe. This comfort level is increasing slowly. Moreover, economists are finding ways to institu-
tionalize their power in certain policy settings. 
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of the scientific community to inform and advise policy makers about potential problems and 
suggest solutions by providing tools and instruments for policy makers, rather than  to answer 
inherently political questions based on  own personal beliefs and preferences.  
 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
This discussion has reflected on how analytical evolutionary and agent-based models can remedy 
shortcomings of standard economic models that overemphasize steady state solutions. Further-
more, it is argued that relying only on models that assume individuals to be motivated only by 
material incentives is dangerous when government policy is designed. This does neither mean 
that we should stop using these standard models, nor does it imply that the models that were 
used in this thesis are always better. Scientific work requires diversity in theories, hypotheses, but 
also in models. These different models will provide good grist for empirical mills that help us un-
derstanding which models apply in which situations. With a diversity in models and policy tools 
we are well equipped to stop the current overexploitation of many of our renewable resources. 
But momentum is vital, because currently the transition from depleting to carefully managing 
some of our most valuable assets is not happening fast enough. 
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Summary
 
 
Social-ecological systems are inherently complex. As a consequence, the way humans use and 
manage a natural renewable resource, such as a fish stock, is affected in various ways. First, this 
thesis investigates several mechanisms that can explain the success of self-governance of small 
communities without any government intervention. Second, this thesis identifies several key fac-
tors that make successful community governance more likely, while it identifies other factors – or 
driving forces – that may undermine or jeopardize self-governance. Finally, this thesis looks at 
the case where self-governance is not sufficient to effectively manage a resource, and government 
intervention is needed. This thesis investigates how formal institutions should be designed in the 
light of social and biological complexity. Since human behavior is contingent on the social envi-
ronment, any attempt to change human behavior – as intended by government intervention – 
depends also on the social context. Government policies that fail to take this into account may 
alienate users and crowd out social norms of cooperation, resulting in a wasteful loss of social 
capital or, even worse, lead to a result that is in contrast to what was originally intended. Fur-
thermore, it is immanent that policy descriptions that work well in one setting may lead to man-
agement failure in a different context. The overriding message of this thesis is that understanding 
biological and social complexity is important to achieve any management objectives one has in 
mind. After all, we cannot manage what we do not understand.  
 Chapter 2 links insights from economic experiments to theoretical models of coopera-
tion in order to understand the circumstances under which government intervention may be 
countereffective, as it undermines the motivation to obey rules voluntarily. Main policy lessons 
are that formal institutions work best if they support local social norms in place. If this is not 
possible, legitimacy can be increased by involving users in the process of policy design. While le-
gitimacy is important, an institution that is perceived to be unfair can be even worse. Financial 
incentives, a special class of policy tools, can be problematic for two reasons. First, they are 
framed in a way that they tend to make an appeal to the individual as a self-interested individual, 
rather than as a good citizen. Second, they are addictive – even if individuals respond to the fi-
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nancial incentive as intended, any compliance immediately stops once the financial incentive is 
removed. 
 Chapter 3 addresses the question why social norms of cooperation do not necessarily 
erode gradually, but often suddenly collapse. In our model, socially minded individuals try to 
convince non-cooperators to restrain harvesting effort to obtain a higher profit for everybody – 
cooperation is thus contagious. With rising levels of cooperation, the temptation to defect in-
creases, as the profits from being the one wolf in a herd of sheep are very high. Surprisingly, we 
find that if individuals face some constraints in their economic activities, collapse of a social-
ecological system occurs under various circumstances.  
 Chapter 4 goes one step further and investigates how a moral system of social sanctions 
that may stabilize cooperation evolves over time. We start with a situation where individuals nei-
ther have a certain moral preference, nor have exact information about the nature of the social 
dilemma the community faces. We find that the sanctioning system automatically evolves towards 
the socially optimal level if two conditions are met. First, economic decisions are revised fre-
quently, while the moral preference to sanction peers is very persistent and changes only slowly. 
Second, individuals base their decision whom to punish and reward on own behavior, where own 
behavior is the moral yardstick that separates good from bad behavior.  
 In the second part of the thesis we pay special attention to the design of formal institu-
tions in fisheries. Chapter 5 investigates how Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod could be optimally 
managed for various objectives, including maximizing fleet profits, minimizing the impact of har-
vesting on the marine ecosystem, or having a diverse fleet to maintain the current structure of 
coastal communities. We develop a management plan that allows the regulator to choose the fleet 
structure that maximizes her objectives. For each policy choice we give the optimal total allowa-
ble catch per year, and the corresponding long-run level of remaining biomass. We also give 
management advice in case the fleet cannot be adjusted in the short run and suggest what to do if 
the biomass levels are far from their long-run optimal level. In addition, the management plan 
also allows the regulator to compare the long-run welfare levels between the various management 
options to determine the costs and benefits associated with each.  
 Chapter 6 deals with the possibility that harvesting pressure affects the genetic composi-
tion of Northeast Arctic cod. Fish stocks that experience high fishing mortality show a tendency 
to mature earlier and at a smaller size. Some have suggested that these changes in life history 
traits could affect the fishery’s yield, as fish is evolving towards smaller sizes. Therefore, fisheries-
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induced evolution may have economic repercussions for society. Our model for Northeast Arctic 
cod predicts that fisheries-induced evolution decreases economic yield if fishing mortality rates 
continue at historically high levels. We also find that maximum economic yield is achieved at a 
considerably lower fishing mortality than what the stock has historically experienced. At this low-
er mortality, fisheries-induced evolution is less pronounced and actually increases the economic 
yield. Overall, we find that evolutionary and non-evolutionary models recommend similar har-
vesting rates and the overriding message is that higher economic yield can be obtained at lower 
harvest rates irrespective of whether evolution occurs or not.  
 Chapter 7 shows how regulations in fisheries policy should be designed in the light of 
social and ecological complexities. Analyzing components of a complex adaptive system in isola-
tion is often misleading. The fundamental complexity of the social and natural environment has 
to be fully accounted for if unpleasant surprises are to be avoided. This chapter examines a list of 
general management tools used in real world fisheries, arguing that the success of a given instru-
ment depends not only on its inherent properties but also on the way these instruments are ad-
ministered.  
 Chapter 8 provides a general discussion that critically reflects on the methods used in 
this thesis and puts them into perspective. We should use models that give us correct answers to 
questions we ask. Models that look good on paper, but have little relevance in reality, tend to be 
bad advisors. This message is even more important when dealing with natural resources that are 
endangered, threatened, or under pressure. After all, we cannot protect what we do not under-
stand.  
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Samenvatting
 
Sociaal-ecologische systemen zijn intrinsiek complex. Als gevolg van deze complexiteit zijn er 
verschillende mechanismen die het menselijk gebruik en beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
zoals een visbestand, beïnvloeden. Dit proefschrift tracht de vraag te beantwoorden welke 
factoren of omstandigheden ertoe leiden dat kleine gemeenschappen natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
succesvol kunnen beheren – zonder ingrijpen van de overheid. Een aantal belangrijke factoren 
wordt geïdentificeerd, die succesvol zelfbestuur faciliteren of juist ondermijnen. Ook wordt 
onderzocht hoe een overheid moet ingrijpen als zelfbestuur niet voldoende is om een hulpbron 
effectief te beheren. Dit proefschrift kijkt specifiek naar de vraag in hoeverre formele instituties 
rekening moeten houden met de aanwezigheid van sociale en biologische complexiteit. Aangezien 
menselijk gedrag afhankelijk is van de natuurlijke en sociale omgeving, zal elke poging om 
menselijk gedrag te veranderen – bijvoorbeeld door een overheidsingreep – beïnvloed worden 
door de sociale context – en op zijn beurt kan het gedrag deze context weer veranderen. 
Overheidsmaatregelen die hiermee geen rekening houden, kunnen gebruikers vervreemden en 
positieve normen en waarden zoals de neiging tot samenwerking, teniet doen. Dit kan leiden tot 
een verlies van sociaal kapitaal of – nog erger – tot een resultaat dat haaks staat op wat 
oorspronkelijk de intentie van de overheidsingreep was. Bovendien is het duidelijk dat beleid dat 
goed in een bepaalde situatie werkt in een andere context kan falen. De belangrijkste conclusie 
van dit proefschrift is dan ook dat het noodzakelijk is biologische en sociale complexiteit te 
begrijpen om management doelstellingen te realiseren. We kunnen immers niet besturen wat we 
niet begrijpen. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 gebruikt inzichten uit economische experimenten en theoretische modellen 
over de evolutie van coöperatie om de omstandigheden te begrijpen waaronder ingrepen van de 
overheid averechts blijken te werken omdat de motivatie om vrijwillig regels te volgen 
ondermijnd wordt. De voornaamste boodschap voor beleidsmakers is dat overheidsregels het 
beste werken als ze ondersteuning vinden van bestaande normen en waarden. Indien dit niet 
mogelijk is, kan legitimiteit verhoogd worden door gebruikers te betrekken bij het maken van 
beleid. Ontbrekende legitimiteit van een overheidsingreep kan ongunstige consequenties hebben, 
maar regels die als oneerlijk ervaren worden zijn wellicht nog erger. Financiële prikkels als 
beleidsinstrument zijn problematisch om twee redenen. Ten eerste hebben ze de neiging om 
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iemand als egoïstisch individu aan te spreken en niet zo zeer als gecommitteerde 
verantwoordelijke burger. Ten tweede zijn ze “verslavend” – zelfs als individuen zoals bedoeld 
reageren op de financiële prikkel, zal dit gedrag onmiddellijk stoppen zodra de financiële prikkel 
vervalt. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de vraag waarom sociale normen niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
langzaam en geleidelijk veranderen maar vaak plotseling instorten. Een model wordt ontwikkeld 
waarin coöperatieve individuen proberen egoïstische individuen ervan te overtuigen om minder 
te gaan oogsten om zo een hogere winst voor iedereen te realiseren. Samenwerking is dus 
besmettelijk. Als meer mensen samenwerken, stijgt echter de verleiding om egoïstisch te zijn. Het 
is natuurlijk voordelig de enige wolf in een kudde schapen te zijn. Verrassend genoeg vind ik dat 
het systeem plotseling kan kantelen als individuen niet ongelimiteerd kunnen oogsten, door 
bijvoorbeeld maar beperkt tijd te hebben. Verschillende omstandigheden zoals instroom van 
nieuwe mensen kunnen er dan toe leiden dat coöperatie maar ook de omvang van de hulpbron 
plotseling ineen kan storten.  
 Hoofdstuk 4 gaat een stap verder en kijkt hoe sociale sancties zoals waardering of 
afkeuring van bepaald gedrag een coöperatieve houding kunnen ondersteunen en stabiliseren. 
Verder wordt geanalyseerd hoe deze sancties ontstaan en hoe ze in de loop der tijd veranderen. 
We beginnen met een situatie waarin mensen geen bepaalde morele voorkeur hebben en ook niet 
weten welk gedrag het beste zou kunnen zijn voor de maatschappij, en komen tot de conclusie 
dat het morele systeem automatisch streeft naar het sociaal-optimale niveau als aan twee 
voorwaarden wordt voldaan. Ten eerste worden economische beslissingen vaak herzien, terwijl 
morele waarden en normen slechts langzaam veranderen. Ten tweede baseren mensen hun 
sanctie beslissing op eigen gedrag, waarbij het eigen gedrag de morele maatstaf is die goed van 
slecht gedrag scheidt. 
 In het tweede deel van het proefschrift besteed ik bijzondere aandacht aan het ontwerpen 
van formele instituties in de visserij. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt hoe “Northeast Arctic (NEA) 
Cod” – kabeljauw die vooral in de Barentszzee voorkomt – optimaal kan worden beheerd onder 
drie verschillende doelstellingen: pure winstmaximalisatie, winstmaximalisatie onder de 
voorwaarde dat geen boten gebruikt worden die averechtse effecten op het ecosysteem hebben, 
en onder de voorwaarde dat om culturele redenen een diverse vloot wordt gebruikt. We 
ontwikkelen een beleidsplan dat de toezichthouder op iedere vlootstructuur kan toepassen die 
haar doelstellingen maximaliseert. Voor elke doelstelling geven we de optimale totale 
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vangsthoeveelheid (“total allowable catch”) en de bijbehorende biomassa op lange termijn. 
Bovendien geven we een beleidsadvies voor situaties waarin de boten van een vloot niet op korte 
termijn aangepast kunnen worden of waarin de biomassa ver van het lange termijn optimum 
verwijderd ligt. Onze analyse maakt het tevens mogelijk om kosten en baten van verschillende 
opties met elkaar te vergelijken. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de mogelijkheid dat visserij onomkeerbare evolutie veroorzaakt 
doordat de genetische samenstelling van NEA kabeljauw wordt beïnvloed. Vissoorten die een 
bijzondere hoge visserijdruk ervaren tonen een neiging om op jongere leeftijd en kleinere lengte 
volwassen te worden – wat ten koste van de lichaamsgroei kan gaan. Deze veranderingen zouden 
de productiviteit en dus het rendement van de visserij kunnen beïnvloeden. Daarom kan visserij-
geïnduceerde evolutie economische gevolgen hebben voor de samenleving. Ons model voor 
NEA kabeljauw voorspelt dat de visserij-geïnduceerde evolutie het rendement in de visserij 
verlagen als de visserijdruk zo hoog blijft als in het verleden. Als er minder vis gevangen wordt, is 
het effect van visserij-geïnduceerde evolutie zwakker en kan de economische opbrengst zelfs 
stijgen. Wij vinden dan ook dat de maximale economische opbrengst wordt bereikt als de 
visserijdruk aanzienlijk lager is dan in het verleden. Verder vinden we dat evolutionaire en niet-
evolutionaire modellen over het algemeen vergelijkbare vangststrategieën aanbevelen. De kern 
van de boodschap is dat lagere vangsthoeveelheden tot hogere economische opbrengst leiden – 
ongeacht of evolutionaire verandering optreedt of niet. 
Hoofdstuk 7 bekijkt hoe regelgeving in het visserijbeleid rekening moet houden met sociale en 
ecologische complexiteit. Het analyseren van enkele componenten van een complex adaptief 
systeem is vaak misleidend omdat het daadwerkelijke gedrag bepaald wordt door interacties met 
andere componenten, en dus het hele systeem. We moeten rekening houden met de 
fundamentele complexiteit van de sociale en natuurlijke omgeving om onaangename verrassingen 
te vermijden. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt welke concrete beleidsinstrumenten in de visserij 
beschikbaar zijn en welke voordelen en nadelen deze hebben. Wij constateren dat het succes van 
bepaalde instrumenten niet alleen afhangt van de inherente eigenschappen, maar ook van de 
manier waarop deze instrumenten worden toegepast. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bediscussieert kritisch de gebruikte methoden van dit proefschrift en vergelijkt ze 
met de aanwezige literatuur. Het is belangrijk om modellen te gebruiken die juiste antwoorden 
geven op de vragen die we stellen. Elegante modellen die niet toe te passen zijn op werkelijk 
problemen zien er wellicht leuk uit, maar zijn over het algemeen een wankele basis voor 
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beleidsadvies. Dit is des te belangrijker wanneer het gaat om natuurlijke hulpbronnen die 
bedreigd worden. We kunnen immers niet beschermen wat we niet doorgronden.  
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January 2011, Cafeteria of the Georg Sverdrups hus, University of Oslo, Norway
 
Excuse me, can I sit down here? Or is this place taken? Thanks, very kind, why is it so incredibly 
busy here? Yes, I think you are right, all students came back from holiday and now everyone 
meets up for a coffee. I must say, the coffee is fantastic here, much better than the one that we 
have in the Netherlands. Have you ever been in Holland? Yes, I agree, Amsterdam is a fascinat-
ing city. I was living in Wageningen – 
 My arrival in Wageningen feels like such a long time ago. But I still remember when I 
showed up at my department for the first time 
it is a small town in the middle of the country. I did my 
PhD there, but now it is finished and I am continuing my research here in Oslo. Oh, you are also 
thinking about doing a PhD? Well, doing a PhD can be fantastic, but at the same time I have to 
warn you. I mean, as a PhD student you are extremely vulnerable. I have seen incredibly smart 
PhD students struggling and suffering, simply because they were at the wrong place at the wrong 
time. But fortunately I was very lucky. Above all, I had great supervisors. My daily supervisor Jo-
han always found the right balance between letting me explore my own opportunities and making 
sure that I did not get lost. Johan always put me back on the ground when I came to the office 
wearing shades, because I thought my future was so bright, but he also built me up when I was 
on my knees, crawling on the Boulevard of broken dreams. And then it is of course only thanks 
to my second supervisor Daan that I was working on such a cool project in the first place. Daan 
is an excellent economist and it was really fun to work with him. I hope to continue working with 
him in the future. Also the other project members have helped making this project such a suc-
cess. It was great to have Jan as a fellow PhD student on my side to share experiences and ideas. 
Also Jana’s input was very useful in putting the project on the right track. And I guess all of this 
would not have happened if I had not enrolled in this resource economics course that Erwin was 
teaching when I was a Master student. Thanks to him I discovered that doing research on the 
interface of natural resources and institutions can be extremely exciting.  
– I was kind of scared, well basically I was a little 
boy. Marjolein helped me getting started, and sharing one office with her was so much fun! I am 
also thankful to Jaap, who has been a very supportive group leader and cared a lot about us PhD 
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students. I also enjoyed being together with my fellow PhD students at Biometris, Maaike, San-
tosh, Apri, Yiannis, Sabine, Tahira, and Robert. Thanks to Patricia, Elisa, Sanne, Simon, Evert-
Jan, Martin, Maarten, Onno Lia, but also all others colleagues, Biometris was a very nice working 
environment. Well, life in Wageningen is a bit on the quiet side, but I always enjoyed living there, 
also because of all the friends that I had. I also had a good start, living in a house with cool 
people. I had a fantastic time together with Herman, Sofieke, Renskita Coen, Ben, JJ, Maya, but 
also all others who have been there. I became close friends with one of my housemates, Maartje, 
with whom I lived later at a different place where we always had Sushi competitions. I have never 
admitted this to her, but her Sushi were so much better than mine. Always! It was also a lot of 
fun to have Tanya in that house towards the end of my PhD. Here 
 Why I ended up in Oslo? Well, basically we have got to blame Mia for all this. She con-
vinced me to come here for a summer to work on the cod and then I fell in love with Norway. 
Mia is a great biologist and it is fantastic to work with her. She can be my wingman anytime! And 
she also became a wonderful friend. It has also been a pleasure to work with Nils-Christian – I 
think we have only scratched the surface so far and I am looking forward to see how far we can 
get! It was also great that Kjell-Arne, Karine and Ragnhild gave me a helping hand to find my 
way among the economists in Oslo. I guess working at CEES was also such a nice experience 
because all my colleagues and friends there were so nice and kind! First of all Jan, with whom I 
discovered that it can be extremely dangerous to open a semi-frozen bottle of Pepsi Max. Did 
you know that it explodes? Yes I know, everyone is talking about these Mintos, but what we ex-
perienced was much more dangerous! It was also great to have Florian around at CEES, my fel-
low-economist among all these bird-huggers and tree-watchers. I also found some very good 
friends in Oslo. It was “grisebra” to live with Anette, she is incredibly funny, and such a good 
in Oslo I will definitely miss 
my good friend Vasilis, with whom I often discussed the challenges and opportunities both of us 
were facing in the Netherlands and abroad. I was also very happy that my friend Kristina moved 
from Ijmuiden to Wageningen – it was very good to have her around! I will also miss the lunches 
and conversations with Marleen. I always enjoyed hanging out with my friends from the aquatic 
ecology group, Andrea, Nika, Darya and Mascha, who always accepted me, even though I was as 
an economist a bit of an invasive species. And often I had a fantastic time with my good friends 
Lucie and Marion. If all else fails, I have the backup-plan to open a bar with Marion in Wagenin-
gen. We want to call it “Bayesian Lounge”. And I am incredibly happy that I met Judith. She is 
just awesome. I wish she was here now! 
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musician! You should check out her website: www.anetteaskvik.com. And I will never forget the 
nights out in Grünerløkka with Silje! Together we were setting the city on fire many times and 
dancing (almost) like stars. I also enjoyed the evenings with Svenn in Kafé Tamara – and of 
course the dinners and conversations with 
 Did I mention that the coffee tastes really good here? Have you ever been in Vienna? The 
coffeehouses there are just marvelous! I spent quite some time there while I was at IIASA, a re-
search institute, where I did parts of my PhD. Thanks to Ulf I had the possibility to visit IIASA 
many times. At IIASA, it was very good that Åke helped me using Adaptive Dynamics. I also en-
joyed all stimulating discussions with Karl around the evolution of cooperation. It all started 
when I visited the Summer Program for Young Scientists. It was a fantastic summer, also thanks 
to all the time I spent with Dolly, Heidi, Thomas, Michiel, Neala, Gergely, Fabian, Simona, Di-
etmar, Marta, Tyler, Carolyn, Miyuki, and Vivek. When I came back to IIASA after that summer 
I was always looking forward to see my friends Bartek, Varia, Fiona, Davnah, and Jacob. And you 
know what the best thing is? One of my dearest friends in Vienna, Barbara, has also moved to 
Oslo. It is “leiwand” to have her here in my cercle d’amis! Just before I finished my PhD I spent 
an unforgettable summer with Thomas and Lauren in Burlington. I hope to see them back very 
soon, maybe in Oslo even. I still have not visited Alex in Sydney, but one day I will! Alex is one 
of my oldest friends, and he also made the great pictures on the cover of my thesis. 
Håkon! Thanks to all my friends here in Oslo, this is 
not just a place where I work now, but it feels already a little bit like my home.  
But you know what the disadvantage is? While doing my PhD I met so many great people 
and found so many new friends, but sometimes I really miss my family and my old friends. They 
are so important to me, but I spend so little time with them. Without their support I could never 
have written my thesis. Sometimes I wish all of them would live in the same city as I do. Then I 
could visit them without travelling all day, or I would give a birthday party and everyone would 
just come. Sorry for telling you all this! I got a bit carried away. Thanks, it is nice of you to say 
that you enjoyed the story. You wonder whether I wish I had done anything differently? No, not 
really. If I look back, all my decisions made a lot sense in the particular context they were made. 
No, that does not mean that all of my choices were good. Not at all! If I could start again, I 
would do a million things differently. Basically I would do everything differently. But let’s not 
worry! It’ too late now, it will always be too late, fortunately.  
 
Det vil helst gå godt. (Max Manus) 
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